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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite billions spent on scientific experimentation, such as the Large Hadron Collider at 
CERN, modem physics remains largely built upon the theoretical basis worked out by Albert Ein-
stein's "thought experiments." It occurs to Appellant that a simple thought experiment, if the 
members of this Court wish to engage in it, may do more than any argument that Appellant can 
make to elucidate why Appellant's challenge to IDAPA 17.02.08.033 is necessary, not only be-
cause of the regulation's constitutional and statutory authority deficits, but as a practical matter 
because it fails to provide clear standards for what attorneys fee arrangements are acceptable and 
when approval of attorneys fees is required, never mind the "clearly articulated evidentiary stan-
dards" that must be used at a hearing. Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138 
(1993). Engaging in this experiment will likely shed light on why even the Commission begs for 
"guidance" in the conclusion to its brief on appeal: 
You are lawyer attempting to decide whether or not to accept a workers compensation 
case, how to structure your fee agreement, and whether to limit the scope of your represen-
tation and if so how. Referring to the graphic at Appendix LIV, "What Attorney Fee Ar-
rangements Are Allowed In A Workers Compensation Case and When Must You Seek Ap-
proval?" and IDAPA 17.02.08.033 what are your options, and when must you seek ap-
proval of an attorney fee? 
The Respondent Commission's brief relies primarily upon this Court's decision in Rhodes 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 125 Idaho 139, 142,868 P.2d 467, 470 (1993), without explicitly addressing 
the issues raised by Appellant regarding his First Amendment challenge to IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.01 (see Appellant's Opening Briefat p. 11-12,20-22,39) nor the constraint on the 
Commission's statutory authority to limit the measure or mode of attorney's fees in view ofLC. § 
3-205 (see Appellant's Opening Briefat p. 8-11, 15-17). The precedential import of Rhodes and 
the application of the doctrine of stare decisis to its holdings are matters that deserve this Court's 
close scrutiny in light of the fact that Rhodes did not consider the statutory authority and constitu-
tional implications ofIdaho Code § 3-205. Furthermore, Rhodes employed the wrong standard of 
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review, and disregarded the constitutional principals announced in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 
864 P.2d 132, (1993). The unfolding realities of the Commission's interpretation and application 
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 that superseded the regulation under consideration in Rhodes, the dif-
ferences between the two, and considerations of judicial policy discussed in Curr, raise serious 
questions concerning 1) the applicability of Rhodes to the issues raised in this appeal with respect 
to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01,2) whether this Court would decide Rhodes the same today if the 
proper legal standard were applied to the identical issues considered in Rhodes, and 3) whether 
Rhodes can be read to even address the primary issues raised by this appeal. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellant raises no challenge to the Commission's exercise 
of discretion, the Commission's brief revisits its reasons for concluding that the Claimants' per-
manent impairment benefits are not "available funds" recovered "primarily or substantially" as a 
result of Appellant's efforts. As discussed below, that much was conceded to the attorney's fees 
hearings in each of the consolidated cases or thereafter. The Commission's own observations re-
garding the problems presented by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, its call to this Court for "guidance," 
and the testimony in the record regarding the shifting interpretations by the Commission of what 
constitutes "available funds" subject to a "charging lien" 1 demonstrate the need for this appeal and 
for this Court's exercise of its exclusive right to regulate the practice oflaw. See, also, table "The 
Commission's Directly Conflicting Interpretations ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01" at Appendix LUI. 
Furthermore, it is by no means clear when attorneys fees must be approved other than in connec-
tion with lump sum agreements, and it is not clear whether non-contingent arrangements are al-
1 Respondent's representation that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 continues to be interpreted as in the past and as its past 
regulations, policies and practices have been applied is inaccurate.There is testimony in the record cited infra that the 
Commission's present interpretation of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is inconsistent with the interpretation it has been given 
in the cases before this Court. For an illustrative example that in the past simply showing that requesting an impair-
ment rating that was ultimately paid without dispute was enough to satisfy the "available funds" and "new money" stan-
dards of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, see the correspondence between the Commission staff and Seiniger Law Offices, 
PA and the order approving the lump sum agreement included in the Appendix at XXX. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
-2-
lowed. See, graphic "What Attorneys Fees Arrangements Are Allowed And When Is Approval Re-
quired?" at Appendix LIV. 
II. I.e. § 3-205 REMAINS THE ApPROPRIATE BASIS UPON WHICH To DECIDE THIS CASE 
The Commission does not tackle directly Appellant's threshold issue, the lack of statutory 
authority for its regulation given the plain meaning ofI.C. § 3-205.2 It is important to reflect 
upon the fact that I.C. § 3-205, passed by the Idaho Territory before the adoption ofIdaho's con-
stitution, is the starting place to understand the constitutional rights attendant to practice the pro-
fession of law in Idaho. "Rights guaranteed by our constitution are those specifically enumerated 
therein or which existed at common law or by statute at the time our constitution was adopted. 
Vol. 1 Idaho Constitutional Debates, 230-1, 257;" [Remaining citations omitted.] Craig v. Lane, 
60 Idaho 178, 89 P.2d 1008, 1009 (1939). Rights guaranteed by the Idaho constitution are the 
rights as there were known in the Idaho Territory at the time Idaho's constitution was written and 
2 Interestingly the current attack on the rights of individuals to pay attorneys is in some ways analogous to the laws 
against champerty that spurred the passage of statutes such as I.C. § 3-205. 
"The English common law and statutes against maintenance and champerty had their origin, if not their necessity, 
in a different state of society from that which prevails at the present time. When the doctrine was established, lords 
and other large landholders were accustomed to buy up contested claims against each other, or against common-
ers with whom they were at variance, in order to harass and oppose those in possession. On the other hand, 
commoners, by way of self-defense, thinking that they had title to lands, would convey part of their interest to some 
powerful lord, in order, through his influence, to secure their pretended right. The want of sufficient written convey-
ances, and records of titles, and the feudal relation of villein and liege lord, afforded facilities for the combinations 
and oppressions which followed this state of things. The power of the nobles became mighty in corrupting the 
fountains of justice. To remedy these evils the law against both maintenance and champerty was introduced." It is 
held in Courtright v. Burnes, 3 McCrary, 60,13 Fed. 317: "The tendency in the courts of the United States is 
strongly in the direction of relaxing the stringency of the doctrine of the common law concerning champerty and 
maintenance, so as to permit greater liberty of contracting between attorney and client than was formerly allowed, 
and this for the reason that the peculiar condition of society which gave rise to the doctrine has in a great measure 
passed away. In some of the states the common-law doctrine is altogether repudiated, and it is held that no such 
contract is now invalid unless it contravenes some existing statute of the state. Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; 
Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580; Richardson v. Roland, 40 Conn. 565; Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Hoffman v. 
Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564; Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 609." Croco v. Oregon Short-Line R. Co., 18 Utah 311,54 P. 985, 987 
(1898). See, also, Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 77 P. 390, (1904) "If, however, the doctrine of champerty ever 
was in force in this state, then, as far as it relates to the mode of compensation between attorney and client, it 
must have been repealed by our statute as found in section 5165, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., which is as fol-
lows: The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors shall be left to the agreement. ex-
press or implied, of the parties. * * *, There is nothing in the above statute which prevents the making of the con-
tract set out above, but the parties were left to make such contract as to the compensation of the attorney, if they 
saw fit to do so." 
Smits v. Hogan, 35 Wash. 290, 294,77 P. 390, 391 (1904). (Emphasis supplied.) 
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adopted. State v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 61 (1941) citing Craig. Courts must be 
guided by the overriding public interest in the preservation of the freedom of contract. Marshall v. 
Covington, 81 Idaho 199,206,339 P.2d 504,508 (1959); Shakey's Inc. v. Martin, 91 Idaho 758, 
765,430 P.2d 504, 511 (1967). With few exceptions, the United States Supreme Court has ac-
tively and consistently encouraged an open market, striking down restrictions that inhibit informed 
negotiation for legal services. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) 
(minimum fee schedules); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on attorney ad-
vertising); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm 'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (restric-
tions on attorney commercial speech). The express language ofI.C. § 3-205 reserving the meas-
ure and mode of compensation to the attorney and client is unambiguous, and is clearly in conflict 
with any gloss on the Workers Compensation Act granting to the Commission the right to limit the 
measure and mode of compensation. Longstanding precedent favors resolution of this case upon 
the basis of the correct interpretation of I.e. § 3-205 and the obvious lack of statutory authority for 
regulations limiting the measure and mode of compensation between an attorney and his client: 
In accordance with the view, early and deeply imbedded in American constitutional law, that 
declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional is the gravest and most delicate duty the 
Court can be called upon to perform, the Supreme Court has followed a policy of strict neces-
sity in considering constitutional questions. Thus, the Court has developed a group of self-
imposed limitations by which it avoids passing upon constitutional issues in cases confessedly 
within its jurisdiction. In the classic formulation by Mr. Justice Brandeis, the seventh and last 
of these rules is: "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if 
a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided. (Citations omitted.) 
Supreme Court Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 
633 (1953). [Footnotes omitted.] 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 conflicts with Idaho Code § 3-205, notwithstanding the Commis-
sion's reading of Rhodes to permit the limitation of attorney's fees to contingent fees on "dis-
puted" benefits giving rise to a "charging lien" under IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a). Rhodes neither 
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considered the conflict between the regulation it considered with Idaho Code § 3-205, nor the con-
flict between Idaho Code § 3-205 and the Commission's interpretation of its authority under Idaho 
Code § 72-803; conflicts that render the provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 limiting the meas-
ure and mode of compensation as between attorneys and clients beyond the statutory authority of 
the Idaho Industrial Commission. Read correctly, Idaho Code § 72-803 is a grant of power to 
Idaho Industrial Commission's to "approve" attorneys fees that must be exercised by providing 
notice and an opportunity to be heard based upon articulated standards as required by Curro The 
regulation in Rhodes, promulgated pursuant to the statutory authority contained in I.C. § 72-508 
satisfied due process by providing for notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of attor-
ney's fees, but the standards that it announced conflicted with the rights vouched safe by the fed-
eral and Idaho constitutions as articulated Curro Curr teaches that whatever standards the Com-
mission may adopt to satisfy due process, they must be limited or at least not conflict with the 
constitutional rights of workers compensation attorneys. By flatly stating that attorney's fees can-
not be limited to "new money," Curr implies that such standards are equitable in nature ("reason-
ableness factors" to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee) as articu-
lated by this Court in its cases and in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5. So read, there is no 
conflict between Idaho Code § 3-205 and Idaho Code § 72-803. The application of the equitable 
reasonableness factors announced by this Court and/or the standards which attorneys are already 
bound to observe contained in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, do not restrain by law the 
"measure and mode" of compensation agreed to by the attorney and client. However, as the 
Commission interprets its power under Code § 72-803, the simple act of the legislature authorizing 
any government agency to approve attorneys fees would permit each agency to promulgate its own 
criteria for attorneys fees without regard to this Court's rules and cases regulating the practice of 
law in so far as attorney fees are concerned for whatever political ends are deemed expedient, irre-
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spective of whether or not they conflict with important principals articulated by this Court on the 
practice of law, access to justice, and availability of counsel. This Court has addressed the impor-
tance of this principal unequivocally: 
If attorneys are denied fees for work prosecuted on behalf of an injured workman, there would 
be a chilling effect upon the ability of an injured party to obtain adequate representation. 
Through their insurance companies, employers regularly obtain exceptional and well-qualified 
counsel to defend them in such cases. It is imperative that courts foster and protect the ability 
of an injured workman to obtain counsel of his choice. We must avoid a policy or a practice 
which would discourage [such] representation .... [Citations omitted.] 
Hogaboom v. Econ. Mattress, 107 Idaho 13,684 P.2d 990 (1984). 
Requiring the Idaho Industrial Commission to observe the constraints on its exercise of 
power imposed by Idaho Code § 3-205 does not diminish its ability to only approve attorney's 
fees that are "reasonable." The Commission might well have reached the same results that it 
reached in all three cases on appeal under an appropriate regulation in the exercise of its discre-
tion. In regulating the practice oflaw, this Court has adopted I.R.P.C. 1.5 regarding attorney's 
fees and has articulated equitable principles to be applied by Idaho's courts and governmental 
agencies in approving attorney fee agreements and awarding attorney's fees. The current regula-
tion already references I.R.P.C. 1.5. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(d)(i and ii) already contains pre-
sumptions limiting attorney's fees to 25% in a case in which no hearing has been held or 30% in a 
case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted. These presumptions do not offend 
either Idaho Code § 3-205 or the Idaho or United States constitutions? Because such a regulation 
would do no more than apply factors that this Court has already announced are to be applied in 
determining the "reasonableness" ofattorney's fees, it would not conflict with this Court's exclu-
sive jurisdiction in regulating the practice of law. Though the results reached by the Commission 
in applying such a regulation might well be unfair, they would not be subject to attack on grounds 
3 The same cannot be said of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (d)(iii) limiting compensation paid for total permanent disability to 
fifteen percent (15%) of such disability compensation after ten (10) years from the date that such total permanent 
disability payments commenced. This section of the regulation directly conflicts with Idaho Code § 3-205. 
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of a lack of statutory authority or unconstitutionality. 
However, this is a distinction not without a difference, because the Commission presents 
itself to this Court in the confused posture of 1) being faced with a regulation that it did not pass 
but feels compelled to apply, 2) recognizing the injustice of being unable to compensate attorneys 
for "valuable services" provided to workers compensation claimants, and 3) needing to ask this 
Court for "guidance" (in essence an advisory opinion) in applying IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS' INTERPRETATIONS OF IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 VARY ON 
A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, AND CONFLICT WITH THE POSITION THAT THE COMMISSION HAs 
TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL 
1. The Commission Applies and Interprets IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 Arbi-
trarily Depending Upon The Result It Wants To Reach 
The Commission's Position In Its Decision In Kulm Below 
In discussing the meaning ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(a) in the decision in Kulm on appeal, 
the Commission supports it interpretation of "available funds" by citing this Court's opinion in 
Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685,963 P.2d 368 (1998): 
"This testimony is also significant because it supports a conclusion that however the PPI rating 
came into existence, the rating and amount of the award were never disputed. According to 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and OLe, "undisputed funds cannot be used to satisfY claims for at-
torney's fees." 
Therefore, the Court's opinion suggests that even if claimant's entitlement to nondisputed 
funds arose after the retention of counsel, such funds cannot constitute "available funds" for 
purposes of the attorney fee calculation. 
RA at 221. In Kulm, the Commission also held that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c contains a further 
restriction on attorney's fees by virtue of its definition of "charging lien": 
"Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that 
the services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of 
which the attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.)". This is but one of 
five requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against 
"available funds". As important is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive. 
Per the language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging 
lien can be said to exist. 
RA at. 222-223. Emphasis supplied. As demonstrated infra, this is not the interpretation that the 
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Commission has consistently given to its attorney fee regulation in general, or IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.0I.c in particular in every case. 
In providing an example of how the Commission contended it would apply this regulation in a 
case where an attorney writes a letter requesting an impairment rating for claimant as soon as the 
claimant is medically stable, and the doctor issues the impairment rating in response to the attorney's 
request, the Commission argues that though the attorney's efforts may be ''primarily responsible for 
securing the impairment rating," they would probably not be "sufficient to demonstrate that his 
actions "substantially" secured the PPI award" since the claimant "was going to be entitled to 
some type of an impairment rating. There was no evidence that surety contested the rating eventu-
ally given by the treating physician." AR 222-223. Of course, the difference between being "enti-
tled to some type of an impairment rating" and getting it awarded and paid is all the difference in 
the world, as the testimony of Alan Hull implies. See, infra at 35. 
The Commission's Position On Appeal 
In its Brief on appeal, the Commission takes the position that: 
" ... the term "available funds" does encompass those non-disputed benefits, claimant's enti-
tlement to which did not arise until after the retention of counsel. The "available funds" which 
are subject to the attorney's charging lien are further constrained by the provisions ofIDAPA 
17.02.08.033.0I.c (Appendix, Document #10, p. 2). The attorney must show, inter alia, that his 
services operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund from which the attorney seeks 
to be paid." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. Emphasis supplied. 
Indeed, in its briefing on appeal, the Commission states: "The net effect of these new regula-
tory provisions is to continue to ensure that the attorney fees approved in workers' compensa-
tion cases can only be taken from funds which the attorney's efforts "directly succeeded in ob-
taining on (his) client's behalf" 
Intervener - Respondent's Brief at 20. Emphasis supplied. The Commission appears to acknowl-
edge that Appellant performed valuable services, but that he is not entitled to be compensated for 
those services from the Claimants' PPI benefits because he did not obtain those. 
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The Commission Has Ruled Directly Contrary To Its Position On Appeal 
Appellant has included in the Appendix to this brief the Commission's unpublished deci-
sion in Rodriguez v. SEDS Corporation and State Insurance Fund, I.C. Case No. 2006-503175. 
That decision demonstrates the Commission's shifting and arbitrary interpretation and application 
ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01. In Rodriguez, Claimant's attorney Breck Barton was awarded attor-
neys fees out of the claimant's permanent partial impairment benefits. Prior to Mr. Barton being 
retained, Claimant's claim had been "accepted" by the surety and benefits were being paid. In re-
sponse to an inquiry from the surety, Rodriguez's surgeon awarded him a 34% whole person rat-
ing and the surety began paying benefits amounting to $52,827.50. Over the course of the payment 
of the impairment rating Barton took attorneys fees in the amount of $10,341.41 and costs of 
$3,000. Barton's "efforts were neither primarily, nor substantially, responsible for securing the 
PPI award within the meaning ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii." See, Order on Attorneys Fees at 2, 
Appendix LIV. However, Barton, who is fluent in Spanish, met with the surgeon and explained 
Rodriguez's continuing medical problems, which apparently led to additional medical therapy, 
temporary disability benefits and travel benefits totaling $139,570.94, the majority of which was 
paid directly to the medical providers by the surety without dispute. In Rodriguez, the Commis-
sion approves payment of attorney's fees from the benefits paid to the claimant on the undisputed 
impairment rating, despite the fact that in this Appeal the Commission suggests that the existence 
of a "dispute" is required by this Court's decision in Mancilla. The Commission observes: 
"These facts set up an interesting conundrum. * * * In short, having provided a valuable ser-
vice, Counsel is left with no means to be paid. However, closer scrutiny of the provisions of 
the applicable regulation reveals that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it was ap-
propriate for Counsel to take a fee against the non-disputed PPI award, in order that Counsel 
should obtain compensation for the service he rendered in connection with the prospective 
medical care eventually authorized by Surety." 
Appendix at LIV. See, also Table "Shifting Sands of Interpretation" at Appendix LIII. The Com-
mission did not seem to be the least deterred by this Court's holding in Mancilla: "According to 
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IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.a and OLe, undisputed funds cannot be used to satisfy claims for attorney 
fees." Mancilla 688,371. It is difficult to understand how IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01's definitions 
of "available funds" and "charging lien" can be "clearly articulated evidentiary standards" as con-
stitutionally required by Curr, 692, 138, when IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01's definitions of these terms 
both permit awarding attorneys fees out of a PPI benefits paid as the result of an impairment rating 
awarded without counsel even soliciting an impairment rating in Rodriquez, and prohibit attorneys 
fees to be taken from PPI benefits paid as the result of an impairment rating awarded as a result of 
a direct solicitation by counsel because the rating was not disputed, as analyzed in the Commis-
sion's hypothetical in Kulm, AR 231-232. It is apparent from the decision in Rodriquez that, con-
trary to the position that it has taken in this appeal, the Commission at its whim arbitrarily inter-
prets IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to permit it to approve attorney fees taken from funds not "primarily 
or substantially" secured by counsel. 
2. The Commission Has Issued Conflicting Decisions Holding In One That 
Only Contingent Fee Arrangements Can Result In A Charging Lien, 
And Holding In Another That Contingent Agreements Are Prohibited 
By The Anti-Assignment Language Of I.C. §72-802 
As observed in footnote 8 of Appellant's Opening Brief, a sitting Commissioner has que-
ried in casual conversation whether claims for contingent attorneys fees may be barred by the anti-
assignment language ofI.C. §72-802. The significance of the question was not fully appreciated 
by Appellant at the time that Appellant's Opening Brief was filed, because the Industrial Commis-
sion had not yet issued its decision in Oasis Legal Finance v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.c. et. aI., 
IC:2007-028248, 1998-038640,2005-506894,2007-024933,2008-017154,2009-017004, Janu-
ary 13,2012, included in this brief at Appendix XI. Curiously, while IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 
essentially limits attorney's fees to a contingent fee on "new money," the Commission held in Oa-
sis that contingency fees are barred by I.C. § 72-802. The urgency of this Court's seriously con-
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sidering the Commission's plea for "guidance' is highlighted by this decision. The conflict in the 
logic behind Oasis and the objectionable portions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 illustrate the need 
for the issuance of an opinion clearly stating that attorneys fees, while legitimately subject to "ap-
proval" by the Commission based on a regulation providing due process and adopting the stan-
dards relating to reasonableness announced by this Court, are governed by Idaho Code § 3-205 
and are outside I.C. § 72-802. 
IV. THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 As APPLIED MUST BE STRICKEN 
To PROTECT THE CLAIMANT'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Though Appellant has been declared to be the real party in interest in this appeal, he 
brought the appeal to assert his past and present clients' rights to hire an attorney to speak for 
them under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the correlative section of 
the Idaho Constitution, §§ 9 and 10.4 Far more than the attorney's fees are at stake in this case. 
Appellant's right to practice a useful profession, recognized as constitutionally protected in Curr, 
and the right of his past and future clients, including those whose cases are on appeal here are 
what is really at stake, as reflected by the averments contained in record of Claimant Laurel Kulm 
set forth below at page 32. Respondent has not addressed this argument. It is clear that if this 
Court does reach the constitutional issues presented in this case (given the policy against doing so 
in view of the lack of statutory authority for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 in view ofI.C. 3-205), it 
should hold that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is unconstitutional because it precludes Appellant's past 
and future clients from retaining counsel to assist them in asserting their legal rights in "undis-
4 "When, however, enforcement of a restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relation-
ship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement 
(typically a constitutional entitlement), third-party standing has been held to exist. See Secretary of State of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2845-2848, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (professional fund-
raiser given third-party standing to challenge statute limiting its commission to 25% as violation of clients' First Amend-
ment right to hire him for a higher fee). A restriction upon the fees a lawyer may charge that deprives the lawyer's pro-
spective client of a due process right to obtain legal representation falls squarely within this principle. See Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623-624, n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, n. 3, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 
(1989.)." u. S Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21, 110 S. Ct. 1428, 1432, 108 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1990). 
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puted" cases. 
United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,88 S. Ct. 
353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) considered a First Amendment challenge to a complaint brought by 
the Illinois State Bar Association and others to enjoin the United Mine Workers of America, Dis-
trict 12, from engaging in certain practices alleged to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
"The essence of the complaint was that the Union had employed a licensed attorney on a salary 
basis to represent any of its members who wished his services to prosecute workmen's compensa-
tion claims before the Illinois Industrial Commission." United Mine Workers, 218,354: 
We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth4 Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its 
members in the assertion of their legal rights. We start with the premise that the rights to as-
semble peaceably and to petition for a redress or grievances are among the most precious of 
the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights, moreover, are intimately con-
nected both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and 
free press. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. (Citations omitted.) The First 
Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government free to destroy or 
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech, 
press, petition, or assembly as such. We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actu-
ally affect the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were en-
acted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or 
even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil. (Cita-
tions omitted.) (Emphasis supplied). 
United Mine Workers, 221-22, 355-56. 
That the States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question. 
See Trainmen, supra, at 6,84 S.Ct. at 1116. But it is equally apparent that broad rules framed 
to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration of justice can in their actual 
operation significantly impair the value of associational freedoms. Thus in Button, supra, we 
dealt with a plan under which the NAACP not only advised prospective litigants to seek the 
assistance of particular attorneys but in many instances actually paid the attorneys itself. We 
held that dangers of baseless litigation and conflicting interests between the association and 
individual litigants far too speculative to justify the broad remedy invoked by the State, a rem-
edy that would have seriously crippled the efforts of the NAACP to vindicate the rights of its 
members in court. (Emphasis supplied). 
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United Mine Workers, 222-23,356.5 Similarly, the argument that denying Workers Compensation 
claimants the right to hire counsel except in disputed matters or by the hour in the name of some-
how promoting "sure and certain relief' is equally speculative and tenuous. If this Court reaches 
Appellant's constitutional challenges, the attorney fee provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 must 
be struck down insofar as that regulation precludes Workers Compensation claimants such as Lau-
reI Kulm and Appellant from agreeing to representation and compensation with respect to "undis-
puted" matters, a concept of almost no utility at the time that Ms. Kulm retained Appellant as her 
testimony by affidavit referenced below makes clear, since all she and Appellant could do at the 
time that she retained him was speculate as to what position the Defendant employer and surety 
might take on the myriad issues that arise in a Workers Compensation case. 
V. RHODES V. INDUSTRIAL COMM'N 
The Commission's brief on appeal, apart from reviewing its reasons for finding that Appel-
lant has not met the applicable standards ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (determinations that are not 
at issue given Appellant's stipulations and concessions here and below), focuses almost entirely 
on this Court's decision in Rhodes v. Indust. Comm 'n, supra.6 Rhodes is divided into two parts, 
"Statutory Authority of the Commission" and "Constitutional Issues." 
1. Rhodes Involved a Different Regulation 
At the outset, it is important to observe that Rhodes was not the same regulation at issue in 
this case. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, the regulation that the Commission applied in this case, was 
enacted on July 1, 1994. Respondent's Brief, p. 18. The regulation in Rhodes was adopted in 
1992 and the decision in Rhodes was issued on December 3, 1993. Appellant has distinguished 
5 See, also, Bhd. ofR. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,7,84 S. Ct. 1113, 1117, 12 L.Ed.2d 89 
(1964): "A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way 
the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic 
public interest." 
6 The Commission's discussion of a trilogy of this Court's cases upholding its discretion in applying IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01 is largely irrelevant, since those cases do not raise or address constitutional issues. 
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the regulation under consideration in Rhodes and IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 in his opening brief. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 34-37. "Judicial opinions are authoritative only on the facts on 
which they are founded, and general expressions must be considered and construed in the light of 
this rule." Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297,306,206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949). Where there is 
room for two constructions of a statute, both equally obvious and equally reasonable, the court 
must, in deference to the legislature of the state, assume that it did not overlook the provisions of 
the constitution and interpret the statutes in a way in which they do not conflict with the constitu-
tion. Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 698, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986). 
Even if this Court should conclude that the distinction between the two regulations drawn 
by Appellant is insufficient to distinguish Rhodes from these cases for purposes of analysis, Rho-
des does not resolve challenges made here that were not raised in it, and its reasoning deserves re-
examination particularly because Rhodes appears to have applied the wrong legal standard. Just as 
some things deserve saying twice, some questions deserve being considered twice, particularly in 
light of aspects ofthe record in this case not before the Court in Rhodes. 
2. Separation of Powers 
The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of govern-
ment, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is 
able to operate independently. 
State v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17,20,244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) (Quoting Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 
135, 139,804 P.2d 308,312 (1990). Simply put, the rules of this Court and the constitutional 
guarantee of the right to practice a useful profession vouched safe in Curl are impacted and cur-
tailed by administrative rules effectively forbidding representation other than in disputed matters. 
Appellant respectfully suggests that the best way to contemplate the statutory authority and consti-
7 "In addition, the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee of liberty 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. Jones v. State Bd. Of Medi-
cine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493,225 P. 491 (1923)." Curr691, 137. 
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tutional deficiencies ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is to consider how this Court would view a law 
that limited compensation to attorneys for employers and their sureties to "disputed" matters and 
to limit attorney's fees to $10 for such matters. This is not simply an exercise in reductio ad ab-
surdum. This is precisely what Rhodes expressly suggests is within the power of any government 
agency or the legislature to do without intruding at all on the exclusive province of the judiciary to 
control the practice of law, or offending either due process or equal protection. Appellant doubts 
that there is one ofthe member of this Court who would vote that such a regulation limiting the 
right to counsel of employers and sureties is within the statutory authority ofthe Idaho Industrial 
Commission, or the constitutional power ofIdaho's legislature. Similarly, one doubts whether the 
majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753, 
(2010) would find a statute limiting the conservative organization's ability to pay its retained at-
torneys more than $10 (or any amount for that matter) constitutional notwithstanding the U.S. Su-
preme Court's cavalier dismissal of the concerns of Plaintiff's lawyers in Triplett and Walters. 
Constitutional rights, and certainly the separation of powers, ought not to depend on whose ox is 
being gored. Unfortunately, the fallibility of the federal jurisprudence relied upon by Rhodes un-
derscores the wisdom of Justice Brennan's observation that state Court's should not mechanically 
apply U.S. Supreme Court decisions to issues involving state constitutional law, and should follow 
constitutional decisions by federal courts only if they are found to be logically persuasive and 
well-reasoned. See discussion at p. 20 infra. 
3. The "Statutory Authority of the Commission" 
Rhodes challenged the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation of the scope of 
power conferred by I.C. § 72-803, complaining that the regulation exceeded any reasonable exten-
sion of the power to "approve" attorney fees, and unreasonably transgressed separation of powers. 
Rhodes 141, 469. Rhodes addresses the issue of separation of powers in a conclusory fashion: 
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This Court has ruled that the Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues 
concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation cases. Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 
939, 737 P.2d 459, 460 (1987). However, this ruling must be balanced against the principle 
that the judicial department of the government is uniquely imbued with the power to regulate 
the practice oflaw. Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Util., 102 Idaho 672, 675, 637 P.2d 
1168, 1171 (1981). Where the practice oflaw intersects with a social system such as the work-
ers' compensation system, the judicial power does not merge, but remains plenary. Any author-
ity exercised by the other departments of government that affects the practice of law must not 
conflict with judicial resolution. The authority granted to the Commission under § 72-803, to 
"approve" attorney fees, does not conflict with the judicial penumbra. The regulation under 
challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application of I.C. § 72-
803, in turn does not overstep the legislative bounds of I.C. § 72-803, read in pari materia with 
the entire Workers' Compensation Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Rhodes 141,469. Rhodes does not elaborate on why the regulation under consideration did not 
conflict with judicial resolution. As discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, that regulation dif-
fers significantly from the one under consideration in these cases. Appel/ant's Opening Brief, pp. 
34-37. Appellant does not argue that regulations that "foster ease, utility, and predictability in the 
application of I.e. § 72-803" are beyond the statutory authority of the Commission. However, 
regulations that limit the measure and mode of compensation clearly go beyond that and expressly 
conflict with I.C. § 3-205' s injunction "The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and 
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained 
by law." The statutory authority of the Commission to implement the regulation under considera-
tion in Rhodes in view ofI.C. § 3-205 was not raised in Rhodes, and therefore it has no preceden-
tial value with respect to that argument in this case. Reviewing the statutory authority of the 
Commission, Rhodes observed that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, as stated in 
I.C. § 72-201, is to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families .... ;" and 
that I.e. § 72-803 grants the Commission the authority to "approve" claims for attorney fees; that 
the Commission has the authority to administer I.C. § 72-803 and to issue regulations necessary to 
bring about secure relief for injured workers and their families. Rhodes 141,469. Emphasis in the 
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origina1.8,9 Rhodes gave Brannon and Idaho State Bar Ass'n summary treatment, and the sweep 
and invidiousness ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 challenged by this appeal merits further considera-
tion of the principles reaffirmed in both. 
In Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. Idaho Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,673-74,637 P.2d 
1168, 1169-70 (1981), an administrative rule concerning representation of parties before the Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission was challenged on the ground that it would allow for the unauthor-
ized practice of law in violation of I.C. § 3-104. In declaring that this regulation violated the con-
stitutionally-protected separation of powers, this Court reiterated its long standing authority that 
the regulation of the practice of law is within the sole province ofthe judiciary: 
The practice of law is so intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power in the ad-
ministration of justice that the right to define and regulate the practice naturally and logically 
belongs to the judicial department of the state government. Under the doctrine of separation of 
powers the courts have inherent power to regulate admission to the practice of law, to oversee 
8 Appellant is not sure what to make of the statement in Rhodes that "[a]ny authority exercised by the other 
departments of government that affects the practice of law must not conflict with judicial resolution." If determining the 
areas in which an attorney may be hired is an aspect of "judicial resolution" then the regulation challenged in this 
appeal clearly conflicts with it. For example, it seems unthinkable that a law stating that only individuals with a net 
worth of over $100,000 can retain an attorney on an hourly basis to consult with them about matters not yet disputed, 
but which may end up in litigation, would not violate the separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that the 
legislature was motivated by a desire to protect those of moderate means from the high cost of legal advice that it 
"finds" unnecessary except in those cases where rights have been "disputed." It is even more unthinkable that a law 
restricting the right of a corporation to hire in house counsel with the restriction that they only handle "disputes" would 
pass constitutional muster. The defect in such a law would not be that it violates equal protection, (though it clearly 
would except under a tortured application of the "rational reason" test) but rather would be that the law clearly would 
conflict with this Court's exclusive authority to control the practice of law. 
9 Though Rhodes cites Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 737 P.2d 459 (1987) for the proposition that "the Commission 
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation cases," Rhodes 
141, 469, the limited issue addressed in Brannon was "whether the Idaho Industrial Commission or the district court 
has jurisdiction to hear a claim by a client against his attorney for alleged breach of contract of representation in a 
workers' compensation claim." Brannon 938, 459. Brannon's holding is similarly limited: 
In view of the uniquely broad grant of original and exclusive jurisdiction over workers' compensation matters given 
to the Industrial Commission, and the fact that I.C. § 72-803 confers upon the commission the jurisdiction to re-
solve claims for attorney fees, we conclude that there exists a legislative intent that jurisdiction over claims by a 
client against his attorney arising out of their fee agreement in a workers' compensation case is properly with the 
Industrial Commission, and not the district court. 
Brannon 940, 461. Contrary to Rhodes citation of Brannon for the proposition that "[t]his Court has ruled that the 
Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation 
cases." Brannon did not so rule, and Appellant is not aware of any other case having so held. The overbreadth of the 
statement is staggering, since if true it would deprive the judiciary of all jurisdiction relating to any matter involving 
attorneys fees, and sweep within the jurisdiction of the IIC even criminal charges relating to attorneys fees. As but one 
example of the absurdity of the pronouncement if taken literally, the Idaho Supreme Court would be powerless to 
enforce Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 dealing with attorneys fees, since the violation of the rule would clearly 
be an "issue concerning attorneys fees in [a] workers' compensation case" over which the Industrial Commission would 
have exclusive jurisdiction. 
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the conduct of attorneys as officers of the court, and to control and supervise the practice of 
law generally, whether in or out of court. It is a prerogative of the judicial department to regu-
late the practice oflaw. However, the state has a substantial interest in maintaining a compe-
tent bar, and the legislature, under the police power, may act to protect the public interest, but 
in so doing, it acts in aid of the judiciary and does not supersede or detract from the power of 
the courts. (Footnotes omitted.) 7 AmJur.2d, Attorneys at Law, s 2, p. 55-56. [Emphasis pro-
vided.] 
* * * 
In Appiication ofKaufinan, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949), this is ... stated: 
From a careful and comprehensive analysis of all the above authorities, which include most 
if not all of the authorities cited by respective counsel and which are closely enough in point 
to require consideration, the following rules seem to be deducible: First, that the process of 
admitting to the bar comprehends fixing standards as to mental and scholastic qualifications 
and determining whether the applicant possesses such requirement; second, that the exercise 
thereof is a judicial function, inherent in the courts; and third, the legislature may enact valid 
laws in aid of such functions and may, if in furtherance thereof, fix minimum requirements, 
but in no event, maximum; and may not require the courts to admit on standards other than 
as accepted or established by the courts, and that any legislation which attempts to do so is 
an invasion of the judicial power and violates the constitutional provisions establishing the 
separate branches of government and prohibiting the legislature from invading the jUdiciary. 
69 Idaho at 315, 206 P.2d at 539. 
Idaho State Bar Ass'n, 675-76, 1171-72. Emphasis supplied. The lesson from Idaho State Bar 
Ass'n. is that administrative agencies may constitutionally aid in this Court's regulation of the 
practice oflaw by adopting regulations that ensure that attorney's fees are reasonable. It is an-
other matter entirely, however, to pass a regulation that essentially makes it impossible for an at-
torney to be paid for all manner of legal services that he is implicitly obligated to provide. lO 
Rhodes upheld the challenged regulation finding that the authority granted to the Commis-
sion under I.C. § 72-803, to "approve" attorney fees, did not conflict with the judicial penumbra 
when read in pari materia with the entire Workers Compensation Act. Rhodes 141, 469. Dis-
missing the argument that I.C. § 72-803 delegated only the power to "approve" attorney fees to the 
Commission, and that the subject regulation in Rhodes went beyond that delegated power, Rhodes 
10 See, for one example Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 Advisor, Comment 5 "In general, a lawyer is not 
expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of 
action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer's duty to the client under 
Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client's course of action is related to the representation." IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01 has other adverse ethical implications discussed infra. 
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held: 
"It [the subject regulation] is a framework establishing uniform grounds for fee approval. The 
language ofLC. § 72-803 contemplates that the Commission will monitor the appropriateness 
of fees on behalf of claimants, and therefore the regulation provides a reasonable interpretation 
ofthe power vested by I.C. § 72-803. In this case, the operative word in I.C. § 72-803 is "ap-
prove.,,4 Rhodes argues that the word "approve" means simply that, to approve. It does not 
mean to "regulate." Given the broad empowerment provided by I.C. § 72-508, coupled with 
the purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act, i.e., to provide "sure and certain relief 
for injured workmen and their families," I.C. § 72-201, we cannot agree with Rhodes' conten-
tion. The absence of the word "regulate" in I.C. § 72-803, is not legally significant and does 
not exact a reading that the legislature intended to confine the Commission's regulatory author-
ity. "The workers' compensation law is to be liberally construed with a view to effect [sic.] its 
objects and promote justice." Mayo v. Safeway Stores, 93 Idaho 161, 166,457 P.2d 400, 405 
(1969). Accordingly, we hold that the word "approve" is sufficient to establish the proper 
delegation of the power to regulate attorney fees. 
Rhodes 141-42,469-70. [Footnotes omitted.] The question left unanswered by Rhodes is when 
does a regulation duly adopted pursuant to the permissible delegation of the power to regulate at-
torney's fees become so broad that it constitutes the regulation of the practice oflaw proscribed by 
Rhodes and Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Uti!., supra? One would assume that the deter-
mination that a claimant cannot hire an attorney on an hourly basis for advice, counsel, and repre-
sentation in matters that have not ripened into a frank dispute, undertakings that probably com-
prise the majority of work done by attorneys, is a matter going to the heart ofthe judiciary's power 
to control the practice oflaw. 
The only exception to the Separation of Powers Doctrine occurs where the exercise of an-
other branch's power is expressly directed or permitted by the constitution. Estep v. Commission-
ers of Boundary County, 122 Idaho 345, 347,834 P.2d 862,864 (1992). Where in the Idaho Con-
stitution is such an expressive directive? Estep dealt with " ... whether a county board of Com mis-
sioners has the authority to promulgate policies or issue orders which limit or direct the hiring de-
cis ions of a clerk ofthe district court." Estep 346, 863. How is the attempt of the Commission to 
eliminate retaining an attorney other than with respect to disputed matters a lesser infringement of 
the province of the Judiciary? 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
-19-
4. The Constitutional Issues Section Of Rhodes Deals Primarily With The 
Petitioners' Equal Protection Challenge. Rhodes Address The Separa-
tion Of Powers Argument Only In A Conclusory Fashion 
In upholding the regulation under consideration in Rhodes, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: "There is a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster sure 
and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by the 
regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less burden-
some." Rhodes 142,470. This statement highlights the fundamental confusion created by Rhodes. 
Assuming that the court is speaking simply to the 25% attorney's fees contained in their regula-
tion, the statement in Rhodes may be debatable but it is not illogical. However, if one reads the 
statement carefully, it does not speak to the issue of whether or not there is a rational relationship 
between limiting attorney's fees to only disputed matters and sure and certain relief for injured 
workers. In fact, the Rhodes decision does not discuss what, if any, rational relationship exists 
between fostering "sure and certain relief for injured workers" and limitation of attorney's fees to 
"new money" even as defined by the former regulation. 
5. Rhodes'Ill-Considered Dicta Should Be Repudiated By This Court 
Unfortunately, the Rhodes decision did not confine itself to the regulation it was consider-
ing, but improvidently included the dicta that provides the fundamental support for Respondent's 
opposition. Rhodes includes dicta which, if this case is not resolved upon a lack of statutory au-
thority, deserve repudiation by this court. The Rhodes court states: 
Unless it can be shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation entirely unavail-
able, evidencing the illegitimacy of the scheme, the scheme does not violate the due process 
right of a lawyer's prospective client to obtain legal representation. 
Rhodes 142-43,470-71. (Relying on dicta from United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 
715, 724, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 1433, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990)). 
Rhodes' observation that only a regulatory scheme that makes legal representation entirely 
unavailable offends due process is clearly dictum. "Where [the] question was not properly before 
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court for decision, expression of opinion thereon was "obiter dictum." Long v. State Ins. Fund, 60 
Idaho 257,90 P.2d 973 (1939). This observation in Rhodes creates the mischief that this appeal 
addresses, because the decision fails to adhere to the venerable judicial wisdom offered by Justice 
Brandeis. "The Court has frequently called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its func-
tion in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this function 
by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction offederal courts is limited to actual cases and controver-
sies; and that they have no power to give advisory opinions." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46, 56 S. Ct. 466, 482, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936). Brandeis lists six rules for 
avoiding pitfalls: "The Court (1) will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of 
the necessity of deciding it; (2) will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied; will not pass upon the constitutionality of 
legislation (3) in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding; (4) ifthere is also present some other 
ground upon which the case may be disposed of; (5) upon complaint of one who fails to show that 
he is injured by its operation; (6) at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits." 
Supreme Court Interpretation o/Statutes to Avoid Constitutional Decisions, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 
633,651 (1953); See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion). 
Rhodes transgresses Brandeis' rules 1,2 and 4. 
Having breached these rules, Rhodes relies on a United States Supreme Court decision 
which, while presumably controlling with respect to a due process challenge brought under the 
U.S. Constitution, is not controlling on a challenge brought under the Idaho Constitution or the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and one which ought not to be persuasive. Triplett in-
volved a challenge to the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 prohibiting attorneys from receiving 
fees for representing claimants except as approved by petitioner Department of Labor. Us. Dept. 
o/Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 715, 110 S. Ct. 1428, 1429, 108 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1990). Triplett 
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relied upon its decision in Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S. Ct. 
3180, 87 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1985) as precedent. Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors up-
held against due process attack a statutory $10 limitation on attorney's fees payable by veterans 
seeking disability or death benefits in proceedings before the Veterans' Administration. Id., 473 
U.S., at 319, 105 S.Ct., at 3188. 
Of course, it is almost always attorneys for David in "David vs. Goliath" battles whose at-
torney's fees are limited in the name of protecting David by legislation proposed by the supporters 
of the Philistines who are concerned for the inability of young boys to afford slingshots. Interest-
ingly, such legislation never seems to be promoted or even supported by the Davids of this world. 
Yet, this Court is asked to turn a blind eye to these legislative charades clearly intended to tip the 
playing field of the Courts to the advantage of certain categories oflitigants in the name of the "ra-
tional basis" test, a standard that as argued by Appellant infra, is not appropriate when issues of 
access to counsel are involved. Fortunately, this Court has demonstrated that it is quite able to dis-
tinguish between a proffered "rational basis" and an arbitrary justification when circumstances so 
require. 
What is the most striking about Walters and Triplett is their import when considered in 
conjunction with the United States Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers, supra. It 
follows from the analysis in Walters and Triplett that while the State of Illinois Bar Association 
could not preclude the United Mine Workers from hiring attorneys to represent their members out-
right, it could have effectively done so simply by limiting their salary to $10. The irony ofthis 
observation brings to mind the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson: "We are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." 
The weakness of the reasoning in Walters, Triplett and the confounding of the sound 
reasoning of Curr by Rhodes, highlights the wisdom in Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s 
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exhortation to the states to consider the limitations of federal Constitutional jurisprudence in 
considering challenges brought under state constitutions. 
But the point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their 
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of 
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the 
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law--for without it, 
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
* * * 
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United States Supreme Court is nec-
essarily wrong in its interpretation of the federal Constitution, or that ultimate constitutional 
truths invariably come prepackaged in the dissents, including my own, from decisions of the 
Court. It is simply that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of 
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. 83 Accordingly, 
such decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and 
the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them. Rather, state court judges, and also 
practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they 
are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the 
policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive 
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. 
Rev. 489, 491,502 (1977) (Emphasis supplied, Citations omitted). 
6. Rhodes Appears To Have Applied The Wrong Legal Standard 
Rhodes applied the least stringent constitutional standard to the petitioners' equal protec-
tion challenge. 
Because the challenged regulation creates no suspect or invidiously discriminatory classifica-
tion and entangles no fundamental right, but involves economic and social welfare legislation, 
it must be tested under the restrained standard of equal protection review, the familiar rational 
basis test. 
Rhodes 142,470. 11 Rhodes assaulted logic and equality before the law when it held that an attor-
11 Although this Court has not expressly declared freedom to contract a "fundamental right" it has declared it to be 
"fundamental law" and appears to have applied something akin to a "means-focus" test to regulations restricting the 
right to practice a profession: 
"Courts scrutinize carefully all contracts limiting a man's natural right to follow any trade or profession anywhere he 
pleases and in any lawful manner. But it is just as important to protect the enjoyment of an establishment in trade 
or profession, which its possessor has built up by his own honest application to everyday duty and the faithful per-
formance of the tasks which every day imposes upon the ordinary man. 159 Minn. at page 299, 199 N.W. at page 
11,52 A.L.R. at pages 1358-1359." 
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ney fee regulation that limits only claimants and not defendants rights to agree to the measure and 
mode of compensation in workers compensation cases, and announced (perhaps for purposes of 
"guidance") in dictum that all limitations on attorney's fees do not deny due process "unless it can 
be shown that the regulatory scheme makes legal representation entirely unavailable." Rhodes 
reached these obviously unjust conclusions because it applied the wrong legal standard in its 
analysis. The standard Rhodes should have applied, and that must be applied in this case if the 
Court is not satisfied that the lack of statutory authority for the challenged provisions of IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01 renders consideration of constitutional arguments unnecessary, is the "means-
focus" test. 
It is enough to say at this juncture that with respect to certain statutes which create obviously 
discriminatory classifications this Court will examine the means by which those classifications 
are utilized and implemented in light of the asserted legislative purpose .... This new interme-
diate standard of equal protection review has been described as "means-focus" because it tests 
whether the legislative means substantially furthers some specifically identifiable legislative 
end. 
Jones v. State Bd of Med, 97 Idaho 859, 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976). Curr cited Jones in sup-
port of its recognition of attorneys' constitutional rights. Curr, 692, 13 8. 
The means-focus test as enunciated by this Court in Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 
Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173,53 L.Ed.2d 223 
(1977), establishes a standard of review under Idaho's equal protection guarantee, separate, 
distinct, and to be applied independently of the standards applied under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Marshall v. Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 205, 339 P.2d 504, 507-08 (1959). 
It must be conceded, and this court has stated, that a regulation abridging or restricting the freedom of contract or 
regulating the right to engage in any lawful business in a lawful manner must be reasonable and must reasonably 
tend to accomplish or promote the protection and welfare of the public. Regulations which are arbitrary or capri-
cious and which unreasonably restrict or interfere with the liberties of the citizen. without accomplishing or promot-
ing a legitimate object of the police power. are invalid violations of the fundamental law. [Citations omitted; empha-
sis supplied.] 
Messerli v. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., 88 Idaho 88,96-97,397 P.2d 34, 39 (1964). 
Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts. 
Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107,110 (1970). Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 
75,233 P.3d 1,6 (2008). 
Freedom of contract is "a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts and is an essential element of the 
free enterprise system." Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787,791,683 P.2d 435,439 (1984) 
(citing Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,499,465 P.2d 107, 110 (1970)). 
Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452, 210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009). 
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Sheppardv. State, Dept. of Employment, 103 Idaho 501,503-04,650 P.2d 643,645-46 (1982). 
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 
Jones, quoting from Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254,30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). 
In considering another regulation of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this Court discussed 
the means-focus test, though it found the regulation unconstitutional under either test: 
In Utilizing either the "rational basis" or the "means-focus" standards of review, I.C. § 72-
1414 fails to pass constitutional muster. First, I.C. § 72-1414 sets forth an arbitrary classifica-
tion, since it burdens only those firefighters who are members of the FRF and are subject to 
involuntarily retirement because of injuries resulting in the award of worker's compensation 
benefits. I.C. § 72-1414 classifies both on the basis of involuntary retirement versus voluntary 
retirement, and membership in the FRF versus the PERS system. Further, the classification is 
arbitrary as between the firefighter injured early in his career, who ultimately receives 100% of 
both his worker's compensation and retirement, and the firefighter injured shortly before re-
tirement who suffers the reduction. Under either of the three instances, the classification is ar-
bitrary and unrelated to furthering a specifically identifiable legislative end. 
Deonier v. State, Pub. Employee Ret. Ed., 114 Idaho 721, 727, 760 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1988).12 
Against the backdrop ofthese cases, Rhodes' cavalier dismissal of the liberty interest of 
workers compensation claimants attorneys announced in Curr, and petitioners due process and 
equal protection challenges to the regulation at issue demonstrates the need for the application of 
the "means-focus" test with respect to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as applied. Assuming that 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 prohibits an attorney for being paid other than with respect to "disputed" 
matters, as now contended by the Commission (and, according to the Commission, required by 
Mancilla), IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is blatantly arbitrary. Surely this Court must reject the argu-
ment that prohibiting a claimant from compensating her attorney for all services, counseling, ad-
vice, research, investigation, advocacy, negotiation, and representation other than with respect to 
matters that have ripened into a frank "dispute" does not "substantially further" any "specifically 
12 But see, Osick v. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. of Idaho, 122 Idaho 457, 459, 835 P .2d 1268, 1270 (1992): "Our concern 
about the precedential authority of Deonier is that because only two members of the Court concurred in both the result 
and the rationale stated in the opinion, the rationale is not controlling for other cases, including this one." 
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identifiable legislative end." Jones, 867,407. The regulation Rhodes upheld did not address a 
"specifically identifiable legislative end" but was upheld because it purportedly served the purpose 
of affording the injured worker "sure and certain relief' simply by virtue ofthe fact that claimants 
would not have to pay as much in attorneys' fees. The problem with the application ofthe "ra-
tional relationship" test in Rhodes, at least as applied to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, is that without 
any focus as to the means involved, and the impact of the regulation on the availability of counsel 
in matters other than those which are "disputed," all limitations and restrictions on the right of a 
claimant to obtain advice, counsel and representation are acceptable without regard to any consid-
eration as to whether or not the attorney's fees claimed are "reasonable." 
No one can gainsay the fact that relief under the Workers Compensation Act is more "sure 
and certain" if claimants can obtain attorney services at a reasonable cost, but it does not follow 
logically that it is more "sure and certain" if the compensation for those services is so low that 
counsel cannot be attracted by the claimant. This much was recognized as intuitively obvious by 
Curr, if not accepted as a matter of judicial notice. Yet the same point was rejected as speculation 
in Rhodes. In any event, while it is rational to assume that a regulation implementing standards of 
reasonableness consistent with this Court's announced equitable standards will promote "sure and 
certain" relief for claimants, it is not rational to assume that reliefwill be more "sure and certain" 
for claimants if they are prohibited from compensating attorneys for services such as counseling, 
advising, researching, investigating, advocacy, negotiations with adjusters, discussions regarding 
the claimant with physicians, and representation other than with respect to matters that have rip-
ened into a frank "dispute." Such a proposition is absurd on its face, and clearly arbitrary. Con-
sequently, despite the Commission's almost exclusive reliance on Rhodes, it does not rescue 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 from Appellant's equal protection challenge. 
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7. Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect 
Rhodes Involved A Different Regulation 
Stare decisis is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law. When the appli-
cation ofthis principle will not result in justice, it is evident that the doctrine is not properly appli-
cable. Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795,801,473 P.2d 937,943 (1970). Although the Commission 
relies primarily on the Rhodes decision to support its present regulation, Rhodes dealt with a simi-
lar yet substantially different regulation. For this reason, the doctrine of stare decisis does not ap-
ply. 
In Addition To Rhodes' Application Of The Wrong Constitutional Standard 
And The Fact That It Did Not Consider A First Amendment Challenge, Rho-
des Failed To Give Stare Decisis Consideration To Curr 
As pointed out above, Rhodes applied a "rational reason" test in its analysis as opposed to 
the "means focus" test required by this Court's prior cases. Further, Rhodes did not consider the 
First Amendment challenges raised on appeal here. Thus, at most Rhodes can be dispositive of 
only limited issues even ifthe doctrine of stare decisis is applied. However, Rhodes failed to con-
sider the doctrine of stare decisis as it should have applied to Curro The policy considerations 
militating against unnecessarily pitting officers ofthe Court against their Workers Compensation 
clients were obviated by the holding in Curro Curr wisely held "Finally, the 'new money' provi-
sion preempts representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-
508." Curr 692, 138. This observation in Curr has nothing to do with the procedural infirmities of 
the Commission's sua sponte reduction of attorney's fees it also struck down, and which Rhodes 
considered remedied. This aspect of Curr 's holding was not discussed in Rhodes. To the extent 
that holding in Curr is in conflict with Rhodes, Rhodes should not be given stare decisis effect. 
The wisdom of Curr and the Rhodes' disregard of its teachings are made clear simply by 
considering the conflict of interest made manifest by IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as presently con-
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strued by the Commission. If this Court considers Curr and Rhodes to be in conflict, then Rhodes 
should fall, for all ofthe reasons urged on this appeal. For the reasons articulated by Appellant in 
his opening brief, he believes that the term "new money" was used in the Rhodes' regulation dif-
ferently than in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 and therefore the doctrine of stare decisis has no applica-
tion in this appeal. 
Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect Because IDAPA 17.02.08.033 
Creates A Conflict Oflnterest Not Created By The Rhodes' Regulation 
The practice of the Commission in sua sponte denying attorney's fees every time that a 
Workers Compensation claimant's attorney cannot document that the benefits agreed to be paid in 
the lump sum agreement were indeed "disputed," runs directly afoul of the admonitions contained 
in Curro "Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect appellants' integrity in the 
eyes oftheir clients, thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship." Curr 692, 
138. 
In most of the cases handled by the Appellant, there is no issue as to whether or not the 
Claimant suffered an injury at work. In such cases, Appellant works with the Claimant and repre-
sentatives of the Defendants, coordinating doctors appointments, ironing out return to work issues, 
making sure benefit checks are paid on time, consulting about possible retraining, investigating 
issues related to disability, obtaining an impairment rating, and attempting as diplomatically as 
possible to cajole adjusters into paying benefits in a timely manner. Part ofthe art of Workers 
Compensation practice is to avoid disputes by preparing the client's case and representing the cli-
ent with tact and diplomacy. However, when, as in these cases, the Commission attempts to re-
quire the attorney to prove that benefits were actually disputed as opposed to artfully coaxed from 
the Defendants, Claimant's Counsel is now manifestly in a battle with his client for the funds in-
volved. Consider the letter of September 19,2009 sent by Appellant to Ms. Kulm and the Waiver 
of Conflict ofInterest that she was asked to sign. Agency Record p. 95-103, at Appendix I. 
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Unfortunately, Appellant is forced to conclude that taking the steps reflected in this letter 
and the attached waiver may be necessary whenever his office chooses to press a claim for attor-
ney's fees which the Commission has declined to approve on the basis that the funds involved 
were not "primarily or substantially" made available as a result of claimant's counsel's representa-
tion. A limitation to a percentage of all benefits recovered and lump sum agreements does not 
have this effect, but a limitation to "available funds" does have that effect now that the present 
Commission is interpreting this to require proof that the right to benefits was in fact disputed. In-
deed, IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as presently applied creates an incentive for claimant's counsel to 
avoid finesse as a means of coaxing sureties to pay benefits for fear that his success in that regard 
will simply undermine his right to attorney's fees, and result in his essentially having to battle his 
own client for the right to payment by marshaling facts at an attorney's fees hearing evidencing 
the existence of a "dispute" to overcome the Commission's tacit finding that the attorney has no 
right to payment. This is a conflict that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized needs to be avoided. 13 
However, if it was not, it would appear that Rhodes failed to consider that the "[T]he rule 
of stare decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindi-
cate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice." Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 
13 The conflicts and problems created by requiring an attorney to justify a fee by retroactively demonstrating a "dispute" 
have been observed by the U.S. Supreme Court: "First, evaluation of the risk of loss creates a potential conflict of in-
terest between an attorney and his client, for in order to increase a fee award, a plaintiffs lawyer must expose all of the 
weaknesses and inconsistencies in his client's case, and a defendant's attorney must either concede the strength of 
the plaintiffs case in order to keep down the fee award, or "allo[w] the fee to be boosted by the contingency bonus [by] 
insisting that the plaintiffs victory was freakish." Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale 
L.J. 473, 483 (1981) (Leubsdorf). Second, in order to determine the proper size of the contingency bonus, a court must 
retroactively estimate the prevailing party's chances for success from the perspective of the attorney when he first con-
sidered filing the suit. Not only is this mathematically difficult to compute, but "once the result is known, it is hard for 
judges and lawyers to regain a perspective of ignorance and to treat the result as only one of several that were initially 
possible." Id., at 486. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 721-22, 107 S. 
Ct. 3078, 3084-85, 97 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1987). 
"Evaluation of the contingency factor pits lawyers against their clients. To increase his fee, the plaintiffs lawyer must 
show that his client had only a slight prospect of success when the case was brought. He will emphasize the barriers 
the client faced: ambiguous precedents, conflicting evidence, plausible defenses, and the like. As a result, the merits of 
the client's claim will be thrown into question before the judge and opposing counsel." John Leubsdorf, The Contin-
gency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale LJ. 473, 482-83 (1981). 
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Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 
72, 77, 803 P.2d 978,983 (1990)). Rhodes totally disregarded without comment the portion of 
Curr holding that attorneys fees could not constitutionally be limited to "new money" and that to 
do so was beyond the scope of statutory authority pursuant to I.e. § 72-508. Curr 692, 138. 
While the doctrine of stare decisis is an important principle that ensures stability in the law, "when 
the judicial interpretation of a statute is manifestly wrong, Stare decisis does not require that we 
continue an incorrect reading of the statute." Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 585, 226 
P.3d 524,527 (2010), citing Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut.Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 
P.3d 1127,1131 (2006). 
Rhodes Should Not Be Given Stare Decisis Effect Because It Is Manifestly 
Wrong, Unjust, Unwise And Brings About Injustice 
Furthermore, the circumstances of this case and the weakness ofthe analysis in Rhodes 
make clear that the rule should not be followed in this case: 
When there is controlling precedent on questions ofIdaho law "the rule of stare decisis dic-
tates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust 
or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and 
remedy continued injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77,803 P.2d 
978, 983 (1990). While it is important that parties and their counsel have predictability regard-
ing the law so that they may make informed decisions in the conduct oftheir affairs, when the 
judicial interpretation of a statute is manifestly wrong, stare decisis does not require that we 
continue an incorrect reading ofthe statute. "We have stated frequently that we will not follow 
prior incorrect decisions merely because the cases exist. The rule to stand by decided cases and 
to maintain former adjudications contemplates more than blindly following a former decision 
even if it is manifestly wrong." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 256, 805 P.2d 452, 462 
(1991). 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. o/Idaho, 142 Idaho 589,592-93, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130-
31 (2006). (Emphasis supplied.) 
"While we are cognizant of the importance stare decisis plays in the judicial process, we are 
not hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine, a defense, or a holding in a case, has proven 
over time to be unjust or unwise." Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 990, 695 P.2d 369,375 
(1985). 
State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661, 8 P.3d 652,656 (2000). 
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VI. THE COMMISSION TACITLY RECOGNIZES THAT ITS REGULATION HAs THE PRACTICAL 
EFFECT OF REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
It would appear that the Commission accepts the fact that its current regulation is having 
the effect not just of regulating fees, but also of regulating the practice of law by making represen-
tation difficult or impossible for some claimants, but simply feels it needs this Court's "guidance." 
As well, the current rule may make it impossible for certain injured workers who desire coun-
sel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the small recompense that the particu-
lar facts of that case may offer. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Relating To Counsel's Request For Approval Of Attor-
ney's Fees --Agency Recordp. 45. 
Quite apart from whether the current Industrial Commissioners agree with the policies that 
were thought to be advanced by the 1994 attorney fee regulation, this Commission is obligated 
to apply this valid regulation, the fundamental underpinnings of which have passed constitu-
tional muster. As noted in this Commission's decision in Kulm, practical difficulties frequently 
arise when trying to apply the regulation. It is a regulation that would benefit, perhaps, from 
studied revision. The Commission is particularly mindful, as was the Court, of the fact that at-
torneys frequently provide a valuable service to an injured worker which does not result in the 
creation of a fund from which the attorney can otherwise be paid. Even so, the regulation is 
what it is, and the Commission is constrained to apply its unambiguous language. The Com-
mission has acted based on its beliefthat this regulation is not only constitutional, but that it 
was correctly applied to the facts ofthe three cases at issue in this consolidated appeal. Never-
theless, the Commission would welcome any guidance or direction that this Court may give 
concerning the continuing implementation of its authority under I.C. § 72-803 or the Commis-
sion's interpretation and application of the current regulation to the facts in this appeal. (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Respondent's Brief, p. 25. There is a bit of a "stop me before I strike again" quality to the Com-
mission's observations concerning a regulation that, whatever it may argue, has not been applied 
uniformly or consistently. 
As stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, what is at stake in this appeal, is the ability of 
Workers Compensation claimants to hire an attorney and pay a portion of benefits that they ulti-
mately receive, whether disputed or not, for legal services that an attorney is either 1) ethically re-
quired to deliver as a part of his representation (by this Court's Rules of Professional Conduct as 
discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, "IDAP A 17.02.08.033 As Construed In Johnson Intrudes 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
-31-
Upon The Province Of The Judiciary And Conflicts With Judicial Policy By Creating Ethical 
Problems Directly Affecting The Practice Of Law," at 31-34), or 2) might otherwise refuse to pro-
vide by limiting the scope of his representation to disputed matters. The Affidavit of Laurel Kulm 
filed in support of Appellant's motion for attorney fees speaks to the need for such legal services 
and the reason that "guidance or direction" is sorely needed, hopefully in the form of this Court's 
reiteration of the unequivocal yet ignored core holding in Curr: "Finally, the 'new money' provi-
sion preempts representation other than in disputed matters once again contravening I.C. § 72-
508." Curr 692, 138. Claimant Kulm sought out Appellant for advice, counsel and representation 
knowing that no actual dispute had manifested itself precisely to make sure that one did not arise: 
9. I sought to retain an attorney for several reasons, including: I felt that I was getting the run-
around from the worker's compensation adjuster; I had been told that I might not have a case; I 
had been told that my injury might not be covered because it was pre-existing from degenera-
tive disease; I wanted to know what my legal rights were; I wanted advice on what to do; I 
wanted the other side to know that I was represented; and I wanted an attorney to fight for me. 
I believed that I was getting pushed around because I did not have a lawyer. 
10. In signing the FEE AGREEMENT, I understood that I was agreeing to pay a contingent 
fee on PPI benefits even if the benefits turned out to be uncontested, but it was worth it to me 
because I wanted to have an attorney to act as my legal counselor and as my advocate. 
11. I could not have afforded to pay an attorney on an hourly fee basis. 
16. I understand that it is against my financial interest in the amount of no less than $3301.72 
to support my Counsel's claim to receive the requested attorney fees. Nonetheless, I know-
ingly and voluntarily support their claim for attorney fees in full. 
Affidavit of Claimant Laurel Kulm, Agency Record p. 89-90. (Emphasis supplied). 
Perhaps most significantly, even if Ms. Kulm had been able to pay for the legal services 
she desired on an hourly basis, the conclusion to Respondent's briefto the effect that the Commis-
sion considers itself stuck with an inherited regulation which it feels "obligated" to follow that 
precludes compensation to attorneys other than in disputed matters, makes it clear that Ms. Kulm 
could not have retained an attorney to assist her on an hourly basis. 14 Although the Commission 
14 Since Courts are guided in their interpretation of administrative regulations, by administrative interpretations, the 
present Commission could have obtained some guidance simply by consulting with Commission staff to determine how 
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relies upon the Rhodes' application of a "rational relationship" test to the Commission's predeces-
sor regulation, and Rhodes' finding that that regulation promoted "sure and certain relief for in-
jured workers" (Rhodes 142, 470), it is difficult to conclude that a regulation promotes sure and 
certain relief when it makes it impossible for Workers Compensation claimants to retain attorneys 
to guide them through a complex statutory scheme in which they are pitted against attorneys and 
seasoned Workers Compensation adjusters. 
This principle extends to our review of administrative rules, and it is this Court's responsibility 
to determine the validity of the rule. "[A]dministrative rules are invalid which do not carry into 
effect the legislature's intent as revealed by existing statutory law, and which are not reasona-
bly related to the purposes of the enabling legislation." (Citations omitted). 
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583, 21 P.3d 903,905 (2001). Rhodes summarily con-
cluded, "There is a rational relationship between the legitimate legislative purpose to foster sure 
and certain relief for injured workers and the attorney fee regulation. The limit imposed by the 
regulation furthers the purpose by making the cost of attorneys paid from new money less burden-
some." Rhodes 142,470. Respectfully, it is a stretch to construe I.C. § 72-201 's declaration of po-
lice power justifying the substitution of a no-fault system for the right to sue in tort based on fault, 
as carte blanche to carve out attorney representation in whatever way the Commission's ever-
shifting composition of political appointees may choose: 
Declaration of police power. The common law system governing the remedy of workmen 
against employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in industrial and 
public work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends 
upon its industries and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, 
therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases ofthe 
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured 
workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault 
and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is other-
wise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such 
the regulation had been applied in the past as a guide to how it had been interpreted. The record reflects, and 
Appellant assures this Court, that the regulation was not applied in the past to require that benefits had to be disputed 
in order for an attorney to take attorneys fees from them. See, Seiniger Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 27 II. 1-18, 
infra. 
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personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abol-
ished, except as is in this law provided. (Emphasis supplied.) 
By Rhodes' reasoning, the Commission could effectively preclude attorney representation 
of Claimants altogether by making it simply financially impossible to undertake representation. 
Even given the current popular animus towards Plaintiffs and Claimant's attorneys, one doubts 
that this Court would tolerate such an intrusion into the regulation ofthe practice of law under the 
Idaho Constitution and in view ofLC. § 3-205. Indeed, it would arguably make infinitely more 
sense to preclude Defendants from retaining legal counsel if the Commission sincerely wanted to 
make relief for injured workers more "sure and certain." Notwithstanding Rhodes' incantation of 
"sure and certain relief,,,15 Appellant is confident that not a member ofthis Court believes that a 
regulation that prohibited Workers Compensation sureties from paying for legal counsel (or pay-
ing them more than $10 as apparently acceptable to the United States Supreme Court) would be 
upheld as valid and constitutional. Yet, this is exactly what Rhodes implies is perfectly accept-
able. Surely, the phrase "sure and certain" relief contained in the Idaho Workers Compensation 
Act's Declaration of Police Power is simply a synonym for "no-fault" rather than a blanket grant 
of authority to regulate to the point of elimination the right to counsel in Workers Compensation 
cases. Obviously, if an agency exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers has the right 
to limit claimant's counsel's compensation so that he can only be paid for "disputed" matters, any 
agency and the legislature has the same power with respect to all attorneys. Would an act prohib-
iting all attorney compensation other than in "disputed" matters be constitutional if such an act 
included a declaration of police power including a perfunctory recitation that the high cost of legal 
15 Ironically, this interpretation effectively presents the mirror image of the order struck down in Idaho State Bar Ass'n v. 
Idaho PUb. Utilities Comm'n, 102 Idaho 672,637 P.2d 1168 (1981). In Idaho State Bar the Idaho Pub. Utilities 
Commission entered an order permitting corporations appearing before it to be represented by non-attorneys. That 
case held that this order violated the separation of powers doctrine and this Court's exclusive role in supervising the 
practice of law by permitting representation by non-attorneys. This case, in contrast, presents this Court with the 
question of whether the Commission can by regulation effectively prohibit attorney representation to the extent it 
desires under the apparently limitless umbrella of providing "sure and certain relief." 
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services imposes an unnecessary and commerce chilling burden on the economy ofIdaho? Would 
a law be constitutional that limited all attorney compensation to $10 for all services performed in 
connection with a matter, such as a real estate closing, a divorce, a corporate merger? The fact 
that the suggestions are absurd, does not compel the conclusion that the analogies are inapt. The 
fundamental principle is that if it is within the Commission's or the legislature's power to decide 
what services claimants' counsel can be paid for, and place limitations other than reasonableness 
upon such payment, it is within any agency's or the legislature'S power to do so for all attorneys 
for any category of service it chooses. The playing field in every legal arena would be subject to 
being tilted by whatever faction controls the levers of power. 
Significantly, effectively preventing counsel from becoming involved in cases other than 
with respect to disputed matters by denying them compensation creates problems for Defendants 
as well as Workers Compensation claimants: 
Oftentimes in my practice I have seen adjusters and even sureties strongly recommend or insist 
that claimants go see an attorney to get the thing resolved. We all recognize the value ofhav-
ing an attorney on the other side, because oftentimes these cases can't get resolved that should 
be resolved until that happens. Ifwe make it impossible by artificially eliminating what they 
may be receiving, we are not going to have that ability to do so and people are going to un-
compensated that should be compensated. It clogs up the system. Having said that, I'm not 
suggesting that you have a carte blanche rule, I'm suggesting just utilizing -- if you want to use 
a calendar approach, a presumption that the person did something and certainly when you have 
a rating out there of 12 percent (the percentage impairment rating obtained by Appellant from 
Dr. Radnovich - Hearing Transcript p. 11 11. 20-22) you have a real incentive to go out and get 
one you know that's going to be lower and pay it. In most ofthese cases, you know, with dis-
ability -- I don't care whether it's two percent or 12 percent, because impairment -- disability 
includes impairment. The question is, is there a rating and are there restrictions. That's what 
determines the value of these claims. And I think these attorneys are earning their fee and the 
proof of that seeing the kind of people who don't have attorneys and to me it's really increas-
ing. I always ask the person at deposition, you know, have you talked to an attorney. Yeah, 
I've talked to an attorney, they wouldn't take my case. What happened? I was just told just go 
ahead and file and they will take care of you. I'm not being taken care of. 
Testimony of Alan Hull, Hearing Transcript p. 181. 20 to p. 191. 23. (Emphasis supplied). The 
Commission's "claim consultants" are advising people regarding litigating claims. As reflected in 
Mr. Hull's testimony, the Commission does not believe that Claimant's counsel should be paid for 
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simply giving advice, but it pays non-lawyers on its staff to do so. 
VII. RESPONDENT'S REVIEW OF THE ApPLICATION OF IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 To THE FACTS 
IN THESE CASES 
Notwithstanding 1) the fact that only purely constitutional issues are presented by this ap-
peal, 2) that for strategic purposes Appellant has conceded for purposes of appeal that he cannot 
demonstrate that he met the standards contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 under attack by "pri-
marily and substantially" creating the "available funds" related to the PPI benefits in each ofthe 
consolidated cases, and 3) that Appellant made no effort to offer evidence on the factual issues 
implicated by the attorney fee provisions ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01/6 Respondent's brief spends 
considerable time analyzing how it determined that Appellant had not met that standard. Appel-
lant does not want to devote too much time to replying to that portion of Respondent's brief, since 
it is not necessary for purposes ofthe issues raised on appeal. However, one aspect ofthe facts 
contained in the record regarding Appellant's efforts deserves attention, because of its implications 
with respect to judicial policy, and is discussed in the next section ofthis brief. 
VIII. THERE Is A SCHISM BETWEEN IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01 As WRITTEN AND THE WAY 
THA T IT WAS INTERPRETED AND ENFORCED 
Respondent Commission traces the genesis ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to the issuance on 
January 9, 1990 of an "informal" rule (lAR 72-803.2) limiting attorney's fees to "new money." 
... [P]ut in writing for the first time the policy which the Commission had already been fol-
lowing - that attorney fees would only be awarded against those contested benefits which the 
attorney had already obtained for the claimant. 'As in the past, the Commission will not ap-
16 In Steinmetz and Gomez, Appellant filed formal documents to that effect, and the record in Kulm reflects the same, 
notwithstanding the testimony of Attorney Alan Hull offered for a different purpose. 
For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable 
IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primar-
ily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits 
paid as consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test." 
For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the constitutionality of the applicable 
IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed" 
the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement 
(LSS) before the Defendants paid those benefits. 
Claimant's Counsel's Admissions For Attorney Fee Hearing, Steinmetz case, CR 467-468, Gomez Case, CR 567-568. 
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prove fees based upon benefits already paid by the employer or surety, or upon uncontested 
benefit amounts to be paid by employer or surety prior to the selection of an attorney. Fees 
will be assessed against "new money" only, i.e., benefits which counsel directly succeeded in 
obtaining on client's (sic.) behalf. IAR 72-803.2 (Appendix, Document #4, fourth paragraph.)' 
Respondent's Brief. p. 14. Emphasis added. Whether or not this statement is accurate depends on 
what it means to "obtain" benefits for claimant, and what "benefits which counsel directly suc-
ceeded in obtaining on client's (sic.) behalf' means. As the testimony in the record reflects, in the 
past the Commission has not applied its rules to require that Workers Compensation claimants' 
counsel prove that benefits were actually disputed. For almost thirty years, Appellant has handled 
Workers Compensation cases that were settled on a lump sum basis and the attorney took a per-
centage fee on the lump sum consideration, either without having to demonstrate that benefits 
were actually disputed, or at most having simply to demonstrate that the attorney was instrumental 
in obtaining the impairment rating. There is testimony in the record from attorneys practicing be-
fore the Commission whose tenure before it exceeds that of the present Commissioners. Attorney 
Alan Hull, essentially the Dean of the Worker's Compensation bar in view of his years of special-
ized practice in that area, testified at the hearing as follows: 
But the interpretation is up to you and we didn't see the interpretation where it's presumed that 
PPI wasn't subject to attorney's fees until about 12 years ago. 
Testimony of Allan Hull, Hearing Transcript p. 911. 6-9. 
Now, I have done this for about 30 years and since Kerr (sic.) was decided and the new regula-
tions were passed, up until about a year ago it was possible to pass the threshold with the 
claims consultants simply by saying -- they said, well, give us a letter that shows that you re-
quested the impairment rating and that's satisfactory. Okay. The present decision and what we 
get out of the -- the informal determination is that that is no longer enough. That we have to 
show, number one, that there is a dispute and we have to show, essentially, that we overcame 
the wrestling match. Okay? Now, if these are to be clear guidelines, it is impossible for both 
of those interpretations of the same regulation to be correct. 
Seiniger Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 2711. 1-18. 
Appellant has handled hundreds of Workers Compensation cases before the Idaho Indus-
trial Commission. If the Respondent Commission is representing that its present regulation as ap-
plied is in essence the same as the "informal rule" (IAR 72-803.2), Appellant, as an officer ofthis 
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Court, can assure this Court that any representation that the Commission is simply continuing its 
present practice with respect to and the interpretation ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is not accurate. 
It has only been within the last several years that Appellant was asked to produce more than a let-
ter to the Claimant's physician requesting an impairment rating to satisfY the requirements of 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 to justifY taking an attorney fee on a permanent impairment rating. If the 
present Commission's interpretation ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 is correct, it may well be that 
prior Commissions (including two ofthe present Commissioners) were lax in its application, but it 
is simply not true that the Commission has consistently limited attorney fees to "new money" gen-
erated as a result of a "dispute." Indeed, in all three cases on appeal here attorney's fees were ap-
proved on benefits other than for permanent impairment paid under the lump sum agreements, 
with no showing by the Appellant that those benefits were "primarily or substantially" obtained by 
his efforts as a result of a dispute, other than the simple perfunctory recitation contained in every 
lump sum agreement of matters disputed in general. The simple fact is that the Commission as 
presently composed, believes that attorney's fees should not be paid on impairment absent a dis-
pute, but accepts that attorney's fees on disability (in excess of impairment) can be paid even if 
there is no proof that disability beyond impairment was actually disputed. 17 Whatever the fate of 
17 This continues to be the case as demonstrated by the comments of Commissioner Baskin at the hearing in the Kulm 
case on appeal here: 
With respect to the facts of this case, I mean it seems clear to me -- at least I'm satisfied that that standard 
was met with respect the PPD benefits that were paid prior to the lump sum settlement. You went out and did 
what good claimant's attorney would do on these, you obtained a vocational opinion from - in this case Mrs. Bar-
ros-Bailey that supported a determination that there was, indeed, some disability in excess of impairment and the 
surety, for whatever reason, started paying it prior to the settlement of the case in chief and, you know, I'm satis-
fied on that showing that it was, indeed, your efforts that were primarily and substantially responsible for securing 
that fund. (Emphasis supplied.) But I have a different issue with respect to the PPI benefits. Where is the show-
ing in that case or with respect to that fund that it was your efforts that were responsible for securing it? 
And, you know, I've thought a great deal about the available fund issue, too. I can tell you have. It seems to 
me that available funds assuredly include funds, the entitlement to which had not been determined until after you 
were retained as counsel. In other words, claimant's in a period of recovery at the time you're retained. Time 
passes, she's pronounced medically stable and she's found to be entitled to a PPI award and say it's the treating 
physician that comes up with that decision at the request of the surety. Now, that seems to me to be within the 
definition of what available funds are. It's something that was not disputed, but it became an entitlement that arose 
after your retention in the case. I think it falls within the ambit of what is meant by available funds. The problem 
that I struggle with is that I see that the available funds to which a charging lien attaches are further constrained by 
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this appeal, its outcome should rise or fall on the reality of practice before the Commission and the 
actual history of the interpretation and application ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01. Whatever the con-
tinued vitality of the Constitutional guarantees recognized in Curr, those guarantees deserve at 
least the dignity of being considered in light of reality and not an administrative fiction. 
IX. THE COMMISSION CONFUSES SPECULATION AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Although the Appellant does not challenge the Commission's exercise of discretion, and 
did not even attempt to prove that he satisfied the requirements ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 with 
respect to his claim for attorney's fees, Commissioner Baskin's interrogation of Attorney Alan 
Hull points to an additional problem with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 as it is being currently applied. 
What the Commission missed is the distinction between speculation and reasonable inferences 
drawn from circumstantial evidence. What Mr. Hull actually offered was circumstantial evidence: 
COMMISSIONER BASKIN: "But since the regs that we have got are the ones that are appli-
cable right now, I would be interested, Mr. Hull, in your comments on what it means to be 
primarily and substantially responsible for securing a fund, particularly against the background 
of this case, which, as I understand it, Mr. Seiniger did go out and retain the services of Dr. 
Radnovich in June of2007. Dr. Radnovich did issue an impairment rating, which was 12 per-
cent of the whole person or thereabouts. The surety did not pay it, refused to pay it, I'm not 
exactly sure why. It may have been because they were taking the position that the claimant 
was not medically stable at that time. But, at any rate, it was not until October of '07 that the 
surety obtained its own rating from Dr. Rogers and it was a six percent impairment rating. 
That was the rating that was paid if it's not a situation where the ratings were average and the 
average paid. The only rating that was paid was the six percent rating. So, with that back-
ground, your comments on -- on how it is that that fund of money -- how we should view that 
in light of the requirements that we only entertain a request for an attorney fee on that sum that 
is demonstrated that counsel's efforts were primarily and substantially responsible for securing 
the fund." 
MR. HULL: "As I told the Commission in our telephone conference, we were hired only to 
the next provision, which contains the four sub parts that have to be met here, not in the disjunctive. Among them 
is the requirement that counsel demonstrate that his efforts were primarily and substantially responsible for secur-
ing the funds from which he hopes to be paid. That's where I get hung up. And I am particularly interested in -- in 
your comments, as well as Mr. Hull's on what that means in our current regulatory scheme and what is the proof 
that we should look at to be satisfied that your efforts were primarily or substantially responsible for securing that 
fund. 
Kulm Hearing Transcript p. 37 I. 8 to p. 39 I. 2. It is obvious that the Commission is applying a different standard to 
permanent impairment benefits than it is to disability benefits, notwithstanding Respondent's briefs representation in 
conclusion that it considers itself constrained by IDAPA 17.02.08.033 to award attorneys fees only with respect to dis-
puted benefits. Commissioner Baskin's comments also directly conflict with the order entered in Rodriguez. 
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draft this and, unfortunately, the adjuster is no longer in the country, so I don't know what their 
thought process is, but let me suggest to you the following: Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came 
aboard there was no effort to get a rating by the surety and as you know from practice, often-
times that's the case. Claimant's counsel will force the surety to get them a rating. Having 
done that, it seems to me that big fund of money that came about, at least partially and proba-
bly significantly because of the result of claimant's counsel. I mean a lot of times the adjuster 
will not get a rating until they are forced into doing that and, certainly, it would appear that 
that was the case here." 
Hearing Transcript p. 11 1.13 to p. 13 1.2. (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Hull's testimony was rejected 
as "entirely speculative." Order On Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration, Agency Record p. 
432. Mr. Hull urged the Commission to create a presumption to reflect the fact that in his long 
experience, obtaining an impairment rating spurs an adjuster to obtain their own impairment rating 
(generally more favorable to the employer/surety) and pay that rating. However, it is unlikely that 
an adjuster would ever admit that this was her motivation for a variety of reasons. Presumptions 
can be created to correct an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to the proof. 2 
McCormick On Evid. § 343 (6th ed.). However, a presumption is not needed because correctly 
viewed, Mr. Hull's testimony that Appellant obtained an impairment rating that was then followed 
by the adjuster obtaining and paying an impairment rating from another physician was circumstan-
tial evidence that the payment of the second impairment rating was prompted by Appellant. This, 
in the face of no evidence to the contrary, should have been sufficient to carry the day for Appel-
lant, had he chosen to raise the factual issue of his meeting the standards ofIDAP A 
17.02.08.033.01 at issue. 
The Commission mischaracterizes Appellant's position as an argument "that the involve-
ment of an attorney always spurs the recalcitrant surety to toe the line and do things in a timely 
fashion." Respondent's Brief, p. 23. (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant has never made such an ar-
gument, though he does argue that this often proves to be the case. This argument is made, how-
ever, not to support the further argument that Appellant should be presumed to have satisfied the 
burden of proof contained in IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01, but to point out that in many cases it simply 
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may be impossible to satisfy that burden due to the subtle realities of the negotiations that take 
place over months or years in the handling of a complex Workers Compensation case. 
That is a different issue than the character of Mr. Hull's testimony. Consider the implica-
tions of not accepting such proof as circumstantial evidence. Impairment ratings are often paid 
months or years prior to a lump sum settlement. In the Kulm case, the adjuster was out of the 
country at the time of hearing. Is Claimant's counsel to depose the adjuster, perhaps multiple 
times, as benefits are paid out to make a record of the reasons that the adjuster made the decision 
to pay the benefits? Suppose that, as in Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 
735 (2000), the adjuster simply testifies that the benefits were paid on advice of counsel. Check-
mate? Yes, if one follows the Commission's reasoning and, regrettably, this Court's reasoning in 
Johnson: "All of this testimony supports the conclusion that any work Pena did was directed at 
encouraging Boise Cascade to accept full responsibility for the medical bills related to the two 
later surgeries, which they questioned but fully accepted immediately after consulting with outside 
counsel, not as a result of anything Pena did." Johnson 353, 738.18 Again, Appellant has not 
raised the Commission's exercise of discretion (on factual issues essentially abandoned in the 
hearings below) on appeal. However, since the Commission was determined below (see, deci-
sions in Kulm) to relitigate that which was not actually litigated in the first place, it falls to the 
Appellant to point out the error in its reasoning. 
X. RESPONDENT'S REVIEW OF PRIOR CASES INVOLVING ONLY CHALLENGES To THE 
COMMISSION'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION Is FLAWED 
Respondent goes to some lengths to review this Court's prior opinions in Mancilla v. Greg, 
18 The implications of Johnson are troubling in that if a claimant's attorney has the burden of proof to establish the moti-
vation of the adjuster in paying a claim, any reliance on advice of its counsels waives the attorney-client privilege. ''This 
Court has also recognized that the attorney-client privilege is a defensive shield and not an offensive sword." In re Ni-
day, 15 Idaho 559,566,98 P. 845 (1908). Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,420,565 P.2d 1374,1377 (1977); 8 
Wigmore, supra, s 2327 at 638. See also: McCormick on Evidence, s 91 at 191 and s 93 at 194-95 (2d ed. 1972); 
Comment, supra, 9 U.C.D. L. Rev. at 496-502, 509-511, 518-520. It would appear from Johnson that the surety's reli-
ance on its counsel's advice was used a sword against Mr. Pena. 
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131 Idaho 685, 687, 963 P.2d 368, 370 (1998), Johnson v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 134 Idaho 
350,352,2 P.3d 735, 737 (2000; rehearing denied 16 Jun 2000), and Cheung v. Perra, 143 Idaho 
30, 137 P.3d 417 (2006; rehearing denied June 29, 2006). Respondent's Brief, p. 20-22. Respon-
dent asserts: "In all three of these cases, Mancilla, Johnson, and Cheung, this Court examined and 
upheld the Commission's application of provisions of the current regulation that is again being 
challenged by Seiniger in this case." Respondent's Brief, p. 22. Appellant will not discuss these 
cases, because each dealt essentially with whether or not the record before this Court contained 
substantial and competent evidence to support the exercise of discretion in applying the applicable 
sections ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 (the attorney fee regulation), not its statutory authority or con-
stitutionality. Appellant makes no such argument here, and therefore these cases are inapposite. 
This appeal deals only with the issues of statutory authority and constitutionality. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The discussion of constitutional questions throws a luster round the bar, and gives dignity to 
its functions, which rarely belong to the profession in any other country. Lawyers are here 
emphatically placed as sentinels upon the outposts of the constitution; and no nobler end can 
be proposed for their ambition or patriotism, than to stand as faithful guardians of the constitu-
tion, ready to defend its legitimate powers, and to stay the arm of legislative, executive or 
popular oppression. 
Joseph Story, Address before Suffolk Bar, Boston, 4, September, 1821, in Miscellaneous Writings 
of Joseph Story 198,227-228 (William W. Story ed. 1852) It is with the greatest humility and 
trepidation that Appellant takes this appeal, because he fears that rather than vindicating the im-
portant principals that motivate him, securing the right of claimants like Laurel Kulm to retain an 
attorney to counsel, advise and represent her even in undisputed matters, he may only succeed in 
prompting the issuance of an opinion offering the Commission what it asks for, an advisory opin-
ion characterized as "guidance." Respectfully, "guidance" of the dubious quality offered by the 
dicta in Rhodes relying itselfupon dicta in Triplett and Walters, will further undermine the judi-
cial office of attorney and concomitantly the authority of the judiciary itself. The principle an-
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nounced in Rhodes in dicta, that any restriction on the ability of an attorney and client to agree to 
the measure and mode of compensation is acceptable so long as the lawyer is paid something, is 
one which, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a legislature dominated by any faction to 
effectively tip the scales of justice irrevocably in its favor. Over the years, Appellant has devel-
oped a profound respect for the reasoning and wisdom ofthis Court. However, Appellant cannot 
shrink from what he considers a moral obligation to challenge the dicta in Rhodes permitting the 
legislature or any agency effectively to deny one side the right to counsel, which, however permis-
sible that may be under a relaxed due process analysis, clearly intrudes on this Court's regulation 
of the practice of law. 
Perhaps it is asking too much to expect this Court to accept Appellant's representation that 
he knows he would be financially better off simply declining clients with small cases, and that for 
over thirty years he has accepted virtually every Workers Compensation claimant that has asked to 
retain him, whether or not it appeared that it would be profitable to do so, believing that by doing 
so he was fulfilling the spirit of his attorney's oath. Appellant does believe, however, that this 
Court will accept the logic of the argument that if the Idaho Industrial Commission can carve out 
the areas of legal service that an attorney can charge for, then so too can every other agency and 
branch of government. 
This Court considers access to justice so essential that attorneys are required to swear that 
they "will never reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or 
oppressed." Appellant has taken this oath seriously and he believes that he has lived up to it. The 
oath, and the fact that the Court can require an attorney as an officer of the Court to perform ser-
vices at no compensation if necessary, make it clear that the practice of law is not merely "eco-
nomic activity" that should be subject to economic regulation at the whim of another branch of 
government. Contrary to the Commission's paraphrasing of Appellant's argument, he does not 
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contend that any attempt by the Commission to use objective criteria to measure "reasonableness" 
is "unconstitutional." However, it is consistent with the judiciary's exclusive right and responsi-
bility to regulate the practice of law to limit a co-ordinate branch of government's right to "ap-
prove" attorneys fees under I.C. § 72-803 or even to "regulate" them, so that any standard, objec-
tive or subjective, does not infringe upon the exclusive right of the jUdiciary to regulate the prac-
tice of law. To the extent that either co-ordinate branch of government or agency adopts its own 
standards limiting what services an attorney can be paid to perform, or what a client can agree to 
pay apart from considerations of reasonableness, that exclusive power is infringed upon. 
Despite the plain language ofIdaho Code § 3-205, Rhodes deals with the rights and duties 
of attorneys with respect to the measure and mode of compensation, as if it were dealing with any 
other "economic regulation." Rhodes 142,470. If Rhodes literally means what it says, the Com-
mission has "exclusive jurisdiction" and could pass a regulation that all fee agreements entered 
into by Claimants are to be enforced according to their terms, without regard to reasonableness, 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 or this Court's cases regarding the factors to be considered 
in determining if fees are reasonable, if supported by the proverbial peppercorn. Of course, this 
example is unlikely, but for purposes of analysis, it illustrates that Rhodes essentially abandons the 
field that it claims to hold exclusively. Clearly, this Court views the regulation of attorney's fees 
to be within the exercise of its regulation of the practice of law. It may be that factors other than 
those contained in Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 and in this Court's cases are appropri-
ate for the Commission to consider in approving attorneys fees, but whatever factors it considers, 
they cannot conflict with the Separation Of Powers Doctrine, I.C. § 3-205, the First Amendment, 
and the other constitutional guarantees vouched safe in Curro 
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Respectfully submitted April 2, 2012. 
Will Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Appellant/Real Party in Interest 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On April 2, 2012 I served two copies of the foregoing by hand delivery on: Lawrence G. Wasden, 
Blair D. Jaynes, Industrial Commission, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 
83720-0041, Facsimile: (208) 334-5145, Telephone: (208) 334-6028, Attorneys for Respondent 
Will Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Appellant/Real Party in Interest 
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WM. BIU!C!< Sl!lNIGU;,JIL 
/J.w, ~ I1!'dl", """ tIM DitWlIfcu..bi. 
JULIE Mt.lWi SElNIGEIl 
u.s.. ~ """ tIM Dimi# t(cu.. ... 
S~ber19,2oo9 
VIA EMAIL TOpurdue2you@msn.com 
And VIA u.s. MAlL 
LaureIKulm 
2090 Avenida de las Alturas 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 
RE: Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center 
Dear Laurel: 
This is in follow-up to the Skype conversation you bad with Breck and me on or about 
September 11,2009. As you know, we have inquired if you would be interested in 
executing an affidavit in support of our claim of attorney' s fees on the permanent partial 
Impairment (pPI) rating benefits, and on a portion of the permanent partial disability 
(PPD) benefits, paid on the injury that is the subject of your worker's compensation case 
before the Idaho Industrial Commission in which we are representing you. 
The amount involved is $330 1.72, which is the amount of attorney fees that the Industrial 
Commission ruled in its Order filed 9/4/09 to have not been substantiated as reasonable. 
(The Order was emailed to you earlier.) 
Unless the ColIllllission or an appellate court changes the Order, you will receive the 
additional sum of$330L72, instead of that sum being awarded to us for attorney fees. 
(Of course, regardless of this issue you will still also receive the $9740.00 as set forth in 
the Lump Sum Agreement you signed.) 
This raises a conflict of interest on our part, in that it is against your financial interest to 
support our claim for these attorneys' fees. I have attached a copy ofIdaho Rule of 
Pmfession Conduct 1.7 and its Commentaty for your review, which addresses conflicts of 
interest between clients and lawyers (which can arise from the lawyer's own interests as 
mentioned in Commentary [1)). You can go to the following web site to review the rules 
of ethics. from which I copied the attached rule: 
http:tr!Sb.idaho.gov/generallrules(!!pC.html. 
A lawyer has an obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Therefore, 
during the phone conversation we had last week, we advised you of certain things that 
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will be included in your affidavit concerning this conflict of interest if you elect to waive 
any conflict of interest and file an affidavit in support of our claim for attorneys fees on 
the PPI and PPD benefits obtained for you for your injury. The proposed affidavit will be 
sent to you under separate cover. 
It: after reviewing the attached, you still wish to file an affidavit in support of our motion 
for attorney fees, I request that you sign the attached waiver and return it to me. Again, 
you have no obligation to waive the conflict of interest or sign an affidavit supporting our 




P.S. You may scan and email your signed waiver. or you may fax it to our temporary fax 
number of208-433·9727. In any event, please also mail an original of your signature to 
us. Thank you. 
942 W. MYRTLE STRE'.ET 
BoISE, IDAHo 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Pax: (208) 345-4700 
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• 
[Ill t.oyalIy 10 a __ ~ uncIeItaldng ~ dIIuc:tI!' _10 that _ wIIhouI that cIIent's 
Infol'mecl consent. 1"111$, __ consent. a Iawyar may not ad aa an acIvocate in one _ against a pet10n IMlawyet 
repmenIs In some OIlIer matIef. _ wIMIn 1M matlel'l1Ilt wholly UIII'elIIlId. The dienI II 10 whom 1M ~ Is 
dlredIy _ II Ilkeiy 10 lIIeI bmlyed. and 1M raauItlng damage 10 !he ~ IlIIatIonship II IbIy 10 Impair tile 
Iawye<'S abIliIy 10 ~ 1M cllent~. In addiIIon, !he dienI on ""'- btIJaIf!he _ 1IIpI~ Is 
undertaken reasonably may !1m that !he Iawyar wi pwwe that cIIent's _ '-elfIIcI\IIeIJ out of IIeferenee 10 !he other 
cfiant. I.e •• lItal tile ~ may be matarIa!Iy IimIIad by tile Iawye<'S InWMt In I'IiIIaIIIInII 1M _ dIent. 
SImiIaIiy. a dir8<:1Iy __ cmftIct may 8IIse wIMIn a Iawyar II ,.quIIed 10 ctOIIHlI8mIne 8 _ WhO appem$ 88 8 
__ In a la'wsuft InvaIvInO anotIler cfiant. as wIMIn !he taaIimOnY wi be danIagIIIg to !he _ WhO Is ~ In 
!he lawsuit. On !he other hand. ~re~llaIIcI, in IIMIIa1ed matIeI'I of dIenta Wb088 inIIInIsIs 8iI8 only 
eccnomically advetw. 1M:!! 88 _1tIIIlon of 00/IlIlIIIiI1G economic ~ in UIII'elIIlId iIIIQIdIon. does not 
01lllnaJ1ly oonsIiIute a confticl of inIetest and IItIl5 may not requIRI __ of tile ~ dIenta. 
[7J 0IIeeIIy. __ can also _ in _ matiere. For example. if a lawyer Is uked 10 ~ 
tile seller of a buein88& In ~with a buyer ~ by !he lawyer, not in tile _ transaction bulin anotIler. 
unrelated _. !he lawyarcould not ~ tile wIIhouI!he informed __ of each client. 
[Ill In addIIloo 10 _ willi OIlIer current dIenta. a lawye(s duII88 of loyally and Independence may be matarIa!Iy 
limited by ~ 10 fonner dIents Under Ruis 1.9 or by tile IawyeI's responslbIIitie to other pet1OnS. 1M:!! as 
ftduda!y duII88 arising from a lawyet's MIYIc:e 88 a _. __ or c::otpOtatei dncIot. 
[101 The iawyet's own In __ not be permIIIad 10 _ an _ e1I'ect on ~taIion of a client. For 
a""",pIe. If !he probily of a lawye(s own conduct In a transaction Is In seriout question. II may be diIIIcuII or ImpoAIbIa for 
tile Iawyar to gIVe a _ deIacIIed advice. SImiIaIiy. when a lawyer has dlecuastons concamIng possIbIII ampIeyment 
with an opponent of !he IawyeI's -. or with a law IImI represanllng 1M opponent. 1M:!! dlecuastons COUld IIIIIlIriaIIy 
limit tile Iawyet'a IIIpI88&ntaIion of !he dlenl In addIIloo. a lawyer may not allow IIIIaIad bwIIness InWMts 10 ailed 
~. for example. by refening dIents to an enI8IpIIsa In which !he lawyer _ an undIscIosad IInanc:IaIInIIIAIsI. 
See Rule 1.8 lor specIIIc Rules paI1aIning 10 II IlIIII'Ibet of personaIlnWMt _.1neIudIng bwIIness transactions with 
dienIs. See also Ruis 1.10 (personaI1nIImISI_ under RuIs 1.7 0IdInarIIy lilt not ImpuIIId 10 other lawyers In a law 
1ImI). 
(11) \M>en lawyers IIIpI88aIIliI!g dlIfimlnI dIents In tile same _ or In $UbsIantiIIIy IIIIeIed _ lilt c:IosaIY teIe1ad 
by blood. maniaga or oIber domaslIc teIaI!onahlp. IheI1I may be • aIgnlIIcanllist that _ conIderu:es wi be J!IW8Ied 
and that !he Iawyet'a domaslIc reIaIionshIp wIiIlnIerfere willi boIh loyalty and Independent profasalonal judgmenI. As a 
result. each _ Is anlIIIed 10 know of tile exIstenoa and ImpIic:aIlons of !he IlIIatIonship beIwaan !he lawyers beIilfII 1M 
Iawyar agrees 10 ~ !he ~1atIon. llws. a Iawyar IIIIeIed 10 anotIler lawyer, e.lI .. 88 parent, dIIkI, sibling, 
spouse or domasIic peItner. 0IdInarIIy may not I'8pI888nI a _ In a _ WIIaI8 that lawyer Is fIIPI8I4IIIIInl anoIber 
party. unIeaa each _ gives InfomIad consent. The dIsquaIIIicatio arieIAo from • dOse famIy or domIIIIic IlIIatIonship 
Is personal and 0IdinariIy Is not IrIipu1ad 10 membenI of IImIa willi whom !he lawyers are II8IlOda!ed. See RuIs 1.10. 
lIZ! A Iawyar 1& prohIbbed from anga;In; In sexual reialicnships willi a __ !he sexual reIaIionshIp predates 
tile fomIation of tile cIIenHawyer reIaIionshIp. See RuIs 1.8(1). 
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(13) A ~ may be paid 110m a _ 0Iher flIIm the dIent, iIIcItJdIng II coden!, If the dIImt iii iII10tmed of thal 
facI and consenIs and 1IIe ~ _ not c:ompromisa 1IIe lawyel'a duty of loyally or indepJndent jIIdgmenI to 1IIe 
_ See Rulli 1.8(1). If aecepIaIIee of 1IIe payment from iIIIY 0Iher __ presan!s a significant rlak _ 1he lawyel's 
repAISeIIletion of 1he eIent will be maIefIalIy IimIIed by 1IIe IawyeI'a ownlnlemt III accommoda1ing 1IIe _ paying 1he 
1awyeI'$ fee or by 1IIe lawyel's ~ to II payer _ Is aiao • coden!, lIlan 1he lawyer must compty WlIII1he 
tlIqulremenls of ~ (1)) befonI accepIIng 1he ~, iIIcItJdIng dete/mIrIIng IVheIIIer tile ccnlIk:t iii 
_ and. If so. _ lhe eIent has adeqUal4ln1cnnation about lhe material rIaks ofllle~. 
[14) 0n:Ilnarily, client! may consent to ..,._1aIlon notwIIhsIanding a c:cnIIk:t. However. as IItdk:aIed In ~ 
(1)). some ccnlIk:ts IIRI nonconsenIabIe. meaning _ lhe ~ ~ cannot ~ ask for SUCh agraamenl or 
provide represantafion on 1IIe basis of 1he dlent's consent When 1he ~ Is I8pI888!lIIng 11lOI'II lIlan _ dIenI, 1he 
question of consantabIIIIy must be resolved as 10 ""'*' cflel\l. 
[IS! ConIIentablllly Is fYpic:aIIy delennlned by considering whelherllle ~ of tile dIImts will be adequately protactad 
If lhe dIImts IIRI permitted to give their Infolmed consent to _1aIlon burdened by a oanlIicI of InIaresI. Thus. under 
~ (b){I). repAISeIIletion Is p!C/IIbIIed If In 1he cItcumsIances lhe lawyer cannot reuonabIy conduda _ 1he 
lawyer will be able to provide ~ and dIIigaIII __ • See Rulli 1.1 (~) and RullI 1.3 (cIIIIgence). 
[16] Paragtapll (b){2) /IeIsaibe$ oanlIicIs ilia! IIRI ~ bacauaa lhe ~tion Is ptOllib4!ed by applicable 
lew. For example. In some sIales IIUbstanIIve lew provides thai lhe same lawyer may noI represanl mora flIIm ana 
defIIndant in a capital case. even WlIII lhe consent of lhe dIenIs. and Under fedenII criminal &tiIluIes _ 
~ by II fonner govamment lawyer IIRI ptOIIib4Ied, despite 1IIe Inbmed consent of 1IIe former dlent. In 
addition. dedsIonaf lew In some sIales limits 1he abIIiIy of a goverr\II18I1Ia dIenI, SUCh 11$ a munIcIpaIIIy. Ie consent 10 a 
oon1IId of InIaresI. 
[17] Peragtapll (b)(3) cIeaait>ea oanlIicIs thallIRI ~ bacauaa of 1IIe irlIdIuIlonaIlnlemt In vigorous 
deveIopmant of ""'*' dIent's poslIIon when lhe dIImts .... a&!;Jned dltecIIy ~__ In the same IiIIgaIIon or 
_ proeei!I(!Ing befonI a 1ribunaI. Whe1het dIImts aN aligned dltecIIy against ""'*' oIher WlIIIIn the meaning of IIIIs 
~ requlle$ IIXIIlIIInation of IIIe cantut of the proceeding. AftIIoutIIIIIlIa peragtapII_ not pnIducIe a lawyel's 
muII!pIa represantafion of adverse psrlIas 10 a mediation (becauaa mediation Is nola pICOHdIng befoN " "1IibImIII" Under 
Ru..,I.Ojm)), such _tation may be ~ by ~ (I>){I). 
[181 Informed consent requires ilia! eaciI allilcktd eIent be _ of 1he I!IIevant c:In:::umsIanca and of 1he material 
and !IIlIlIO!1IlbIy btIaaeabIe ways _ IIIe oanlIicI eouId have ad-. elects on 1he ~ of thai cIIenl. See Rulli 
1.0(1) (lIIbrmed consanI). The InformelIon requiNd depends on 1he ...... of 1he ccnlIk:t and 1he _ of 1he rIaks 
Involved. When NPNMfttation of muII!pIa dIImts In a single mat1er Is UnderIeken. the InformelIon mus1 Include 1he 
impI!caIIons of 1he common ~ including possible elects on loyally, confidentiaIIIy and lhe ~
p!MIege and 1he advantages and rIaks Involved. See CommenI.a 1301 and (31) (elfect of common repreaaIIletion on 
contidentiaIiIy). 
[19] Under_circumstances K may be impossible 10 make lhe disdosure necB8SIIIY to~ consent For e.amp/e. 
when 1he lawyer represents diIfeIenI dientI in I1IiaIed _ and _ of the cIIenta I8fUses 10 -.I to lhe dIsdoswa 
/IeC8S$8I)' Ie perm111he oIher eIent 10 make an Inbrmed dadslon, !ha lawyer cannot ~ ask 1he ta\IIlr 10 consent In 
some _ lhe altemIIIIve 10 common __ can be .. at ""'*' party may have 10 ~ sapatIIIIII......-IlaUon 
WlIII !ha possIbI\IIy of incurring addI60naI =- Thesa costs.. along WlIII !ha beneIIIs of securtng sapatIIIIII repreaanIaUon • 
.... fa<*n _ may be considered by !ha affedecI dIImt In dete/mIrIIng wheIher common __ Is In 1he dIent's 
~. 
(20) P8IlI(/IIlIlII (1)) requires IIIe lawyer 10 ~ 1he informed consent of IIIe dIent. c:ontrmed In wriIIng. SUCII a 
wriIIng may consIs1 of a document eocacu18d by the dIImt or one thai !ha lawyer promptly I8CORIs and InINmIts 10 lhe 
eIent bIIowIng an oral consent See RullI 1.0(1)). See alSO RullI 1.0(11) (wriIIng ~ t!IIieIo1mnIc _I. If ft Is 
not I8asIbIe 10 _In or _ 1ha WIllIng at 1he _ lhe eIent gives Inbmed consent then 1ha lawyer mus1 ~ .... 
_ H WlIIIIn a NaSonable _ 1hareaIIer. See Rula 1.0(1)). The requIramenI of a wriIIng cM& not IUpIIIaIIt the nMd 
In moat _ for tile lawyer 10 talk witllhe dIent, 10 explain lhe rIaks and advanIagae, If any, of.-1IatIon burdened 
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[2lII Con1Wcts of inIenIst under pa/8QllIph$ (a)(1) and (a)(2) aris& In 0Il/IIelCtII oilier than 1I!lgaIIon. For a dIscussioI'I of 
dlreetiy adwtse CM1IlcIs ill llansaclional maIIIn ... Comment [7). RawnI facials In deWmlning ~ .... is 
significant potentIat lor ___ the duralIon and Intlmacv of the IawyeI'a I'IIfaIIonsI1lp wIIh the dIenI or 
clients ~. the fundIomI being petfotmed by the lawyer. the IIkaIIIIood Ihet ~ will an... and the IIkaIy 
pII!judioe 10 the ClIent trom the conIIItl The qUllllllon 1$ often one of ptOXimity and <leg-. See Comment 181. 
(27) For example. ootdIIcit qUIIIIIIon$ may a_ In aslate planning and asIaIe~. A lawyer may be G8IIed 
upon 10 pmpare wms lor several family memIlers, !ItJdI aa hIlIband and WifII. and, depending upon the c:IrcuInsIanaIs a 
COIIlIic! of inIete$I may be praaant In aaIaIe admInlslnllion the 1den1ilit of the client may be UI1dear under the laW of a 
pat1IcuIar jurisdIcfIon. Under one \/lew, the dIenI is the fidudaty; under _ \/lew the dIenI Is the asIaIe or trust. 
including Its beneIk:Iariaa. In onIer 10 CCIYIply wIIh COIIlIic! of inIenIst roiec. the lawyer should maIca cIur the IawyeI'a 
I'IIfaIIonsI1lpIo the pa/IkIs~. 
~I IMIeIttet a COIItid Is ~ dtIpeIId& on the cin::um&la_. For example. a lawyer may no! ~ ~ 
pa/IkIs 10 a negoIIaIIon \III'loee 1_ are bldamenlatly antagonIStic 10 aad't oilier. but ccmmon Is 
pemIIs&ibIe when! the _ 818 genEIIllIy aligned In inIenIst even thoOIgII .... Is _ dlIIiIrenca In inIIInISt _0 
them. TIIus. II lawyer may Mel< 10 ~ or adjust a tefalionslllp ~ clients on an amfcIIbIa and II'IUIII1IlIy 
~$ ba$I$: lor exaMpI&, in helping 10 0/IIIII1IZlI a IluslnaaII In whIcI! two or MOta _ 818 ~.
~ out the financial ~ of an ell1erpti$a In whlcll two or more clients have en inlerasl or 8ll'lllllllnlllI 
property dislllbutlcn in __ of an asIaIe. The lawyer _b 10 I8SOIVe poIe!ItiaIIy _ IntareaIs by developing 
the parties' fIlIlIIJaI 1n!e/8$1II. OIherwiH. eacIl party might ~ 10 obtain SIIpa/lIIII repJ1!iIIIfItII. wIIh the possIbIIiIv of 
inCtming ~ cost. complication or ....... flliglltlOn. GIven 111_ and _ nHevanI facIors. the clients may p.efar 
lila! the lawyer act lor all of them. 
(29) In eonsIdeting whether 10 repruen! tnIlIIIpI& _ in the same _. a lawyer Mould be mIndfUl Ihet If the 
common ~ falls _the poIe!ItiaIIy ad ___  be 18COIICIIed. the _ can be addi1IonaI 
cost.  and 1IIICIImInaIIon. OIdInarlIy, the lawyer will be frlR:ed 10 WIIhdraw fIom ~ all of Ihe 
clients If the common ~ falls. In soma siIIJations. Ihe risk of faIIura 1$ so great Ihet  flIPI_lIaIIcI. Is 
pl&inIy Impossible. For exampl&. a lawyer _ ~ common ~lIaIIon of clients when! oonIantIous IIIIgaIion 
or negotiaIIons _ them al8 lmmInant or ccnternpIaIad. 1oforeoWr. because Ihe lawyer 1$ noqulnld 10 be lmpartiaI 
~ commonly I8flI'iIIIII'lI clients, ~ of tnIlIIIpI& clients Is Improper whan • Ie unlikely Ihet Impa!tiaIily 
can be 1IIlIIntaInad. Generally. If the I'IIfaIIonsI1lp between Ihe pa/IkIs hall lIIIeady .-ned 1IIIIagoftIarn. Ihe possIbIIiIv 
Ihet the clients- inIe!esla can be adequalaly seM<I by common ~ Is no! very good. 0II1ar I8IevaI1t factoIs 
ani ~ lila lawyer subSequenUy will ~ boll! pa/IkIs on a CIOAIInuing balls and ~ the sl\uallon ImIoIves 
<::raaIinO or tan'IIInatiItO a I8ia1Ionship ~ the pa/IkIs. 
(30) A partic:uIaIIy impoI1ant Iactor ill deWmIning 1IIe ~ of common ~ Is the e!rect on client· 
Iawy .... COIIIidenlIalIty and the allomey_ privIIega. VWh I'IIgiII'C 10 the auomey_ privIIega. Ihe prevaifIng rule Is 
IIIat. a$ ~ ~~ clients. Ihe privIIega dOe$no! lI\Iad\. Hence. 1_ be a$$UIIIIId Ihet If IIIIgaIion 
_las between II1II clients. the privIIega will no! protect any !ItJdI oornrnunIoIIIio and Ihe clients should be 80 
adVIaed. 
[311 As 10 Ihe duly of con1ldantiaIIIy. COI1IInued common ~ will aIr!tott oetIaInty be ~ If one 
client uI<a the lawyer not 10 dIsdcse 10 the oilier dIenIlnIormaIIon relevant 10 Ihe common representatIcn. ThIs IS 80 
_ Ihe lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to aad't client, and eacIl dIenI has the tight 10 be informed of eny1hing 
bearing 00 lIIe ~ Ihet might aft'act Ihet cIient'5 __ and Ihe tight 10 expecIlhet the lawyer wII use Ihet 
InIormaIIon 10 Ihet dIenI's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should. allhe 0tlI$a1 of Ihe common raprwenIalion and 8$ 
part of Ihe pn:iC8$$ of _nioo eacIl cIient'5 inIormed consent. advise aad't dIenIlhet Informa1Ion will be sllal8d and Ihet 
the lawyer will ~ 10 WIIhdraw K one dIent decIdeIIlhet some _ malarial 10 the ~ should be kepi fIom 
lite oilier. ill IImIIed _. ft lI'Iay be appmprillle for the lawyer 10 J)I1)OIlad willi Ihe raprwenIalion whan the 
clients ~ 8iQIIiled. after being propeI1y inIormed. Ihet Ihe laWyer will keep ceIIIIIn InIormaIIon confidential. For exampI&. 
Ihe lawyer may I1IIISOflIIl>Iy _ lite! faIIura to dlsdoH one dlenl's InIda secta1S 10 enoIhet client will no! ad-'Y 
afIect represenIaIIon imIoIvlng a jCm1! _18 between the clients and 8gnIe 10 kaep Ihet InIormaIIon contIdIIn1iaI wIIh the 
inIormed OOOtIerIt of boll! clients. 
1321 'M1en see4dng 10 astabllsh Of adjust a I'IIfaIIonsI1lp ~ clients, Ihe lawyer should make cIur Ihet the Iawye($ 
role Is no! Ihet of pa!1Iisans!llp oonnaiIy expecIad in oilier _ and. 1IIus, Ihet file clients may be !IIqUirad 10 
aAWlle greater rasponsIbiD!y lor decIskIns \lien whan aad't dIent 1$ separateIy~. Any IImII:aIIonII onlhe scope 
of Ihe __ lion _ necessary as a _ oflhe 00I!IIII0Ii ~ should be fully explained Ie Ihe clients at 
1IIe 0tlI$a1 of the repJ1!iIIIfItII. See Rule 12((;). 
[33) SIIbjed to the above 1ImIIaIIons, aad't dIenI In the CCIIIImOII replU8nlallon hall Ihe tight 10 loyal and dIIIpnI 
~ and Ihe protecIori of Rule 1.9 oonceming Ihe obligations 10 a former cIIim!. The dIenI alSO hall Ihe IIgIIt to 
dIscIlIIIga the lawyer as a1a1ad In Rule 1.16. 
942 W. MYR1U:!. STREET 
BoISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345·1000 












1341 A lawyer who ~ a corporaIIon Of otIIet organlallon dae$ no!. by virtue of \bat ~ -.rIIy 
f8PA1Nnt any constillJenl Of aIIIIia1ed organIaIIon, oucII 11& a peren! or subeIdlaIy. See Rule 1.13(1). TbIIs.!he lawyer 
lor an organlallon 1$ no! bCmld from ICOepIl/!O tepnlgenta1loll acIvenIe !D an aIIIliate in an IlIII'llIaIed mailer. unIes$ lie 
~ ... oucII \bat !he aftiIiaIe shoufd also be ~ a client of !he lawyer. IherII 1$ an UIldemandiIIO 
between !he lawyer and !he orgatllD!lcnal client \bat Ill. lawyer wIIi aWIId tepnIgentaIIoII acIvenIe 10 the CIIIetIt'lI aiIIIiIIes, 
Of the Iawyer'a obIIgaIIons 10 eIIher !he ~ client Of the new client ani IikIIIy 10 limit maIet!aIly the Iawyer'a 
tepnIgentaIIoII of the other dIent. 
[35} A lawyer lor a COIpOI'dOn Of otIIet organIaIIon who Is also a membet of /IS bo8nI of dItIIt:IOfS shoufd deIermII'Ie 
_ the recponsIbIIIlIe of the two roles may conftict The lawyer may be caIed 01\ to _ the corporaIIon in 
_ irwoMnQ -. of lie dI!edors. ConsideI'aIIon shoufd be glven to lie fnIquencoy with which such sIIuationa may 
arise. the poIentIaIlnIensIIy of the conftict. the eIfecI of the Iawyer'a reaiIInaIIon from lie I>oanI and tile ~ of lie 
COIpOI'dOn'a obtaining legal advice from another lawyer In such SIIuaIIons. If lie .. Is materIIII- risk \bat the dwllOIo will 
compromise lie lawye(s Independence of profes;slonaI ju<IgmenI. !he lawyer should not SlIM! as a diA>cIor or shoufd 
cease to act as the COIpOI'dOn's lawyer """"' c:cnlIIdII of in_ arise. The lawyer shoufd _ !he other ..-.", of 
!he bCanI \bat In some ~ mattera dlscussed at bCanI meeIIngs WhIle !he lawyer 1$ pnasenlin lie capadIy of 
dIredor might no! be proIactad by !he atlDmey-dient privilege and \bat <XlI'lflIcI of ~ ~ might require lie 
lawyer's reoosalll& II dIredor Of migllll'llq1Jll& !he lawyer and the Iawyer'a firm 10 cIecIimI  of !he corporaIIon 
In a mailer. 
942 W. MYR11..E STREET 
BoISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
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&ptRnbtJr 19, 2009 
Page90f9 
WAIVER O'r CO'NJ'LICf O'r INTEREST 
• 
r have rud the foregoing letter dated September 19, 2009 and the foregoing ethics Rule 
1.1. I undemand the nature and extent of the contlict of interest that Soiniger Law 
Offieos. P.A. baa in regard to the attorney fee issue in my worker's compensation case 
titled Kubn v. Mercy MedlcoJ Center. 
r understand that it is against my financial interest in the IIDIOUDt of no less than $3301.72 
to support their claim for attorney fees. I Iatowingly and vohmtarily elect to waive the 
oonfIict of interest. 
I understand that I have no obligadoo to waive the contlict of interest or to sign an 
affidavit supporting the claim ofSeinlger Law Offices, P.A. for attorney's fees. 
I have bad an opportunity to discuss this issue with Seiniger Law Oftlces, P.A. to my 
satisfaction. I also undmtam:I that 1 have the right to CODSUIt with separate legal counsel 
before signina this waiver or before signing any affidavit. 








942 W. MlIlI.11.P. Snmrr 
BoiSB, lDAIiO 83102 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (lOS) 345-4700 
APPENDIX 
/D3 
Letter to Laurel Kulm Advising of Conflict ofInterest and Waiver of Conflict 
- [X] -
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. OASIS LEGAL., 2012 WL 369798 (2012) 
Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C. v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.C 
2012 WL 369798 (Idaho Ind.Com.) 
Industrial Commission 
State of Idaho 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
v. 
OASIS LEGAL FINANCE, L.L.C., REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, DEFENDANT 
BRET TYLINSKI, CLAIMANT 
v. 
GUERDON ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., EMPLOYER 
AND 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, SURETY, DEFENDANTS 
JONATHON GOULD, CLAIMANT 
v. 
ORMOND BUILDERS, INC., EMPLOYER 
AND 
STATEINSURANCEFUND,SURETY,DEFENDANTS 









FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 By Order dated January 26,2011, Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., ("Oasis") was ordered 
to show cause why certain legal funding contracts between Oasis, and two Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Claimants, Bret Tylinski and Jonathan Gould, should not be 
found to be invalid under the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws. Subsequent thereto, 
the Commission was presented with a proposed lump sum settlement in the case of Terry 
Denny v. URS, for review and approval. That agreement anticipated a payment from the 
proceeds of the lump sum settlement to Oasis, in satisfaction of another legal funding 
contract. The Industrial Commission consolidated the three matters for the purposes of a 
show cause proceeding held on November 3, 2011 at Boise, Idaho. Present for Oasis was 
APPENDIX 
Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C. v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.C 
- [XI] -
R. Daniel Bowen, Esq., of Boise, Idaho, and William M. McErlean, Esq., of Chicago, 
Illinois. At hearing, the testimony of Lisa Foreman, General Counsel for Oasis, was 
taken. Oasis offered Exhibits 1 - 15, which were admitted into evidence. The prehearing 
deposition of James Arnold was also admitted into evidence. In addition to the foregoing, 
the Commission takes judicial notice of its own legal files on each of the three matters 
consolidated for purposes of the show cause proceeding. 
Oasis submitted a post-hearing brief and the matter came under advisement on December 
5, 2011. Being fully apprised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues the 
following decision regarding the applicability of the provisions of to the 
Oasis purchase agreements. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Inc. 
1. Jonathan Gould suffered a work related injury on or about May 22, 2008. His timely 
claim was accepted by Surety, and workers' compensation benefits were paid to 
Claimant, or on his behalf, for the effects of the injury. The parties disputed the extent 
and degree of both Claimant's impairment and disability in excess of impairment. These 
and other disputes were resolved via a lump sum settlement approved by the Industrial 
Commission on or about September 2, 2010. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, it 
was anticipated that Claimant would receive $32,391.50 lump sum consideration. The 
Commission approved attorney's fees in amount of $8,097.88, and costs in the amount of 
$1,000.00. Per the terms of the agreement, it was anticipated that Claimant would net 
$23,293.62 after the payment of attorney's fees and costs. On or about September 9, 
2010, the Industrial Commission was contacted by Claimant who had questions about 
additional funds withheld from the settlement. An inquiry from the Industrial 
Commission revealed that following approval of the lump sum settlement agreement, 
Surety contacted the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to ascertain whether or not 
a child support withholding order was in effect. Upon being advised of the settlement, the 
Department of Health and Welfare immediately issued a withholding order and delivered 
the same to Surety. Surety deducted the sum of $11,646.81 from the settlement amount 
for payment to the Department of Health and Welfare in satisfaction of the withholding 
order. Surety then forwarded a check in the amount of $20,744.69, ($32,391.50 -
$11,646.81) to Claimant's counsel. 
*2 2. The Commission also learned that an additional payment had been made directly 
from counsel's client trust account to an entity identified as Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., 
in the amount of $7,461.00. Claimant's counsel explained that this payment was made to 
satisfy Claimant's obligation under the terms of an agreement he had previously made 
with Oasis. After deductions for costs and attorney's fees approved by the Commission, 
the valid child support order, and the payment to Oasis, Claimant netted $4,185.81 from 
the original settlement of $32,391.50. 
3. At the request of the Commission, counsel provided the Commission with a copy of an 
Oasis "Purchase Agreement" executed by Claimant on June 16, 2009, pursuant to the 
terms of which he received the immediate payment of $3,650.00. The agreement 
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describes the transaction as follows: 
Seller [Gould] sells all of Seller's interest in and to the Purchased Interest to Purchaser 
[Oasis], and Purchaser purchases the Purchased Interest from Seller on the terms and 
conditions provided in this Purchase Agreement. The purchase of the Purchased Interest 
shall entitle Purchaser to receive the Oasis Ownership Amount ... As consideration for the 
sale of the Purchased Interest, Purchasers shall pay the Purchase Price to Seller ... " 
Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55. 
4. The terms "Purchased Interest" and "Oasis Ownership Amount," are defined as 
follows: 
"Oasis Ownership Amount" is the amount Purchaser is to be paid out of the Proceeds and 
as determined as of the date Purchaser receives payment based on the Payment Schedule 
on Page 1 of this Purchase Agreement. 
"Purchased Interest" means the right to receive a portion of the Proceeds equal to the 
Oasis Ownership Amount on the further terms and conditions provided for in this 
Purchase Agreement. 
§§ 1.2 and 1.4, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 56. 
Therefore, the interest that Oasis purchased for the sum of $3,650.00 is its right to 
recover from the proceeds of the workers' compensation case the "Oasis Ownership 
Amount," an amount which equals the original purchase price plus an additional amount 
that increases with the passage of time. Per the Gould agreement, the Oasis ownership 
amount payable to Oasis at any particular time is described in the payment schedule: 
Payment Schedule 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Oasis Ownership Amount: (Payoff 
Amount) 
June 16,2009 to December 15,2009 $5,475.00 
December 16,2009 to June 15,2010 $6,022.50 
June 16,2010 to September 15,2010 $8,212.50 
September 16, 2010 to December 15, 2010 $9,125.00 
December 16,2010 to June 15,2011 $10,057.50 
June 16, 2011 to December 15, 2011 $11,862.50 
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December 16, 2011 and thereafter $12,775.00 
Fees Due at Repayment: 
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months $20.00 
Subsequent Case Review for each additional $20.00 
funding 
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per 
Funding 
*3 Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55 
$ 9.00 
5. The purchase agreement further specifies that the Oasis ownership amount shall be 
determined as of the date Oasis receives payment in full from or on behalf of seller. 
Importantly, the agreement specifies that seller is not entitled to receive any proceeds 
from the workers' compensation claimant until Oasis has received the Oasis ownership 
amount. (See, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 58). To this end, Oasis required both Gould, and his 
attorney, to execute an "irrevocable letter of direction" contemporaneous with the 
execution of the purchase agreement. Pursuant to the terms of irrevocable letter of 
direction, both Claimant and his attorney acknowledge and agree that the Oasis 
ownership amount is to be paid from the proceeds of any settlement of the workers' 
compensation claim before any funds are released to Claimant. The letter further 
anticipates that any settlement monies paid by Employer/Surety will be paid by check to 
Claimant's attorney, and that all disbursements of funds will be made through the 
attorney's client trust account. (See, Oasis Ex. 10, p. 64). 
6. The purchase agreement also makes it clear that in the event Gould takes nothing on 
his underlying worker's compensation claim, he has no obligation to pay the Oasis 
ownership amount. 
7. Notwithstanding that the payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount bears 
some similarities to the repayment of the principal amount of a loan, plus interest thereon, 
the agreement goes to some length to dispel any notion that the transaction should be 
construed as a loan versus a purchase and sale: 
Risk of Loss; No Loan Transaction. The purchase of the Purchased Interest and the other 
transactions contemplated by this Purchase Agreement involve a substantial economic 
risk and a bona fide risk of loss to Purchaser. The Oasis Ownership Amount has been 
negotiated to account for such risk. The sale of the Purchased Interest is an absolute sale 
and not a loan secured by a collateral assignment of the Purchased Interest. 
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Treatment of Transaction. Seller agrees to treat and report this sale and purchase of the 
Purchased Interest as a sale transaction and not as a loan for all purposes (including tax 
purposes). 
Treatment in Bankruptcy. If Seller commences or has commenced against it any case or 
other proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy, insolvency or similar law prior to payment 
of the full Oasis Ownership Amount to Purchaser, Seller shall cause the Purchased 
Interest to be described as an asset of Purchaser (and not as a debt obligation of Seller) in 
any oral or written communications, including, without limitation, any schedule or other 
document filed in connection with such case or proceeding. 
§§ 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 57. 
8. As of the date of settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim, the 
payment schedule specifies that Oasis was entitled to collect the sum of $8,212.50. 
However, through the efforts of Claimant's counsel, and with the agreement of Oasis, 
that sum was reduced to $7,461.00. 
*4 9. On learning of the existence of the purchase agreement, and in view of the direct 
payment to Oasis from counsel's client trust account in the amount of $7,461.00 from the 
proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the Commission filed its timely notice of 
reconsideration of the lump sum settlement agreement pursuant to the provisions 
~~,,"' Under that section, the Commission is empowered to reconsider its decision to 
approve the lump sum settlement agreement on its own initiative. Reconsideration of the 
approval of the settlement was thought necessary because of concerns over the legality of 
the payment to Oasis under the provisions 
10. Following notice to the parties, the Commission held a hearing in Idaho Falls on 
November 30, 2010, for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the 
nature of Claimant's agreement with Oasis, Mr. Wetzel's involvement in the transaction, 
and the manner of the disbursement of funds. A copy of the transcript of those 
proceedings has been offered into evidence as Oasis Exhibit 2. 
11. Many of the Commission's concerns over the legality of the $7,461.00 payment could 
not be adequately addressed by the parties in attendance at the November 30, 2010 
hearing. In furtherance of its duties to administer the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws, 
and pursuant to the Commission is empowered to make such inquiries 
and investigations as may be necessary to assure the proper administration of the 
Workers' Compensation laws of this state. The Commission ordered Oasis to appear and 
show cause why the Commission should not enter an order finding that the payment 
made from counsel's client trust account in satisfaction of the June 16, 2009 purchase 
agreement is illegal under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state, and further 
requiring Oasis to return the sum of $7,461.00 to Claimant. 
Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises 
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12. On or about August 10, 2007, Bret Tylinski suffered an accident/injury arising out of 
and in the course of his employment. The claim was accepted by the Workers' 
Compensation Surety, and benefits were paid to Tylinksi, or on his behalf. 
13. As did Gould, Tylinksi sold the right to a portion of the proceeds of his workers' 
compensation settlement to Oasis. Tylinki's case, however, involves two purchase 
agreements. The first agreement was made on or about December 20, 2008, pursuant to 
the terms of which Tylinksi agreed to sell his interest in a portion of the proceeds of any 
subsequent recovery on his workers' compensation claim to Oasis for the sum of 
$1,050.00. The Oasis ownership amounts and the payment schedule differed from the 
payment schedule at issue in Gould, because of the lower purchase price. In connection 
with the December 20, 2008 purchase agreement, the following payment schedule 
applies: 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Payment Schedule 
December 19,2008 to June 18,2009 
June 19,2009 to December 18, 2009 




December 19, 2009 to March 18, 2010 $2,362.50 
March 19,2010 to June 18,2010 $2,625.00 
June 19,2010 to December 18,2010 $2,887.50 
December 19,2010 to June 18,2011 $3,412.50 
June 19,2011 and thereafter $3,675.00 
*5 Oasis Ex. 3, p 36. 
14. On or about January 5, 2009, Tylinksi entered into a second purchase agreement with 
Oasis, under the terms of which Claimant received $550.00 consideration from Oasis in 
exchange for Oasis' purchase of an interest in the proceeds of any subsequent workers' 
compensation settlement. The payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount for this 
purchase is set forth in the agreement as follows: 
Payment Schedule 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Oasis Ownership Amount (Payoff 
Amount) 
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December 31, 2008 to June 29, 2009 $825.00 
June 30, 2009 to December 30,2009 $907.50 
December 31, 2009 to March 30, 2010 $1,237.50 
March 31, 2010 to June 29, 2010 $1,375.00 
June 30, 2010 to December 30, 2010 $1,512.50 
December 31,2010 to June 29, 2011 $1,787.50 
June 30, 2011 and thereafter $1,925.00 
Oasis Ex. 6, p. 46. 
15. The purchase agreements at issue in the Tylinski matter are substantially similar to 
the agreement at issue in Gould. However, the Gould agreement contains the following 
provision: 
No Assignment. The parties agree and affirm that this contract does not represent an 
assignment of workers compensation benefits as defined under state law. 
See, § 6.6, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 59. 
The Tylinski agreements are bereft of this "no assignment" language. 
16. As did Gould, Tylinski and his attorney executed two irrevocable letters of direction. 
17. On or about November 5,2010, Tylinski submitted a proposed lump sum settlement 
agreement for review and approval by the Industrial Commission, under the terms of 
which Tylinski would receive $18,000.00 in settlement of his claims. After deduction of 
attorney's fees and costs of suit, Claimant was expected to net $11,226.00. 
18. Although not disclosed in the lump sum settlement agreement, the Memorandum of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs submitted by Claimant's counsel reveals that counsel expected 
to pay, from the proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the sum of $4,945.00 to Oasis. On 
or about December 9, 2010, the Commission entered its order approving the lump sum 
settlement in part, but requiring Claimant's counsel to retain the sum of $5,220.00 from 
the proceeds of the settlement, representing the amount that would be payable to Oasis if 
paid subsequent to January 6, 2011, but prior to June 19, 2011. Counsel was ordered to 
hold this sum in trust, pending further order from the Commission on the validity of the 
contract between Ty lin ski and Oasis. 
Terry Denny v. URS 
19. At all times relevant hereto, Terry Denny was employed by URS. On June 29 or June 
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30, 2009, Denny suffered an accident/injury arising out of and in the course of his 
employment with Employer. The claim was accepted by Employer/Surety, and workers' 
compensation benefits were paid to Denny or on his behalf. 
20. On or about September 9,2010, Denny entered into a purchase agreement with Oasis, 
under the terms of which he was paid the sum of $5,150.00 in consideration of Oasis' 
receipt of an interest in the proceeds of any future recovery made by Denny in connection 
with his worker's compensation claim. The purchase agreement specifies the following 
payment schedule of the Oasis ownership amount: 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Payment Schedule 
September 9,2010 to March 8, 2011 
March 9, 2011 to September 8, 2011 




September 9,2011 to December 8,2011 $11,587.50 
December 9,2011 to March 8, 2012 $12,875.00 
March 9, 2012 to September 8, 2012 $14,162.50 
September 9,2012 to March 8, 2013 $16,737.50 
March 9, 2013 and thereafter $18,025.00 
Fees Due at Payment 
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months $30 
Subsequent Case Review for each additional $20 
funding 
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per $25 
Funding 
*6 21. The terms of the Denny purchase agreement are substantially similar to those at 
issue in both the Gould and Tylinski transactions. However, the Denny "no assignment" 
language differs slightly from the language used in the Gould contract. In this regard, the 
Denny agreement specifies: 
No Assignment of Workers Compensation Benefits. The Parties agree and affirm that 
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this contract does not represent an assignment as defined under state law. 
§ 5.8, Denny Purchase Agreement. 
22. On or about April 8, 2011, Denny and Employer/Surety presented a proposed lump 
sum settlement to the Commission for review and approval, under the terms of which 
Claimant would receive $20,000.00 new money. The explanatory attorney fee letter 
submitted by Fred Lewis, Claimant's counsel, reflects that as of Apri118, 2011, the Oasis 
ownership amount was approximately $7,800.00. By Order filed April 25, 2011, the 
Industrial Commission approved the proposed lump sum settlement agreement, except 
that the Commission ordered counsel to hold the sum of $7,724.25, representing the 
Oasis ownership amount, in trust, pending the Commission's determination of the 
validity of the purchase agreement between Denny and Oasis. 
23. Following the issuance of the Industrial Commission's January 26, 2011 Order to 
Show Cause in the Gould matter, the Commission entered its May 18, 2011 Order 
consolidating the Tylinski, Gould and Denny matters for purposes of the Order to Show 
Cause hearing. 
24. Preparatory to hearing, the hearing testimony of James Arnold was taken by way of 
prehearing deposition. 
25. James Arnold is an attorney practicing in eastern Idaho. His practice involves 
primarily the representation of injured workers before the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
26. He testified that approximately five years ago he became aware of the existence of 
Oasis, and other legal financing companies whose business model involved the "loan of 
monies to injured workers against the anticipated recovery in a personal injury or 
workers' compensation action." He testified that he was initially very leery of these 
companies since the money "loaned" to the injured worker was very expensive. However, 
he testified that as his experience with Oasis increased, he found the company easy to 
work with, and willing to negotiate what the company would accept in satisfaction of the 
Oasis ownership amount. Mr. Arnold testified that because of the expensive nature of the 
Oasis money, he attempts to persuade clients to utilize Oasis' services only as a last 
resort, i.e. after his clients have exhausted more conventional, and cheaper, loan 
opportunities. 
27. Mr. Arnold testified that he has no business relationship with Oasis, and that he has 
never received a client referral from Oasis. 
28. Mr. Arnold testified that Oasis does vet the cases of injured workers who offer to sell 
an interest in the proceeds of their workers' compensation claim to Oasis. He testified 
that Oasis is ordinarily reluctant to provide money in cases where liability is disputed. 
However, he noted that in the cases where this has become an issue, he has persuaded 
Oasis to complete the transaction because of his representations about the strength of a 
particular case. He stated that as he developed a relationship with Oasis, the vetting of 
cases with Oasis became easier as the company developed confidence in Mr. Arnold's 
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ability to evaluate cases. 
*7 29. Finally, Mr. Arnold testified that in spite of the expensive nature of the Oasis 
money, the company fills a real need in the Idaho Workers' Compensation system. 
Where $3,000 or $5,000 means the difference between being evicted from one's 
apartment, or missing a mortgage payment, during the pendency of a workers' 
compensation claim, it is worth obtaining money from Oasis, when all other resources 
have been exhausted. 
30. Lisa Foreman is General Counsel for Oasis. She is licensed to practice law in the state 
of Illinois, and has been employed by Oasis since September 2005. Her job 
responsibilities include oversight of litigation in which the company is involved. As well, 
she assists with the company's regulatory initiatives nationwide. She testified that the 
business model utilized to purchase interests in the proceeds of workers' compensation 
claims is used in 45 states inclusive of Idaho. In five states, Oasis has either chosen not to 
do business, or is prohibited from following this business model by applicable law. 
31. Ms. Foreman testified that the Oasis purchase agreement was drafted so as not to 
conflict with non-assignment statutes similar to I.e. § 72-802. Specifically, she testified 
that although the purchase agreement may involve an "assignment," the assignment 
anticipated by the agreement is not the prohibited assignment of a workers' compensation 
"claim." Rather per Ms. Foreman, the purchase agreement anticipates the assignment of 
a contingent interest in the proceeds of a workers compensation settlement. If the 
purchase agreement was intended to effectuate the assignment of the injured worker's 
claim, then one would expect Oasis to be the only entity which could prosecute the claim 
following the assignment. Clearly, the purchase agreement does not anticipate that 
anyone but claimant can prosecute the claim. The only assignment which Ms. Foreman 
would concede might be anticipated by the language of the purchase agreement is the 
assignment of a contingent interest in the proceeds of the workers' compensation 
settlement. Per Oasis when it comes to applying the language of I. . § 72-8 2, there is a 
reru and significant difference between the assignment of a workers compensation claim 
and the assignment of the proceeds of a workers compensation claim. The former is 
prohibited, the latter is not. 
32. Although the purchase agreement bears some similarities to a loan transaction, neither 
would Ms. Foreman concede that the agreement should be treated as a loan. In the main, 
her argument is that a true loan creates an obligation for the repayment of a debt certain, 
whereas the Oasis purchase agreement creates an obligation only upon the occurrence of 
certain contingencies, including, inter alia, claimant's receipt of an award or settlement 
of some type following the prosecution or settlement of his claim 
33. For the same reason, Ms. Foreman argued that neither does the Oasis purchase 
agreement create a creditor/debtor relationship. Importantly, however, Ms. Foreman 
acknowledged that at some point in the course of an Oasis transaction with an injured 
worker, the relationship might mature into one of a creditor and a debtor. If a settlement 
is obtained, and if there is money remaining in the attorney's client trust account 
following the payment of medical bills and attorney's fees, then Oasis may become a 
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creditor with respect to the proceeds of settlement owed to Oasis per the purchase 
agreement. (See, Hr. Tr., 16/18-18/14). 
*8 34. Confirming Mr. Arnold's testimony, Ms. Foreman acknowledged that the Oasis 
money is "expensive," but that Oasis purchase agreements fill a need that goes largely 
unfilled among a sizeable minority of the population of workers' compensation 
claimants; without Oasis type purchase agreements, such claimants would be unable to 
bridge the financial abyss that lies between the curtailment of workers' compensation 
benefits and the resolution of the workers' compensation claim. Ms. Foreman explained 
that Oasis is not as draconian as might be suggested by the repayment schedules 
described above. Oasis frequently agrees to a reduction of the repayment amount 
depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
35. During the pendency of the Commission's consideration of this matter, Oasis has 
agreed to freeze the payment schedule for each of the three cases at issue in this 
proceeding. 
ISSUES 
The following matters are at issue: 
1. Whether there is an actual controversy which warrants the Commission's review of the 
application to the Oasis contracts; 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to consider the legality of the 
Oasis purchase agreements under ~~~~~, 
3. Whether the Oasis purchase agreements violated the provision of~:..:-;:t--'-'='--=~. 
a. Whether the Oasis purchase agreement is a prohibited assignment of a workers' 
compensation claim; 
b. Whether Oasis is a "creditor," and if so, whether the settlement amounts paid 
following the approval of the lump sum settlement agreements at issue constitute 
"compensation" not subject to the claim of a creditor. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
I. 
1. As Oasis has noted, the record is bereft of evidence that any of the Claimants in this 
consolidated proceeding take the position that Oasis is not entitled to recover the Oasis 
ownership amount following the settlement of their respective workers' compensation 
claims. Indeed, although it was Mr. Gould's inquiry concerning the propriety of the 
payment of the Oasis ownership amount from his attorney's client trust account that 
alerted the Commission to these practices and initiated the instant inquiry, Mr. Gould 
testified that although he and his attorney considered whether to dispute the Oasis claim 
to a portion of the proceeds of settlement, he ultimately decided that the indebtedness he 
had voluntarily incurred should be paid. Mr. Gould testified that even if the settlement 
proceeds in question had been paid directly to him, and contrary to the irrevocable letter 
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of direction, he would nevertheless pay Oasis what he owed. Although it can be supposed 
that one or more of the Claimants in these matters might find a use for the monies that are 
in dispute, none of the Claimants have voiced opposition to the agreements they 
executed. However, we do not feel that in the absence of a challenge to the provisions of 
the purchase agreement by one or more of the Claimants, we are prohibited from 
considering whether or not the Oasis purchase agreements are invalid under ~~~"-
*9 2. First, these matters arise under the statutory responsibilities created by ~'-'--"'--'-"=-
In full, that section provides: 
Lump sum payments. Whenever the commission determines that it is for the best interest 
of all parties, the liability of the employer for compensation may, on application to the 
commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of 
one or more lump sums to be determined, with the approval of the commission. 
3. Therefore, it matters not that the parties have provisionally settled their disputes unless 
the Commission, too, can be satisfied that the settlements are in the best interest of the 
parties. The fact that none of the Claimants in these proceedings have seen fit to 
challenge the propriety of the Oasis purchase agreements informs, but does not govern, 
the Commission's inquiry into whether or not these settlements are in the best interest of 
the parties. Indeed, were we to adopt Oasis' reasoning, the Commission would never be 
able to consider whether or not a proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties 
since the parties, having provisionally settled their disputes, can no longer be said to have 
matters in controversy. 
4. In summary, vests the Commission with the responsibility to ascertain 
whether the proposed lump sum settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Part and 
parcel of that determination is the Commission's assessment of whether or not the 
provisions of bar Oasis from access to the proceeds of settlement. In each 
of the three cases referenced above, the Commission still has before it for consideration 
whether the lump sum settlement agreement should be approved. Therefore, 
notwithstanding that the parties are in apparent agreement concerning the disposition of 
the proceeds of settlement, the Commission's inquiries concerning the proposed 
settlement are not only appropriate, but required. 
II. 
5. Oasis also challenges the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to review the propriety 
of the purchase agreements between Oasis and the Claimants, and each of them. Under 
~--"-'--'-='-'-~, the Commission has jurisdiction to consider all questions arising under the 
Workers' Compensation laws of this state. See, ~~="--"~=~~~~-==~~"-'-
~~~"--'.~, the Commission has the responsibility to approve 
lump sum settlement agreements and, in so doing, must determine that the settlement is in 
the best interest of the parties. It necessarily follows that the Commission has jurisdiction 
to clarify claimant's rights under the lump sum settlement agreement that is presented to 
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the Commission for approval. See, Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, supra. It is also 
worth noting that the statutory provision which may invalidate the Oasis purchase 
agreement is a statute specific to the Workers' Compensation laws, and the Commission 
clearly has jurisdiction to consider whether one of the provisions of the statutory scheme 
it administers affects Oasis' claim to the proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement. 
*10 6. For these reasons, the Commission rejects Oasis' assertion that it does not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The questions before the Commission 
are clearly questions arising under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state. 
III. 
I.e. § 72-802 provides: 
Compensation not assignable - Exempt from execution. No claims for compensation 
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the 
worker's compensation laws of any other state, shall be assignable, and all compensation 
and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, except the restrictions 
under this section shall not apply to enforcement of an order of any court for the support 
of any person by execution, garnishment or wage withholding under chapter 12, title 7, 
Idaho Code. 
7. This statute, and similar provisions found under the laws of other states, appears, at 
first blush, to bar two types of actions. First, the statute prohibits the assignment of 
claims. Second, the statute prohibits the claims of creditors against compensation and 
claims therefor. With respect to the statutory prohibition against the assignment of 
claims, Oasis acknowledges that an assignment took place. However, it argues that the 
assignment was not a prohibited assignment of a claim. Rather the as ignment made by 
each of the thre Claimants to Oasis is of a non-prohjbited type- the assignment made by 
the Claimants was of a contingent right to the proceeds of a workers compensation 
settlement. Oasis argues that had the Idaho legislature intended to prohibit this type of 
assignment, the statute would have so stated. In other words, the legislature would have 
prohibited not only the assignment of "claims for compensation," but also the assignment 
of "compensation." This argument, according to Oasis, finds its best support in the fact 
that the prohibition applicable to creditors applies not only to "claims for compensation," 
but to "compensation" as well. The argument is that the legislature clearly appreciated a 
distinction between compensation and claims therefor in connection with the prohibition 
against the claims of creditors, and it must therefore be presumed that it understood the 
significance of prohibiting the assignment of only "claims for compensation," instead of 
"claims for compensation" and "compensation." This argument has found good traction 
in several jurisdictions. 
8. In Kentuckv Employers ' lvil/Ilial Insurance v. Nova'ion Capital, LLC 201 1 W.L. 
832316 (K v. Ct. App. Februarv 25. 20 II) claimant entered into a settlement of his 
workers' compensation case under the terms of which he would receive $400 per week 
for 70 weeks, one lump sum payment of $150,000 and $486 for 520 weeks. Thereafter, 
claimant entered into an agreement with Novation Capital, pursuant to the terms of which 
US Governrnent Works 
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claimant assigned his right to the proceeds of his structured settlement in exchange for a 
lump sum of $112,952. 
*11 The workers' compensation surety objected to the agreement, arguing that it violated 
the anti-assignment provisions of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation laws, which 
provided in pertinent part: 
[n]o claim for compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, except court or 
administratively ordered child support pursuant to All compensation and 
claims therefor, except child support obligations, shall be exempt from all claims of 
creditors. 
Noting the general rule that courts are required to construe words and phrases according 
to their usual, ordinary and every day meaning, the court rejected the surety's challenge, 
reasoning that by its express language the statute only prohibited the assignment of 
"claims," not the assignment of "compensation." Supporting this conclusion was the 
court's analysis of the broader language prohibiting the claims of creditors. In this regard, 
the court stated: 
Significantly, the second sentence of the statute distinguishes claims and compensation. 
As pointed out by the circuit court in its thoughtful analysis, had the General Assembly 
intended to prohibit the assignment of an award or settlement, it could have simply 
included language expressing such intent. Based on similar facts, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court reached the same result. 
In Newberg, the injured employee and his employer entered into a settlement agreement 
that provided for reimbursement by the Special Fund for amounts determined to be the 
responsibility of the Fund but paid by the employer pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement. 
9. In Rapid Settlements LTD's Application for Approval of Structured Settlement 
Payment Rights v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, 133 Wash. Ct. App. 350, 
~"'-'-=-::''-'-'=-~=':;:'..L' North Carolina resident Hargette was the beneficiary of a structured 
settlement in a North Carolina workers' compensation case. To fund the settlement 
payments, employer/surety purchased an annuity from Symetra Life Insurance Company. 
The settlement agreement and the annuity contract prohibited Hargette from assigning his 
right to payment. Time passed, and at some point, Hargette arranged to give up his right 
to some of his future periodic payments to Rapid Settlements LTD, in exchange for a 
lump sum payment. As required by Washington law, Rapid notified Symetra and sought 
court approval over Symetra's objection. 
In addition to arguing that the annuity contract itself prohibited the assignment of the 
right to periodic payments, Symetra argued that applicable North Carolina Workers' 
Compensation law also prohibited the assignment by Hargette of his right to receive 
periodic payments under the annuity contract. In particular, North Carolina law provided: 
No claim for compensation under this Article shall be assignable, and all compensation 
and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from taxes. 
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To this argument, Rapid responded that by its specific language, the North Carolina Act 
bars assignment only of "claims for compensation," not the right to payments achieved 
by the settlement of such claims. 
*12 10. The Washington court ruled that the phrase "all compensation and claims 
therefor" clearly expressed an intention on the part of the North Carolina legislature to 
distinguish between claims for compensation and compensation itself. Had North 
Carolina intended to bar assignment of compensation itself, the statute would have been 
worded differently. For example, North Carolina could have stated the statutory 
prohibition against assignments as follows, had it wished to prohibit both the assignment 
of claims and compensation therefor: 
No compensation and no claims for compensation under this article shall be assignable, 
and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and 
from taxes. 
11. The statutory language at issue in both cases discussed above is similar, but not 
identical, to the Idaho statutory scheme. In connection with the issue currently before the 
Industrial Commission, the language of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims 
bears closer examination. Following the 2009 amendment to the section of 
the statute dealing with the prohibited assignments reads as follows: 
Compensation not assignable - exempt from execution. No claims for compensation 
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the 
workers' compensation laws of any other state shall be assignable ... 
12. It is immediately apparent that the non-assignment provisions of ~:..:...-"---'-=-=-"-'=., 
though similar to the statutes at issue in the Kentucky and Washington cases discussed 
above, contains some significant differences. Against the suggestion that Idaho too is 
among those jurisdictions which distinguish between the assignment of claims and the 
assignment of compensation there are two components of the statutory language which 
suggest otherwise. First, the title of the statute plainly states that compensation [is] not 
assignable. Anticipating the need to reconcile this language with the interpretation it 
promotes, Oasis argues that the title of the statute must be ignored where it conflicts with 
the unambiguous direction of the body of the statute. In other words, Oasis argues that 
the title of the statute cannot be used to create an ambiguity where none otherwise exists. 
Cited in support of this proposition are "-""'=-='-'-"'--=-:-'-=~-'-'-"-'--'-"--"'=-"'-.!-'-'="'-'--"=-"---''--'''-'= 
-'-"--'-'-'==-'-"-''-'-"--'-'-~=-=--'''-'--'--1.=''-~' and Sf at e v. Pete rso n . 14 I I dah 0 473. I I I P. 3 d 1 58 
~'-"--'..L.' In Peterson, the court ruled that although the title is a part of the statute, it may 
not be used as a means of creating an ambiguity when the body of the act itself is clear. 
We believe that Oasis has correctly apprehended Idaho's adoption of this general rule of 
statutory construction. However as developed below we al believe that the body of the 
statute is not without ambiguity thus making it appropriate to consider the title of the 
tatute along with the language of the statute itself to infer the legislature s intentions. 
*13 13. As noted, the statute ostensibly prohibits only the assignment of claims, while 
protecting both claims and compensation from the claims of creditors. However, it is 
important to recognize that in the section of the statute prohibiting the assignment of 
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claims, the 2009 amendment to the statute specifies that this prohibition against the 
assignment of claims includes "compensation payable" to an Idaho resident under the 
workers' compensation laws of another state. Had it been the intent of the legislature to 
narrowly define the word "claim" to mean only the assignment of claimant's chose in 
action, not to include the proceeds payable as a consequence of the successful 
prosecution of that claim, then the amendment would have been stated differently, or 
incorporated elsewhere in the statute. To be consistent with the construction urged upon 
the Commission by Oasis, the statute could have been written as follows: 
No claims for compensation under this law, including claims for compensation payable to 
a resident ofthis state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state ... 
As well, to give effect to the construction urged by Oasis, the 2009 amendment could 
have been inserted at a different place in the statute: 
No claims for compensation under this law shall be assignable, and all compensation and 
claims therefor, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the 
workers' compensation laws of any other state, shall be exempt from all claims of 
creditors ... 
14. Instead, the amendment makes it clear that "claims," which term includes 
compensation payable to an Idaho claimant under the workers ' compensation laws of 
some other state, are not assignable. This structure strongly sugge ts that the legislature s 
us of the tenn claim was intended to include not only a prohibition against the 
assignment of the cause of action, but also a prohibition against the assignment of the 
proceeds payable to an injured worker as the result of his or her workers compensation 
claim. 
15. To th extent that the non-assignment language of the statute is deemed ambiguous 
we think that the title of the statute hich is not util ized in this context to create an 
ambiguity, actually lends further support to the proposition that what the legislature 
intended was to prohibit both the assignment of claim and proceeds thereof. 
16. This reading of I.e. § 72-802 finds support in the recent case of Williams v. Blue 
Cross of Idaho, supra. Discussing in the legislature's purpose in adopting I.e. § 72-802, 
the court observed: 
The purpose behind exempting workers' compensation proceeds from the claims of 
creditors is not to allow the injured worker to recover twice for his or her medical 
expenses but, rather, to protect the worker and his or her family from the financial 
difficulties associated with the worker's injury. 
"Workers' compensation awards are intended not to make the worker rich, but to keep an 
injured worker and the worker's family from becoming destitute because the breadwinner 
has been injured and cannot work. In order to protect this award and further this policy, 
workers' compensation statutes typically provide that these awards cannot be attached by 
creditors. Moreover, they provide that the worker cannot voluntarily assign the proceeds, 
primarily in order to ensure that injured workers who may have a valid claim but have not 
U S Government Works 
APPENDIX 
Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C. v. Guerdon Enterprises, L.L.C 
- [XXVI] -
yet received the first payments and are desperate for cash do not sell their rights at fire 
sale prices." ~~~~~~==.!.~~~~~~~==~=~~~~L.J,c:.~::'=~~ 
17. The Court paraphrased the ~~-'-=~= prohibitions as follows: 
The plain language of prohibits (1) a workers' compensation claimant from 
assigning workers' compensation proceeds to a third party, and (2) a creditor, other than 
one seeking to recover child support, from asserting a claim against workers' 
compensation proceeds paid to a claimant. 
Although the Court was well aware of the specific language used by the legislature in 
crafting the provisions of the statute, it nevertheless concluded that the prohibition 
against assignment extends to the assignment of workers' compensation proceeds, 
exactly what has been attempted in these cases under the Oasis purchase agreement. We 
also think it important that the Williams Court made a point of emphasizing that 
~~= is intended to protect the injured worker against exactly the type of practice that is 
at issue in this matter. By its citation to the ALR 5th Article quoted above, the Court has 
recognized that one of the purposes is to ensure that injured workers with 
valid, yet unrecognized, claims, will not sell their rights at "fire sale prices" in order to 
keep body and soul together during the pendency of their claim. The Court's explanation 
of the legislative purpose underline precisely anticipates the facts of these 
cases. 
18. The assignment at issue was an assignment of an expectancy, or a contingent right to 
receive workers' compensation benefits. Certainly, at the time of the assignment, these 
were rights that had not yet ripened to a certainty. However, the assignment of a 
conditional right to something is well recognized under Idaho law. See, =:.:;;.:;..:~-'-!. 
~'-'-'~"-'-~~~~~~. We see nothing in the facts of this case that makes the Oasis 
purchase of a contingent right to the proceeds of a workers' compensation claim anything 
less than an "assignment" of an expectancy, under Idaho law. 
19. We are not unmindful of the fact that the prosecution of a contested workers' 
compensation claim is a sometimes protracted affair. We are aware of the fact that it is 
not unusual for a typical workers' compensation claimant to be deemed a poor credit risk, 
unable to access any of the more traditional, and cheaper, forms of credit available in the 
community. We recognize that whatever else might be said about the cost associated with 
obtaining money from a legal financing company such as Oasis, these companies fill a 
need as lenders of last resort who can provide an injured worker with the means to obtain 
what is absolutely necessary to keep a roof over his head, or put food on the table, until 
he recognizes something from his workers' compensation claim. We are loathe to deny 
the injured workers of this state this last choice, especially when we have nothing to offer 
Claimant during the pendency of a litigated claim. However, we believe that the Oasis 
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business model, notwithstanding that it is styled as a purchase/sale, nevertheless relies 
upon an assignment of a contingent right to workers' compensation benefits. We find, 
therefore, that these assignments are invalid under =~~~':' 
*15 20. Because we have found that a prohibited assignment of Claimants' rights to 
workers' compensation benefits took place, we do not reach the question of whether or 
not Oasis is also a creditor who is prohibited from making a claim against compensation, 
or claims therefor. 
21. Although we have found that the Oasis agreements rely upon a prohibited 
assignment, we also recognize that our ruling has the potential to create a windfall to 
Gould, Tylinksi and Denny. To prevent unjust enrichment to these Claimants, we believe 
that where a Claimant's recovery in an underlying workers' compensation case is 
otherwise sufficient to implicate the requirement to pay the Oasis ownership amount, the 
equitable solution is to require the injured worker to reimburse Oasis in the amount of the 
purchase price originally paid by Oasis to the injured worker at the outset of the 
relationship. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The purchase agreement and associated documents executed by Tylinski, Gould and 
Denny create assignments of an expectancy in the proceeds of their workers' 
compensation claims, which is prohibited under the provisions 
However, to prevent unjust enrichment to Tylinksi, Gould and Denny, and to return the 
parties, as nearly as possible, to the positions they were in prior to the prohibited 
assignments, Tylinksi, Gould and Denny shall each reimburse Oasis in the amount of the 
purchase price paid by Oasis under the terms of the purchase agreements at issue; 
2. On the Commission's Notice of Reconsideration of the lump sum settlement at issue in 
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Oasis is directed to repay to Claimant the sum of $3,811.00, 
representing the difference between the negotiated settlement of the Oasis ownership 
amount ($7,461.00) and the purchase price originally paid by Oasis ($3,650.00). The 
subject lump sum settlement agreement is, in all other respects, approved, per the 
Commission's Order of September 2,2010; 
3. In the matter of Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises, LLC, and pursuant to the December 9, 
2010 Order approving, in part, the lump sum agreement, counsel for Claimant is hereby 
ordered to release to Claimant the sum of $3,620, representing the difference between the 
amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction of the Commission 
($5,220.00) and the purchase price paid by Oasis, ($1,600.00). Counsel is directed to 
release to Oasis the sum of $1 ,600.00; 
4. In the matter of Denny v. URS, and pursuant to the Commission's Order approving, in 
part, Stipulation and Agreement for Lump Sum Settlement filed April 25, 2011, counsel 
for Claimant is hereby directed to release to Claimant the sum of $2,574.25, representing 
the difference between the amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the 
direction of the Commission ($7,724.25) and the purchase price paid by Oasis 
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($5,150.00). Counsel is directed to release the sum of$5,150.00 to Oasis. 
*165. This order is final and conclusive as to all matters decided herein pursuant to 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Chairman 
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Har 10 200S 213SPH IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COHHI •• I 2083342321 
To: AJuUew Marsh 
Fax: 345-4700 
IDAHO lNDUS1'IUAL COMMISSION 
Benefits and Claim8 Section 
(208) 334-6000 
F)u{(108) 334-2311 
The IndIlSIrial Con:!mDsion b.u received a propoaed LUMP SUM SET'T'LBMBNT 
AGlU!EM!NT ill tile cueofShazon Cavanaah'VII. St. Lake', but b.u DOt xeceive IIiIIOUIb 
infmma1l.onfdocumenta!ion to complcIe tile audiIiDg pIOCCU. l'he Commit8ion is Wl8blc to 
complete tile auditina process unIi.l tile roqllelltod iIlf'ormation below is received. 
o Medical reports 
o I'oitia1 moclicaI report 
o Operative nport 
o Impai.rmeat l'Ifins(a) 
DOtber: 
o Affidavit of Attomlly Fee MIIIllO!8IIIIlut A.ttomoy fee ~diacIo-' 
ir.eIni2ed com. 
o COi!iiiiailOD of paymeat Of 6iilii!ii piid (j)ijiiiCiiif IIiitOij) 
o Av-ao -ldy wage caIc1Ilation.s 
o Certiticata ofSemc:e 
o TIDfI1>D caIcuIaIioDB and time abeets 
r8I 0Iber-~~_"~ 
Name: lllllllifer Poole 
CompemaIiOll. ConaulIant 
Phorul: (208) 334-6000 
Date::March 10. 2009 
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Idaho Industrial Commission 
Compensation Consultant 
700 S Clearwater Lane 




RE: Cavanagh VI. Sf. Lukes 
Date of Injury: 4/0912006 
IIC Case No.: 06-004060 
Dear Ms. Poole: 
A.NOltEW C. M.WH 1-'1,-,_11_-
VIA FAX TO 334-2321 
Thank you for your correspondence of 3/10/09 requesting more information about the 
legal services we provided to Sharon Cavanagh prior to settlement. 
Sharon retained this office on June 6, 2006 for several reasons, including her concerns 
that her employer (a self-surety) intended to wrongfully discontinue her medical and 
other work comp benefits. Here it is in Sharon's own words. (Donna and Mert represent 
her employers.) 
06-01·2006 I called and talked to Donna to ask if she would let me know 
what is going to happen next She asked me ifI'd talked to Mert, I told her 
no, she told me to leave another message with Mert. Donna did not give 
me any further information. Mert bad left a message that there are 
appointments set up with a doctor Beaver, but I don't know who this is or 
why. I spoke with Men to get more information about the scheduled MD 
appl's and to ask how long my Worker's Compo checks would be 
continuing. Mert did not call me back with an answer. 
06-04-2006 • During this week, Melt left messages on my phone, but 
never explained what the 6br meeting with a Doctor was for, or how long 
my benefits would continue. She made iDsiDuations that I would have 
my benefits diseontiDued in didn't have these scheduled examinations. I 
replied to her when I would be available for these examinations, and that I 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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was not refusing to take them, Mert also said, if I didn't see Dr Beaver, I 
would have to pay them $2,000- $7,000, 
I placed a call to St, Luke's on 6/12106 and they immediately backtracked, saying that 
they would keep paying and would not be disputing Sharon's work comp claim, 
1D the ensuing five ~ until the m mtiDg_11l13/06. this DfIlce SIDt ormceived 
OWfSt1~ 2(}phtme~d~OtmallCM'IMS_~~ The 
~~a~tI)Ur.NicolafofAPPImtiDg(4Il4lO6}. 
As a result of our efforts. Sharon received medical treatment from Dr. Nicola without the 
threatened interference from her employer, a PPI rating from Dr, Nicola, and a lump sum 
settlement for PPD, future medicals. and all other disputed benefits. 
From the date of the PPI rating until settlement, there were at least 50 more document, 
phone, and email events. During Sharon's case, attorneys Breck Seiniger and Andrew 
Marsh, and our work comp paralegals, advocated for her on issues including, medical 
treatment, mileage and travel reimbursement, problems with and harassment by her date-
of-injury employer, fe-employment issues, representation with the ICRD, and related 
work comp issues, including of course obtaining a Jump sum settlement where the 
employer disputed any disability beyond impairment. 
For all of our efforts, and the many hours of work, and the value of our skill and 
reputation, and the cost of our overhead, this office stands to have received a total of 
$1746,01 in fees If the lump sum settlement agreement is approved by the Commission. 
I would like to quote from Mr. Seiniger's correspondence to the Commission in a 
previous case: 
We believe that in attempting to prevent claimant's counsel from being 
paid a fee on the whole value of the case, and limiting Seiniger Law 
Offices, P.A,'s fees to "new money" the Commission is clearly acting 
outside the scope of its authority and in violation of counsel's 
constitutional rights: 
In sua sponte reducing appellants' uncontested attorney fee agreements 
without the suitable advance notice to all ofthe parties directly involved, 
accomplished through properly enacted regulations, and without a 
meaningful hearing, the Commission has acted in disregard of important 
constitutional mandates. Specifically. the Commission'S current stance. as 
Sejniger !IJltly ooints out, fails to compensate an attorney for acting solely 
as a counselor and fails to recognize efforts that do not generate monetary 
awards such as obtaining permission for medica! care or procuring an 
impairment rating, Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made 
suspect appellants' integrity in the eyes of their clients, thereby seriously 
942 W. MYRTI..E STREET (208) 345-1000 Andrew@Seinigerl.aw.com 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 Fa.'C (208) 345-4700 www.SeinigerLaw.com 
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undermining the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the "new money" 
provision preempts representation other than in disputed matters once 
again contravening LC. § 72·508. The net result of the Commission's sua 
sponte conduct is a deprivation of appellants' property rights under the fee 
agreement without due process of law. 
Curr V. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 692, 864 P.2d 132, 138 (Idaho,I993). 
If you are aware of any authority to the contrary. Seiniger Law Offices, 
P.A. would appreciate being made aware of it, because we would likely 
decide to decline representation in cases where some, but not all, of the 
benefits will "probably" be paid. It is unfortunate that after claimant's 
counsel went to the expense in time and money to establish the foregoing 
law, the Commission's representatives continue to try to limit claimant's 
counsel's fees to "new money." 
However, the fact is that it is never clear when a potential client comes to 
see us what, if any, benefits the claimant will ultimately be paid, since 
many defenses can be raised during the course of negotiations or litigation, 
including apportionment for pre-existing conditions, denial of benefits for 
failure to cooperate with treatment, etc. As but one eXatnple of the benefit 
that a claimant obtains by retaining an attorney that may affect his rights, 
communications between the surety or its attorneys and the claimant are 
conducted through the claimant's attorney, and thus there is essentially no 
chance that the claimant will make statements against interest or be 
overborne upon by "nurse case managers" or other agents of the 
Defendants who may regard an unrepresented party as less likely to know 
their rights and insist upon them. Although such behavior may not be 
widespread, and claimant '8 counsel does not accuse the Defendants, their 
agents or attorneys of any such conduct in this or other cases, such 
conduct certainly occurs. 
Thus, the counsel given to a claimant by an attorney is not simply the 
equivalent of a legal "Hallmark Card." It may be vital to protecting the 
claimant'S rights, and certainly is essential to advising a claimant as to 
what those rights are. For the Commission's representative to deny 
attorneys fees on "uncontested" impairment ratings assigned after counsel 
has been retained and is actively representing a claimant is equivalent to 
either an implicit finding that such counsel was of no value in the 
particular case (which they could never know with respect to an 
uncontested attorney fee agreement) or an implicit finding that such 
counsel is never of sufficient value to justify compensstion. 
If the Commission would adopt a procedure whereby a claimant can come 
to the Commission within some reasonable number of days before or after 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET (208) .345-1000 Andrew@Seinigerl..aw.com 
BoiSE, ID .... HO 8.3702 Fax: (208) .345-4700 www.seJnigerLaw.com 
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the claimant's initial meeting with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. and obtain a 
guarantee that any benefits will be paid and that no defenses exist as to 
those benefits, then Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., despite its constitutional 
rights set forth above, \\-111 voluntarily agree in writing not to take an 
attorney fee on those benefits. Of C<lurse, that will never happen, because 
all defenses remain open to defendants in a workers compensation case as 
a matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the 
Commission. 
We hope you will consider the above legal and factual issues in making your decision. 




cc: Racbael O'Bar, counsel for defendant 
942 W. MYRTI.E STREET 
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March 23, 2009 
Andrew Matsh 
Seini.ger Law Offices 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
RE: Sharon Cavanagh LSS 




Your letter of March 17, 2009 10 Jennifer Poole bas been forwarded to me. The Idaho SupMlICI 
Court's decision, Curr v. Curr, cited in your letter, was certainly pivotal. In response, the 
IndUSlrial Commission promptly promulgated its cw:rent attorney fee rule, which bas 
subsequently been cited several times by the Supreme Court in attorney fee appeals. 
We are not now attempting 10 prevent proper attorney fees from being paid. We are rather trying 
10 provide the oversight msndsted by statute and rule 10 determine the reasonableness of such 
requested fees. 
In JO'Iif letter you~ .ftlqUClll for lID impairmeatmtingbrt __ to ..... Woukt 
yoaploueforwardaeopyottlllt~to*PooIe? If there was a prior medieaI 
opinion of stability that prompted that correspondence, a copy of that would also be helpful. 
Thank you. 
~ 
Manager. Claims & Benefits 
lEU lIAR 25 Z009 
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April 7, 2009 
Jennifer Poole 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Compensation Consultant 
700 S Clearwater Lane 




RE: Cavanagh vs. St. Lukes 
Date of Injury: 4/0912006 
IIC Case No.; 06-004060 
Dear Ms. Poole: 
ANDRFW C. MARSH 
I .... , ~_M"'-· 
VIA FAX TO 334-2321 
&.~y_ Scott MoDoupl's .. cIated.3J23l09.~tmd~.«IPJ of ... 
oo~ to Dr. N'tOOla~a PfI·1'lltiBg{61151Oli). 




cc: Rachael O'Bar, counsel for defendant 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 3454700 
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]UlJI! M.usfI SmNIOEll u.;.,1 __ .DiJltitltI~ 
f1g u,£ MtIII 
George Nicola, M.D. 
June 15, 2006 
West Idaho Orthopedics & Sports Medicine 
206 East Elm 





Dear Doctor Nicola: 
Slu:utm Cavanagh 
Sf. Luke's Replttll Medical Ce1de 
fMlfl9l2fJ(J6 
This office has been retained to represent your patient Sharon CaV8llll8h. who is 
processing a claim for work related injuries. EDeiosed is a medieal. waiver uthorizIDg 
yoa to give lIS medical iDformation about your patient ud our dieDt. 
In an attempt to settle this case prior to hearing, we intend to submit to the 
Defendant's representatives a copy of your medical evaluation and report. However. we 
would like "u to proyide !bat report 0Dlx at such hie u you S!JducJe CUt Mt. 
Cm' ...... is stable aud !H be ciY" a pen!Wlept impairment ratiIyr. Please do not 
send a report if you do IIOt believe that the patient has a permanent impairment. In that 
case please ask one of your staftto caI1 us and so advise. 
1. Your findings. 
2. Your diagnosis. 
3. Your treaunen1. 
4. Your prognosis. 
5. An itemized statement of your fees to date. 
6. An estimate, if available, of future medical costs. and a statement of 
whether it is more probable than not that such costs will be incurred. 
7. AD Iarpab_hadq. 
8. CompletioD of the endosed physical Umltatioll8 form showiDg the 
restrictioll8 wbieh you utieipate my eHeat will have based upon her 
942 W. MYlt1'U! STIt.EET 
BOise, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
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pIlysieal impairmeat. A statemeat of physieal restr1ctioDl is eaeatial 
for tile evaluatiou of disability by a voeatioual espert. 
We would also like you to know that in this state au injured person may recover 
damages not only for injuries to normal parts of the body, but also for injuries to those 
parts of the body which were abnormal before the injury took place. If you found auy 
pre-existing abnormalities or pre-existing conditioas such as degenerstive arthritis, it is 
important for US to know whether these have beeu aagravated or inflamed in auy way. 
Would you please send us a copy of your curriculum vitae so that we may put in 
on file? Thank you very much. 
ACMljh 
Enclosures: 
• Medical Release 
- LimItations Fonn 
00: Claimant 
Andrew C. Marsh 
SElNIGER LAW OmCBS, P.A. 
APPENDIX 
Illustrative Example of Prior Application of "Available Funds" - IDAPA 17.02.08.233.01 
- [XXXVIII] -
• • 
CIIIbtumt: SiitITOlI CfIIJtIIIlIIII 
EmpItJyer: St. Luke's Rep1flll Me4ktII Ceillei' 





Based upon your surgica1 findiDgs, was Ms. Cavanagh's condition and 
resultant need for surgery a result of an acute injury consistent with the 
reported mechanism ofinjury1 __ yes __ 110 
Is Ms. Cavllllqh medically stable? __ yes __ 110. Ifnot, 
what is the anticipated date 1bat she will be medically stable? __ _ 
What permanent physiatl impainnent would you assign as a result of the 
claimed injuries? 
Do you feel that Ms. Cavllllqh will be able to return to her date-ofinjury 
job as Administrative Supervisor at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center? 
__ yes __ no 
4) Do you anticipate assigning any permanent limitatiom or restrictiOllS as a 
direct result of Ms. Cavanagh's industtial injuries? If so, please specify. 
--~ .. -- ..... ~~-- ------------
S) Does Ms. Cavanagh have any other medical condition that appropriately 
limits her physical activities? Please specify. 
6) What is your prognosis regarding Ms. Cavllllqh's future medical care? 
Date 
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ANDERSON, JULIAN" HULL LIJ' 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. 5'" Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, 10 83707·7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
Alan 1<, Hull· ISB No.: 1568 
Attorneys for Defendant 
mrt MaR -b i P II: l~ 
RECEIVED 
liiCUS I !<IAL COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SHARON C. CAVANAGH, 
Claimant, 
vs. 




I.C. No. 06-004060 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, 
RELEASE AND LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT, AND ORDER OF 
APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
In consideration of the premises and promises and covenanta hereinafter 
sat forth and subject to the CommiSSion's approval and Order of Discherge 
pursuant thereto, the abova-antltled parties do stipulate and agree aa. follows. 
On or about April 9, 2006, Sharon C. Cavenagh, hereinafter referred to as 
Claimant. suffered an industrial eccldent arising out of and In the course of her 
employment with St Luke's Regiona' MedICal Center, hereinafter referred to es 
Self-Insured Employer. 
On the date of the accident, the Employer was aelf-insured for liability 
under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. The Employer, 
Surety and the Industrial Commission of the Stete of Idaho received edequate and 
timely notice of the eccident end injury. 
At the time of seid ecoldent. Clalment was 60 years of age. divorced, and 
had two children under the age of 18. aalmant worked part-time as a night Ihlft 
nursing supervisor and earned $28.27 per hour. In the accident of April 9, 2006, 
Claiment was walking through the Administration offICe when she tripped end fell 
over a garbage can, ceusing injury including e frlCtUfe of her 'eft upper arm. 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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Claimant sought Immediate medical treatment in the emergency department 
of St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. Claimant's x-rays indicated comminuted 
fracture of the proximal left humerus. 
At the time of this injury. Claimant was recovering from a decompression 
and rotator cuff repeir of her left shoulder and was working with restrictions of no 
lifting. pushing or pulling more than 25 pounds and no overhead work with her 
left arm. Claimant was waaring a sling on her left arm. 
Claimant was avaluated in the emergency depertment of St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center on April 10. 2008 for complainte of left ahoulder psin. 
left cheat pain and left hend pain. Claimant noted that she hed had a work 
related injury after failing over a trash can and landing onto her left shouldar and 
sustaining a proximal humerus fracture of tha left shoulder. Claimant hed been 
placed in a shoulder Immobilizer. Claiment was treated and diagnosed with a 
humerus fracture and a chest wall contusion. 
Claimant was evaluated by Dr. George Nicola on April 12. 2006, in follow 
up 01 her 'aft rotator cuff rapair. Claimant noted that sha had falten over a trash 
can and had sustained a slightly comminuted fracture of har proximal humarus 
with a fracture line that went up into the greater tuberOSity. None of them were 
displaced significantly. On examination Claimant's neurovasculer exam was 
intact. Claimant was plaCed in a sling and awathe. Claimant was asked to return 
for x-rays in one wsek. Claimant was preacribed Dllaudid and Soma. Clelment 
was taken off work through April 20, 2006. due to the fracture. 
Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola on April' 20, 2006, for post-operatlve 
follow-up. Claimant's shoulder was vary stiff and sora. Dr. Nicola opined that 
sha WIS developing pain shoulder syndrome. Claimant's 'aft shoulder x-ray 
looked good and the fracture was unchanged. Claimant was r.ferred to St. 
Luke's Elks for a fairly vigorous course of physical therapy. Claiment was 
provided a release to return to modified work in nursing servicas in a supervisory 
position. Claimant was edvised not to drive. 
Claimant sought traatment in the emergency dapartment of St.' Luke's 
Regional Medical Canter on April 23. 2006. tor complalnta of 'eft elbow awelling 
and redness. Clalment waa diagnosed with acute cellulitla of the left elbow along 
With arm pain. Claimant was prescribed Levaquin and released to follow-up with 
Dr. Nicola. 
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola in follow-up on April 24. 2008 for evaluation of 
har left elbow. It was noted that she had been aeen in the emargency room for 
obvious cellulitis noted over the olecranon burse. most likely due to rubbing in the 
sling. Claimant was on Levaquin. • Claimant's redneas and awelling were 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT. RELEASE AND LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT, AND 
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decr.ased with a less defined bord.r. Claimant was advised to r.maln out of the 
sling and rest h.r elbow. Claimant was prescribed Tramadol. Claimant was kept 
off work through April 28, 200fl. 
Claimant participated in physical therapy for passive rang. of motion with 
St. Luk.'s Idaho Elks Rehabilitation from April 26, 2008 through July 12. 2006. 
On April 27. 2006, Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola for follow up. It was 
noted that Claimant was making slow progress and wu doing batter. The plan 
was to continue her with a range of motion and edema-control program. Claimant 
was returned to modified duty of light assist with hat left arm, I ••• , computer and 
writing. Claimant was rastricted from uss of her lett shoulder. Use of hat lett 
hand. arm and elbow w.re encouraged. Claimant was prescribed Vlcodln and 
Zoffan. Claimant was edvis.d not to drlv •• 
Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola on May 11, 2006 in follow up. Claimant 
hed made a remarkable improvement with hat hand/shoulder syndrom.. Dr. 
Nicola was plaased with her progress. Claimant was pr.scribed Norco. 
Claimant's physical therapy was continued and ehe was ral.asad to modified duty 
of light use of h.r I.tt hand, i .•.• comput.r and paperwork and no Ilttlng with h.r 
I.tt arm. 
On May 18, 2008, Claimant r.turned to Dr. Nicola for follow-up of her laft 
shoulder. Claimant' a sting wes removed and ah. w.s aHowed full rang. of 
motion. Claimant's pain appearad to be lasaaning, her motion wes better and her 
str.ngth was improved. Claimant was advised to Increase her activity including 
driving. Claimant complained that driving wa. difficult. It wss noted that 
Claimant had some abdominal complaints Including a recant episode of 
pancreatitis. Claimant was prescribed Zofran and Norco. Claimant was releasad 
to modified duty of no lifting greater than two pounds with her left arm. 
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola in follow up on May 2&. 2006, for stiffness in her 
shoulder. Claimant noted her pain was decreased and her hand swelling and 
stiffness wer. .xcellent. Claiment was referred for a fairly vigorous shoulder 
rehabilitation cours.. Claimant was prescribed Norco. Claimant wa. out of her 
shoulder sling and doing well. Claimant wu relaased to modified duty of no 
overhead lifting and no littlng greater than 2& pounda with hat lett shoulder. 
On June 8. 2006. Claimant raturned to Dr. Nicola for fOllow up. Claimant 
continued to experiance aome decrsesed motion of the shoulder. but minimal 
complaint.. Dr. Nicola opined that the shoulder would gradually loosen up. 
Claimsnt was stili having problems with her hand including stiffness. Claimant 
was able to flex her finders until she was approximately one Inch from the paim 
and complained of some pain and swelling In the metecerpal Joints. Dr. Nicola 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT, RElEASE AND LUMP SUM seTTLEMENT, AND 
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opined that some of her hand 8weiling was preexi8tlng arthritis, although she hed 
some stiffnes. snd psln from the shoulderlhsnd syndrome. Dr. Nicola Indicated 
that patiants who hIve some preexi8tlng erthritls tend to teke longe, to recover, 
Claimant notad a new problem of right knee prepatellar bursitis. Claimant claimed 
this was due to her work accident. Claimant and her sister claimad this first 
sterted in May. Dr. Nicola stated, ..... IS a rule. if tha patlant were to develop a 
prepatellar bursitis from a direct fall. the ewelling should be immediate.· Dr. 
Nicola advised Claimant to ice and wrap tha knee. He noted that she may need a 
surgical debridement or aspiration. Dr. Nicola referred Claimant to Dr. Monte 
Moore for II second opinion as her symptoms were "tanding to drag out ..... 
Claimant was prlScribed Norco. Claimant WIS refeased to retum to modified duty 
of light use of her left upper extremity. no use of her 'eft hend above cheat 
height. and no kneeling or squatting. 
In a 'etter to Claimant's self-insured employer dated June 8. 2006. Dr. 
Nicola provided the history obtained from Clalment that she had fellan on all 
fours. striking both knees. Clalment stated that sha did not report the knee. but 
that it began hurting immediately. Dr. Nicola edded. "Obviously, in spite of what 
Ms. Cavenagh (sic:! state. in terms of her injury. a patient who does not complain 
of knee pain or swelling, and there Is no history of knee pain for fiva weeks post 
injury from an industrial Injury, suggests that the swelling may be from aomathing 
other than the circumstances of her" fall of O4-OS'()6." Dr. Nicola added that 
prepatellar bursitis can be due to a number of factors including a fall onto the 
kne .. , chronic kneeling on the knees. and sometim.. due to no cause 
whatsoever. Dr. Nicola added that a flv .. week lag between the time Claimant fell 
and when the swelling was noted suggested that It was not due to the InjUly. Dr, 
Nicola agreed that Dr. Wei .. at St. Luke's Occupational Health would be 
appropriate for a second opinion evaluation In thla matter. 
Claimant saw Dr. Nicola In follow up on June 22, 2006. Claimant noted 
that sha WIS doing batter. Her hand range of motion WIS much improved. She 
complained of some bruising of her shouldar, but it was not visible. Claimant 
noted some continued stiffne .. mainly In abduction at approximately 46 degr .... 
External rotation was graduelly improving. Claimant notad that at that point het 
knees wara not a problem. Claimant stated that her knees were aggravated when 
she was kneeling, which Dr. Nicola edvised her not to do. Dr. Nicola added that 
Claimant did not need any further treatment for her knees. Claimant was 
complaining of soma radicular symptoms In ulnar distribution with a positive 
Tine"s at the elbow. which he did not think was directly related to her industrial 
condition. Dr. Nicola ordered Claimant an elbow pad. Claimant was prescribed 
Lyrica. Dr. Nicola noted that Claimant was scheduled to ... Dr. Weiss. 
Claimant was evaluatad by Michaef Weiss, M.D., on June 28, 2006, for 
complaints of pain in he, ulnar hand, beginning at her elbow with weakn ... in her 
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hand. Claimant also notad aching and sharp pain in her shoulders with limited 
range of motion. Claimant related the onset of this to her trip and fsll work injury 
of 04119/06 IsiC) when she fractured her 'eft arm. Claimant noted her pain as 
5110. C'aimant's left elbow lacked 10 dagrees of full extension. Cleimant's grip 
strength was 55 pounds right and 18 pounds left, Claimant's sansation was 
decreased to light touch in the ulnar distribution of the 'eft hand. Claimant was 
diagnosed with status POst left rotator cuff taar and repair. status POst arm 
fracture, complicated by catlulitis, and 'eft ulnar neuropathy I secondary to the arm 
fracture. Claimant hed r .. ponded well to Lyrica, which tanded to support a 
neuropathic problem. Claimant w .. referred for electtodiagnostlc tasting of the 
left upper extremity. Claimant w.. released to modified work with no lifting 
above shoulder level. limited forceful gripping. no repetitive use of har left hand 
and lifting or pushing limited to tan pounds. 
Claimant underwent an electrodiagnostlc examinetion on July 12. 2006. 
Claimant was diagnosed with possible subacute to chronic left ulna, axonal 
neuropathy. 
On July 19. 2006, Dr. W .... provided Claimant with work restriotiona 
including that she could lift. push and pull up to 25 pounds with her 'eft arm. 
In a July 20, 2006 letter to the salf-Insured employer, Dr. Nicola noted that 
x-rays of Claiment·. left shoulder showed a well-healed fractur.. Th.te wa. no 
avidenc. of Significant problem.. There was a aUght deformity noted of thl 
greater tuberosity, but that was certainly reeaonable at thia time and should not 
result in any restriction or disability. In review of Dr. Weiss' nerve conduction 
study. it showed possible subacute to chronic left ulnar neuropathy, but appeared 
to be chronic in nature. Dr. Nicola opined thet Claimant may have had a flare-up 
in a preexisting ulnar neuropathy due to the sw .. ling and edema In her upper 
extremity, which should respond well to conservative treatment. CI"mant had 
done fairly well on Lyrlca and her nerve conduction atudy showed a mild ulnar 
neuropathy. Or. Nicola opined that this w .. greduelly Improving and continuing 
to Improve. Or. Nicola did not recommend any treatment. Dr. Nicola disagreed 
with Dr. W"ss' suggestion of modified work activity with lifting or pushing with 
the left arm limited to 10 pounds. Dr. Nicola recommended Claimant do forceful 
gripping and repatitlve use of the hand, as he thought the Initial problemS with the 
hand were due to disuse and use should be encouraged as much .. posaible. 
Claimant was provided a release to return to modified duty with lifting, pushing 
and pulling up to 25 pounds with har teft arm. 
Claimant returned to Dr. Wei .. on August 2. 2006. Claimant w .. doing 
w,,1 on Lyrica. Claimant continued to have somewhat decre .. ed range of motion. 
Claimant's grip strangth hed improved with 50 pounds right 25 pounds left. 
Sensation remained decreased to the left ulner hand. Dr. Wei .. noted that 
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Claimant should do well on the membrane stabilizing medlcationa which w.re 
racommendad for at least three montha. Claimant WII prater/bed Neurontin. 
Claimant's light duty work WII continued and sha was asked to return In one 
month for follow-up. . 
Claimant returned to Dr. Wei .. on August 16, 200fS. Claimant noted that 
har shoulder was not both.ring her. Claimant noted that Neurontin cauted double 
vision and difficulty during long work days. Claimant rated her pain as 411 0 from 
her elbow distally. On examination Claimant's senaatlon wa. dlCr.ated in her 
ulnar left hind. Dr. Weill noted, "Generally neuropathiee ara not conaldered 
work related unle •• thl. Is related to her surgery In soma way." Dr. WeiSa 
raferrad Claimant for a neurology consult and prncribed Claimant Nortriptyline. 
Claimant'a work restrictions ware continued unchanged. 
Claimant raturned to Dr. Nicola on August 17, 2006 in follow up. Claimant 
was doing fairly wall with regard to her shoulder. It was noted that har main 
problam wa. stiffna.. and pain in her hand. but her shouldar w.. doing wa" 
without any significant difficulty. Ovarall. Dr. Nicola opined that he did not ... 
any faason for changa In treetment. Or. Nicola opined that Claimant hed ,eeched 
maximum medical Improvement of her 'houlder. Claimant wa, returned to 
modified work of no h.avy lifting and no forcaful gripping with her left hand. 
On October 5. 2006, Claimant returned to Dr. Nicola in follow up. 
Claimant was doing fairly well. On examination Claimant', shoulder showed mild 
limitation of motion, which Dr. Nicola attributed .. much to her rotator cuff repair 
as to her shoulder fractura. Claimant' a neurovascular axam w.. IntlCt. 
Claimant's hind looked graat. Claimant wa. mls.lng a vary amall amount of full 
flexion into tha palm but doing well. Claimant we. teking Amitriptyline and 
Neuront;n. Ovarall, Claimant w •• continuing to improve. 
In a .... detId Nov ... 13, 2001, Dr, Neall ....... CIeInwIlhld 
.re.chId IMXImwn IMCIIcaI ..,.,.., __ tor .. left tuMNe ".... • of 
.~ 17. 2001. 'The _____ of ClUllMc'e .... ~
twit ,...",.. to Nee . Dr . ..... opIMd dIM ... a I~ ..... 
. J*8Oft ~. ,... with IO~ ..,..,... ........... ,..., QIIf , 
.... 2 .•• ~ .,."... IniPllmwtt ,.... to .. AprIl I, 200e WOftt 1$rY. 
Or. ..... diet 0IIrMnt WOUld not MId .., UIMr ....... for ... 
won l..-v. Dr. Nicola opined that Claimant did not hev. any permanent 
restriction. related to tha work injury. Claiment WII restricted from heavy 
overh .. d lifting due to har rotator cuff te.r which wa. not work related. 
On NowmW 14. 2001, ........................... '11111 .. . 
. ...., October I, 2001 ... to Dr. ........ CllllMnt'I ....... __ .,.. 
~ evaIunion. Dr. NIoaIe OOI.lIin_ CIIIIMM ........... ........ 
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.. 
m .. icallmprovement from her left burRenIa fI' ... of AprI I, 20M .. of ... 
8XacerDltion of her "eexieting ulnar~. ClalmlM" ~ a '" 
wI'Iola peraon Impalrmlnt rating. 
Claimant's Pllt medical history iS81gnlflcant for a September 4,2003 right 
rotator cuff repair by Dr. George Nicola, pancreatitis. lapneole. gastrojejunostomy. 
pyloroplesty end multiple myeloma. 
Claimant had a laft shoulder Injection by Or. GlOrge Nicola following the 
onset of very significant impingement and pain on December 22, 2001. 
Claimant underwent decompression and rotator cuff repair of her 'eft 
shoulder by Dr. George Nicole on February 18.2008. 
Pertinent m .. lcal records are attached to the original Agreemant es exhibit 
There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the 
partles as to the degree, If any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need 
for retraining, and the need for future medical benefItS. 
Claimant and Defendant, desiring to settle the controversiaa in an amicable 
way and to avoid the cost and delay of litigation of this claim and to buy their 
pasce, have enterad into a settlement egreement which is acceptable to Claimant 
and to the Defendant and which ia in the best interest of the partles. By rauon 
of said settlement agreement, the parties hereto desire to Iettle and foraver 
conclude Claimant's rights under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of 
Idaho. "Claimant has offered to accept and the Defendant hal offered to pay the 
sum of $3,099.00. aa itemized beloW, es full and flnal,attlement of Claimant's 
claim. The partie, agrae that settlement 18 in tha best Interast, of the parties. 
It ia stipuleted end agreed thet the aforementioned settlemant consideration 
includes 10SI of wage earning capacity and non·medical factorl, should such 
exist. 
The parties waive any Findings of Fact and Conclusiona of Law es part of 
the conaideratlon for thil agreement. Claimant hereto specifically and exprasa!y 
waives all rights to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided for undar 
Idaho Coda 172·718. 
In processing this claim. medicel expanses in the amount of $10,289.00 
have been incurred by Claimant and paid by the Self-Insured Employer aa Itemized 
below: 
~: 
Americana - Occupational Health 
Occupational Medicine and Rehabilitation 
Orthopedic Fracture Clinic 
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St. Luke's Meridian Medical Centar 
~V'Ic'l Therapy: daho 11($ Rehab Hospital 
MjlCelianeou~: 
Boise City.xi. Inc. 
Bolsa Radiology Group 
Casa Management Services of Idaho 
Sharon Cavanaugh - mileage 








• 8158.70 $ 42.60 
'1,717.44 
• 152.24 $ 73.10 
• 24.80 13.lli:lt 
'10,289.00 
CLAIMANT UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES 
NOT ITEMIZED AS BEING PAID ARE HER RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UPON 
APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE DEFENDANT WILL HAVE NO FURTHER 
RESPONSIBILITY FORMEDlCAL EXPENSES INCURRED TO DATE OR TO BE 
INCURRED IN THE FUTURE, EXCEPT AS HEREIN BEFORE PROVIDED. 
Claimant hereby attests that 11 she is not currantly on Medicare; end 21 
does not expect to be on Medicare in 30 months and that she deas not have a 
settfement of over '250,000.00 Claimant attests that naither she nor any of her 
medical providers to her knowledge received Medicare benefits, 88 provided under 
42 USC Section 1395, as a result of the work-related Injuries sustslned on AprIl 
9. 2006. sat forth heraln. 
The parties hereby recognize that errors running to the benefit of either 
partY may have basn made in the benefit computatlons while procaeslng 
Claimant's claim end heteby ag .... end atipulete that the lump sum conalcleretion 
to be paid upon approval of thla agreement takes Into account an such errors 
found in the accounting and further atipulete and agree that the Induatrial 
Commission is empowered to make any necaasary corrections In the accounting 
without the necessity of any party creating an eddendum. 10 long 88 the amount 
to be paid Claimant, $3,099.00. is not sffected. 
An itemization of Claimant's clalm as required by the Induatrial Commission 
is as follOWS: 
TotaI~ftlbfflty BwfJq. 4n1t04T166 
(2 weeks & 5 days (I $1508.50/wkl 
'-t:!; T~ DtubI!Ity Btnef!tt. hlbit"8" 
4/28/06 to 5/13106 
(2 weeks & 2 days ., various/wkl 
.1,380.20 
• 120.12 
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P~YIicllImptlnntnt-
• ·Ie~ (12.6 weeks 0 t310.7S/wlt) 
Lump ~ COQIIdtratIo"" (lnCUCf .. any decreased wage earning 
capacity. non-medical factors and 
permanent partial disability, if anyl 
TOTAL: 
~O Pr.vlous'y Paid: 
PTO Previously Paid: 
PPI~P.b 
AMOUNT DOl! CLAIMANT 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND com: 
A. Attpmey tees am" to US 
B. Costs taken prior to L$S 
C. Addltiona! enpmey fus to be 
taken from LSS 
O. Additional COstl to be taken 
from L$S 
g;"IZEP USl£'in0~ANDING MtlDICALS 011 deduct eum aettJerMntI 
emount due ClaImant 
E. iota! of Outstlrt:; Medica!. 
o be deducted lump eum IMIttIementi 
amount due ClaImant 
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· . 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subuaet Line. C • D relating 
to attorney fees, and Line E 
relating to outstanding 
medlcals, from the tetal 
amount due Claimant of this 
LSS) 
2301.20 
The panie. acknowledge that the nature and extent of this Injury, 
temporary and pemanent penial disability, pefl"IIanent impairment, medical and 
ralated expense. In this matter Bre uncertain and may be continuing or 
progreuive and may exceed thou hereinbefore set forth, and the above shall not 
limit the acope of thia agreement or the order of diachlll'ge entered by the 
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and Include all rights and 
claims to all permanent and temporary compensation and all medical and ralated 
benefitS whether or not known, harein listed, discovered or contemplated by the 
pertles, except ss herein before specifically provided. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and subject to the 
approval of this entire agreement by the Induatrial Commiaaion of the Stata of 
Idaho, the parties hereby stipulate and ag,ee that the Commlsaion may make and 
anter its order approving a lump sum aattlarnant of this claim by the payment to 
Claimant by the Self-Insured Employer of the sum of $3,099.00. 
IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that this payment is in full and finel 
settlement and release of all claims of Cleimant, har heirs and reprssantatives. for 
compensation for total and partial temporary disability, medical IXpenSSS, both 
past and future, speCific indemnity for permanant disability, decreesed wage 
earning capacity, and any and all claims which Claimant and her heirs now have 
or may have against tha Defendant in the future on account of such accident 
snd/or injury under the worke,'. compensation laws of the State of Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED thet the Defandant Self-Insured 
Employer shall pay the sum within thirty dey. following their receipt of the 
approved snd conformed copy of thia antire agreement. Any Intereat allowable 
under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the Stata of Idaho will not begin to 
accrue until after the thirty-day period. 
IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED, STIPULATED AND AGREED that Claimant 
undarstands that by antering into this agreement, and upon Ita approval by the 
Industrial Commission. her compensation cisims and all rights In connection 
therewith will be finally and forever settled and closed and that she will be foraver 
berred from reopening this claim or otherwise claiming additional compensation 
benefits on account of such accident andlor injury. 
Claimant does agree to INDEMNIFY. DEFEND and HOLD ST. LUKE'S 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER HARMLESS from and against any further claim for 
benefit which Is, Of may be, psyable pursuant to the Worker's Compensation 
Laws of the State of Idaho and which arose out of or Is related to said accident 
and/or Injury. This indemnification and hold harmless agreement shall In no way 
inure to the benefit of any third perty or any party not herein specifically named. 
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IT IS FURTHER REPRESENTED AND AGREED by the pertle. that it ,. in their 
beat intereats that this claim be finally and foraver settled, satisfied and 
diacharged, and the perties hereto acknowledge that thi. agreement is mede at 
Claimant's requeat snd is the acceptance of her offer by the Defendant. Claimant 
acknowledges that she has carefully read this agreement and lagal Instrument In 
Its entiraty, has received the edvlce of har counsei, and that she underatsnds Ita 
contents and has signed the same knowing that this agreement forever concludee 
and fully diaposes of any end all claims of any kind and character that sha has or 
may have against the Defanctant on account of the above Injuries. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
"f2' II.: ... 
County of f2!?HH,,,;/>'( I 
SElNIGERLAW OFFICES. P.A. 
By~~ 
A meya for Claimant 
ST. LUKE'S REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER. 
SaIt·lnsured Employer 
SHARON C. CAVANAGH, being first duly sworn upon oath. deposes and 
saya: 
That aha ia the Claimant in the abovtHntitied claim; 
That aha has r .. d the foregoing lump sum agreement, knows the contents 
thereof and Mliavea tha .. me to be true to the Mat of her knowledge. 
~>C1t~ 
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oapES OF APPftOYAL AND DISCHARGE 
UPQN LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
The foregoing stlpulatlon, egreement end patltlon having duly end regularly 
come before this Commlulon, and It appearing that the Interests of juStice and 
tha best intaresta of tha partlH herein ara, and will be, served by approving thla 
egreement granting the ordar of discharge as preyed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the foregoing lltipulatlon and agreement shall be and 
the same harein is approved, and further. the above-entltled proceedings are 
hereby dismiued and concluded with prejudice. 
L. ' 
DATED this 10"" day of ot>lU.O, .2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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The Commission's Directly Conflicting Interpretations of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 
THIS CASE 
"The net effect of these new regulatory provisions is 
to continue to ensure that the attorney fees 
approved in workers' compensation cases can 2.Ol¥. 
be taken from funds which the attorney's efforts 
"directly succeeded in obtaining on (his) client's 
behalf." Intervener - Respondent's Brief at 20. 
Emphasis supplied. 
"Importantly, a charging lien can Q.!Jll: attach to 
available funds where it is demonstrated that the 
services of the attorney operated "primarily or 
substantially" to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.)" Decision in Kulm. AR 148. 
Emphasis supplied. 
Commission's Application of 
17.02.08.033.01 to its own Hypothetical in 
Kulm. AR 219-223 
Analysis; step 1 • "Available 
Eu.mIi: (Claim accepted and benefits paid 
before atty is retained) After atty is 
retained, atty writes doctor and 
requests impairment rating when 
claimant is at max. med. 
improvement. Doctor responds to 
request, sends impairment rating, 
which surety pays without dispute = 
"available funds" 
AnalYSis; Step 2· "Charging 
um: 
No attorneys fees "[a]ttorney's 
actions probably would not be 
sufficient to demonstrate that his 
actions "substantially" secured the 
PPI award, since attorney's efforts 
were not, in the main, or essentially, 
responsible for obtaining the PPI 
award. There was no dispute that 
claimant had suffered a significant 
injury, and there was no dispute that 
she was going to be entitled to some 
type of an impairment rating. There 
was no evidence that surety 
contested the rating eventually given 
by the treating physician." AR-
231-232. Em hasis su lied. 
r 




Commission's April 28, 2011 I nterpretation of I DAPA 
17.02.08.033 in unpublished opinion designated as 
order 
Facts: Attorney took funds from PPI while it was 
being paid but PPI benefits were not primarily or 
I
substantially to secured by the attorney. 
Rodriguez Order at 1-3 
Analysis; step 1· "Ayailable Funds" 
The PPI benefits are "available funds". 
Rodriguez Order at 4. 
Analysis; step 2 • "Charging Lien" 
A "charging lien" attached to the PPI benefits 
because the fund of medical benefits was paid 
(without dispute) after the atty met with the 
claimant's doctor and translated. Rodriguez 
Order at 5. Parenthetical supplied. 
Contradictory Reasoning : 
"A charging lien may be asserted by 
counsel against claimant's right to any 
compensation where it is shown that .. 
the services of the attorney operated 
"primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be 
paid." Rodriguez Order at 5. 
. Yet the Commission concludes: "Counsel 
i is entitled to a fee on medical benefits, but 
I cannot obtain payment from that source. 
I However, the chargjng lien that has been 
L established by Counsel, attaches to 
"available funds." in this case, the PPI 
~ previously paid to Claimant, and 
from which Counsel has previously taken 
fees." Rodriguez Order at 5. 
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What Attorney Fee Arrangements Are Allowed In A Workers 
Compensation Case lUI! When Must You Seek Approval? 
Scope of IDAPA 
10.02.08.033.02 
All requests for approval 
are deemed requests for 
"charging lien" 
Required: 
In any proposed lump 
. sum settlement ... 
Upon request of the 
Commission 
Regulation does not cover: 
Situations where no 
"Charging Lien" is sought 
Situations where fees are 
to be taken other than 
from "available funds" 
Attorneys fees in 
non-contingent 
arrangements 
Approval of attorneys fees 
incurred by Defendants 
IDAPA "Fee Agreement" 
Provisions 
IDAPA 10.02.08.033.01.d. 
"Fee agreemenf' means a 
written document 
evidencing an agreement 
between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with 




"Reasonable" means that 
an attorney's fees are 
consistent with the fee 
agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available 
funds, subject to the 
element of 
reasonableness contained 
in IRPC 1.5 
APPENDIX 
Questions Unanswered 
By IDAPA 10.02.08.033 
When do you need to 
seek approval of fees on 
benefits paid by 
agreement other than on 
approval of a lump sum 
agreement? 
What standards Apply To 
Fees Where No Charging 
Lien Is Sought? 





Are Fee Agreements 
Enforceable or Just a 
Limitation on an Equitable 
Right to Compensation? 
Regulation contemplates 
Contracts, not just 
equitable relief 
Lawyers are apparently 
required to have a written 
fee agreement 
Relationship Between 
Contract And Equttable 
Principals 
Are Equitable Principles A 
Limitation On The 
Contract Or An Alternative 
Remedy? 
Can A Fee Greater Than 
Contract Rate Be Ordered 
By The Commission On 
Equitable Grounds? 
What aspect of IDAPA 
10.02.08.033 either 
requires or prohibits 
requests for approval of 
fees other than with 
respect to a charging lien? 
Is there are right to collect 
fees without approval? 
What Attorney Fee Arrangements Are Allowed In A Workers Compensation Case and When Must You Seek 
Approval 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






SEBS CORPORATION INC., ) IC 2006-503175 
) 
Employer, ) 
) ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) 
and ) 
) FI LED 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) APR 28 2011 ) 
Surety, ) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Defendants. ) 
) 
This matter came before the Industrial Commission pursuant to the Commission's 
February 25, 2011, Order on Reconsideration, and pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(b), for 
the purpose of entertaining evidence and argument of Counsel in support of his claim for an 
award of attorney's fees in the amount of $20,000.00 on an approved Jump sum settlement. This 
Order supersedes the Commission's December 13, 2010, Order Approving In Part Modified 
Lump Sum Agreement, and the January 19,2011, Order Releasing Final Proceeds to the extent 
those orders treat the issue of Counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth 
below, we approve Counsel's request for attorney's fees on the lump sum settlement. 
On or about January 23, 2006, Claimant suffered a severe urethral injury as the result of a 
compensable accident/injury. benefits were paid On or about 
February 16, 2006, Claimant retained the services of Breck Barton, Counsel herein. Claimant 
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eventually underwent urethral reconstruction surgery performed by Dr. Taylor. This surgery was 
not successful. Claimant continued to have pain and difficulty urinating. As well, he developed 
g;fU;!~~J;J Dr. TaylotdeclamdClmmant ll'Mlically stable. and entitled to a 
opklion. and. &egan pay.Jn.ent of 
At 2006 rates, a 34% impairment rating equates to $52,827.50. Over 
As 
well, he took costs in the amount of $3,000.00. 
Dr. Taylor rendered his opinion on Claimant's 
impairment at the request of Surety. Surety accepted Dr. Taylor's opinion, and commenced the 
payment of the rating. Although Counsel requested a rating from Dr. Taylor, that request was 
not made until after Dr. Taylor had already rated Claimant. 
Shortly after Surety commenced the payment of the PPI rating, Claimant and Counsel 
met with Dr. Taylor. Claimant does not speak English. Counsel is fluent in Spanish. Claimant 
and Counsel explained to Dr. Taylor that Claimant continued to have severe urethral discomfort, 
incontinence and testicular pain. Dr. Taylor was evidently impressed enough with these 
complaints, which he had apparently not fully comprehended, that he arranged for additional 
medical consultation/treatment for Claimant, notwithstanding that he had only recently declared 
Claimant medically stable. Claimant eventually underwent further surgical therapy, to include 
treatment by a noted regional expert on urethral reconstruction. Claimant obtained an excellent 
surgical result. It is clear that because of Counsel's efforts in meeting with Claimant and Dr. 
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Taylor, Claimant received additional successful medical therapy valued in excess of 
$125,000.00, along with attendant TID and travel benefits. In total, Counsel was primarily or 
substantially responsible for securing additional medical, travel and TID benefits valued at 
$139,570.94. By far, the largest portion of these additional benefits was paid directly to 
Claimant's medical providers by Surety, after Surety agreed to provide the prospective care that 
had been recommended by Dr. Taylor and the experts with whom he consUlted. 
These facts set up an interesting conundrum. Counsel took a $10,341.41 attorney fee on 
a PPI award which he did not "primarily or substantially" secure, yet he is unable to take a fee on 
the over $125,000.00 of medical benefits he secured for Claimant following Dr. Taylor's 
premature pronouncement of Claimant's medical stability in September 2006. Although Counsel 
was primarily and/or substantially responsible for securing this treatment, there is no way for 
Counsel to obtain payment following Surety's agreement to provide the requested care: Payment 
for services goes directly to the providers who can, perhaps, be forgiven for insisting that they 
receive full payment for the services that they intend to provide, without deduction by 
Claimant's Counsel for the services that he provided in obtaining Surety's agreement to provide 
to be paid, However, closer scrutiny of the provisions of the applicable regulation reveals that 
under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it was appropriate for Counsel to take a fee against 
the non-disputed PPI award, in order that Counsel should obtain compensation for the service he 
rendered in connection with the prospective medical care eventually authorized by Surety. 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.80 defines available funds as follows: 
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall 
not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's 
agreement to retain the attorney. 
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Available funds do not include, inter'alia, workers' compensation benefits that 
were not disputed prior to Counsel's retention, Here, Counsel was retained on February 16, 
2006. At that point, Claimant was still receiving medical treatment and was stiU in a period of 
17ebmary 16, 2006. Of course, Claimant did become medically stable in September 2006, at least 
per Dr. Taylor, and Surety did accept, without dispute, the impairment rating given by Dr. 
Taylor. 
was ."llI''''''-y, That issue had not yet come into existence. Tberefm'e,. we 
conclude that the PPI award .of$S2.827~SO 
applicable regulation. 
Next, we must ascertain whether Counsel's charging lien can attach to those available 
funds in order to satisfy Counsel's claim for attorneys fees. Like the term "available funds," the 
term "charging lien" is a term of art, and is defined at IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.01.c. as follows: 
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the 
Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to 
demonstrate that: 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable 
principles; 
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n. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure 
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid; 
iii. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds 
rather than from the client; 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the 
case through which the fund was raised; and 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and 
application of the charging lien. 
For purposes of the instant inquiry, attention is first directed to the provisions of subpart 
(c)(ii). A charging lien may be asserted by counsel against claimant's right to any compensation 
where it is shown that . . . the services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially to 
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." Assuredly. Counsel's actions were 
initially, and in the main, responsible for securing over $125,000.00 in medical benefits for his 
client See, Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC 2006-012770 (filed May 20, 2010). As well, 
Counsel certainly "seeks" to be paid out of the medical benefits he obtained for Claimant. The 
problem, of course, is that Counsel can "seek" payment from these benefits, yet never obtain a 
nickeL Again, those benefits were paid directly by Surety to Claimant's medical providers who, 
themselves, have an interest in being paid. mtitled to '\1 on medicallJeneftts" but 
~tithedby 
and 
provisions of II J ,. ... ,.. 
attorney's fee, 
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We to pomt out that 
PPI award, hil claimwoultibetienied. Although the PPI award does 
constitute "available funds," Counsel did nothing to ''primarily or substantially" to secure that 
award. Therefore, if the only issue before us was Counsel's entitlement to a fee on that award, 
we would be constrained to deny Counsel's claim. HOYlfWer ... here. Counsel "'$eeks'*i) bepaiti 
In accordance with the forgoing. the fees that Counsel has previously taken against the 
PPI award, in the amount of $10,341.41, along with previously taken costs in the amount of 
$3,000.00, are approved. As well, Counsel's request for fees in the amount of $8,65859, 
proposed to be taken against lump sum consideration of $24,000.00, is likewise approved, as are 
costs ofS928.42. We note that Counsel's efforts were primarily andlor substantially responsible 
for securing benefits with a value of $139,570.94. At the allowed 25% rate, Counsel is actually 
entitled to an award of $37,892.74. However, his past and current fees total only $20,000.00, 
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In accordance with the foregoing. the sum of $9,587.01, which was the subject of the 
Commission's January 19,2011, Order Releasing Final Proceeds, is hereby released to Counsel, 
ill accordance with this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 




Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
R.D. ~ynard, Co ~sionet 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the tlf day of ~r; f , 2011 a true and correct copy of 
the Notice of Video Conference on Attorney's F es was served by regular Umted States upon 
the following: 
BRECK H BARTON 
POBOX 100 
REXBURG ID 83440 
amw 
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